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Distributed Firewall For MANETs
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) are increasingly used in military tactical situations and in civil rapid-deployment networks, including emergency rescue operations and {\it ad hoc} disaster-relief networks. The flexibility of MANETs comes at a price, when compared to wired and basestation-based wireless networks: MANETs are susceptible to both insider (compromised node) and outsider attacks due to the lack of a well-defined perimeter in which to deploy firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and other mechanisms commonly used for network access and admission control. In this paper, we define a distributed firewall architecture that is designed specifically for MANETs. Our approach harnesses and extends the concept of a {\it network capability}, and is especially suited for environments where the communicating nodes have different roles and hence different communication requirements, such as in tactical networks. Our model enforces communication restrictions among MANET nodes and services, allowing hop-by-hop policy enforcement in a distributed manner. We use a ''deny-by-default'' model where compromised nodes have access only to authorized services, without the ability to disrupt or interfere with end-to-end service connectivity and nodes beyond their local communication radius. Our simulations show that our solution has minimal overhead in terms of bandwidth and latency, works well even in the presence of routing changes due to mobile nodes, and is effective in containing misbehaving nodes
Spectrum sharing security and attacks in CRNs: a review
Cognitive Radio plays a major part in communication technology by resolving the shortage of the spectrum through usage of dynamic spectrum access and artificial intelligence characteristics. The element of spectrum sharing in cognitive radio is a fundament al approach in utilising free channels. Cooperatively communicating cognitive radio devices use the common control channel of the cognitive radio medium access control to achieve spectrum sharing. Thus, the common control channel and consequently spectrum sharing security are vital to ensuring security in the subsequent data communication among cognitive radio nodes. In addition to well known security problems in wireless networks, cognitive radio networks introduce new classes of security threats and challenges, such as licensed user emulation attacks in spectrum sensing and misbehaviours in the common control channel transactions, which degrade the overall network operation and performance. This review paper briefly presents the known threats and attacks in wireless networks before it looks into the concept of cognitive radio and its main functionality. The paper then mainly focuses on spectrum sharing security and its related challenges. Since spectrum sharing is enabled through usage of
the common control channel, more attention is paid to the
security of the common control channel by looking into its
security threats as well as protection and detection mechanisms. Finally, the pros and cons as well as the comparisons of different CR - specific security mechanisms are presented with some open research issues and challenges
Security and Privacy Issues in Wireless Mesh Networks: A Survey
This book chapter identifies various security threats in wireless mesh
network (WMN). Keeping in mind the critical requirement of security and user
privacy in WMNs, this chapter provides a comprehensive overview of various
possible attacks on different layers of the communication protocol stack for
WMNs and their corresponding defense mechanisms. First, it identifies the
security vulnerabilities in the physical, link, network, transport, application
layers. Furthermore, various possible attacks on the key management protocols,
user authentication and access control protocols, and user privacy preservation
protocols are presented. After enumerating various possible attacks, the
chapter provides a detailed discussion on various existing security mechanisms
and protocols to defend against and wherever possible prevent the possible
attacks. Comparative analyses are also presented on the security schemes with
regards to the cryptographic schemes used, key management strategies deployed,
use of any trusted third party, computation and communication overhead involved
etc. The chapter then presents a brief discussion on various trust management
approaches for WMNs since trust and reputation-based schemes are increasingly
becoming popular for enforcing security in wireless networks. A number of open
problems in security and privacy issues for WMNs are subsequently discussed
before the chapter is finally concluded.Comment: 62 pages, 12 figures, 6 tables. This chapter is an extension of the
author's previous submission in arXiv submission: arXiv:1102.1226. There are
some text overlaps with the previous submissio
A Review of the Energy Efficient and Secure Multicast Routing Protocols for Mobile Ad hoc Networks
This paper presents a thorough survey of recent work addressing energy
efficient multicast routing protocols and secure multicast routing protocols in
Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs). There are so many issues and solutions which
witness the need of energy management and security in ad hoc wireless networks.
The objective of a multicast routing protocol for MANETs is to support the
propagation of data from a sender to all the receivers of a multicast group
while trying to use the available bandwidth efficiently in the presence of
frequent topology changes. Multicasting can improve the efficiency of the
wireless link when sending multiple copies of messages by exploiting the
inherent broadcast property of wireless transmission. Secure multicast routing
plays a significant role in MANETs. However, offering energy efficient and
secure multicast routing is a difficult and challenging task. In recent years,
various multicast routing protocols have been proposed for MANETs. These
protocols have distinguishing features and use different mechanismsComment: 15 page
Anonymity networks and access to information during conflicts: towards a distributed network organisation
Access to information is crucial during conflicts and other critical events such as population uprisings. An increasing number of social interactions happen in the cyberspace, while information exchanges at the infrastructural level (monitoring systems, sensor networks, etc.) are now also based on Internet and wireless links rather than ad hoc, isolated wired networks. However, the nature of the Internet allows powerful hostile actors to block, censor, or redirect communication to and from specific Internet services, through a number of available techniques. Anonymity networks such as Tor provide a way to circumvent traditional strategies for restricting access to online resources, and make communication harder to trace and identify. Tor, in particular, has been successfully used in past crises to evade censorship and Internet blockades (Egypt in 2011, and Iran in 2012). Anonymity networks can provide essential communication tools during conflicts, allowing information exchanges to be concealed from external observers, anonymised, and made resilient to imposed traffic controls and geographical restrictions. However, the design of networks such as Tor makes them vulnerable to large-scale denial of service attacks, as shown by the DDoS targeted at Tor hidden services in March 2015. In this paper, we analyse the structural weaknesses of Tor with regard to denial of service attacks, and propose a number of modifications to the structure of the Tor network aimed at improving its resilience to a large coordinated offensive run by a hostile actor in a conflict scenario. In particular, we introduce novel mechanisms that allow relay information to be propagated in a distributed and peer-to-peer manner. This eliminates the need for directory services, and allows the deployment of Tor-like networks in hostile environments, where centralised control is impossible. The proposed improvements concern the network organisation, but preserve the underlying onion routing mechanism that is at the base of Tor's anonymity
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