1,351 research outputs found
Consensus-based approach to peer-to-peer electricity markets with product differentiation
With the sustained deployment of distributed generation capacities and the
more proactive role of consumers, power systems and their operation are
drifting away from a conventional top-down hierarchical structure. Electricity
market structures, however, have not yet embraced that evolution. Respecting
the high-dimensional, distributed and dynamic nature of modern power systems
would translate to designing peer-to-peer markets or, at least, to using such
an underlying decentralized structure to enable a bottom-up approach to future
electricity markets. A peer-to-peer market structure based on a Multi-Bilateral
Economic Dispatch (MBED) formulation is introduced, allowing for
multi-bilateral trading with product differentiation, for instance based on
consumer preferences. A Relaxed Consensus+Innovation (RCI) approach is
described to solve the MBED in fully decentralized manner. A set of realistic
case studies and their analysis allow us showing that such peer-to-peer market
structures can effectively yield market outcomes that are different from
centralized market structures and optimal in terms of respecting consumers
preferences while maximizing social welfare. Additionally, the RCI solving
approach allows for a fully decentralized market clearing which converges with
a negligible optimality gap, with a limited amount of information being shared.Comment: Accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Power System
Double-Sided Energy Auction in Microgrid: Equilibrium under Price Anticipation
Citation: Faqiry, M. N., & Das, S. (2016). Double-Sided Energy Auction in Microgrid: Equilibrium under Price Anticipation. Ieee Access, 4, 3794-3805. doi:10.1109/ACCESS.2016.2591912This paper investigates the problem of proportionally fair double-sided energy auction involving buying and selling agents. The grid is assumed to be operating under islanded mode. A distributed auction algorithm that can be implemented by an aggregator, as well as a possible approach by which the agents may approximate price anticipation is considered. Equilibrium conditions arising due to price anticipation is analyzed. A modified auction to mitigate the resulting loss in efficiency due to such behavior is suggested. This modified auction allows the aggregate social welfare of the agents to be arbitrarily close to that attainable with price taking agents. Next, equilibrium conditions when the aggregator collects a surcharge price per unit of energy traded is examined. A bi-objective optimization problem is identified that takes into account both the agents' social welfare as well as the aggregator's revenue from the surcharge. The results of extensive simulations, which corroborate the theoretical analysis, are reported. © 2013 IEEE
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