A theoretical and computational basis for CATNETS

The main content of this report is the identification and definition of market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. These build the theoretical foundation for the work within the following two years of the CATNETS project. --Grid Computing

Theoretical and Computational Basis for Economical Ressource Allocation in Application Layer Networks - Annual Report Year 1

This paper identifies and defines suitable market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. --Grid Computing

Scalability and robustness of a market-based network resource allocation system

In this paper, we consider issues related to scalability and robustness in designing a market-based multi-agent system that allocates bandwidth in a communications network. Specifically, an empirical evaluation is carried out to assess the system performance under a variety of design configurations in order to provide an insight into network deployment issues. This extends our previous work in which we developed an application that makes use of market-based software agents that compete in decentralised marketplaces to buy and sell bandwidth resources. Our new results show that given a light to moderate network traffic load, partitioning the network into a few regions, each with a separate market server, gives a higher call success rate than by using a single market. Moreover, a trade-off in the number of regions was also noted between the average call success rate and the number of messages received per market server. Finally, given the possibility of market failures, we observe that the average call success rates increase with an increasing number of markets until a maximum is reached

A distributed auction-based algorithm to allocate bandwidth over paths

Session 01 : Scheduling and bandwidth allocationInternational audienceIn the literature, Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) double-sided auctions have been applied to inter-domain traffic exchange because they provide incentives to be truthful and lead to an efficient use of the network, among relevant properties of mechanism design. Unfortunately, the resulting resource allocation scheme is neither budget-balanced nor solvable in a decentralized way, two important properties. We present a different but more realistic auction-based algorithm for allocating bandwidth over paths to end users or ISPs, leading to a new budget-balanced pricing scheme for which allocations and charges can be computed in a decentralized way