508 research outputs found
Composability in quantum cryptography
In this article, we review several aspects of composability in the context of
quantum cryptography. The first part is devoted to key distribution. We discuss
the security criteria that a quantum key distribution protocol must fulfill to
allow its safe use within a larger security application (e.g., for secure
message transmission). To illustrate the practical use of composability, we
show how to generate a continuous key stream by sequentially composing rounds
of a quantum key distribution protocol. In a second part, we take a more
general point of view, which is necessary for the study of cryptographic
situations involving, for example, mutually distrustful parties. We explain the
universal composability framework and state the composition theorem which
guarantees that secure protocols can securely be composed to larger
applicationsComment: 18 pages, 2 figure
Strong and uniform convergence in the teleportation simulation of bosonic Gaussian channels
In the literature on the continuous-variable bosonic teleportation protocol
due to [Braunstein and Kimble, Phys. Rev. Lett., 80(4):869, 1998], it is often
loosely stated that this protocol converges to a perfect teleportation of an
input state in the limit of ideal squeezing and ideal detection, but the exact
form of this convergence is typically not clarified. In this paper, I
explicitly clarify that the convergence is in the strong sense, and not the
uniform sense, and furthermore, that the convergence occurs for any input state
to the protocol, including the infinite-energy Basel states defined and
discussed here. I also prove, in contrast to the above result, that the
teleportation simulations of pure-loss, thermal, pure-amplifier, amplifier, and
additive-noise channels converge both strongly and uniformly to the original
channels, in the limit of ideal squeezing and detection for the simulations.
For these channels, I give explicit uniform bounds on the accuracy of their
teleportation simulations. I then extend these uniform convergence results to
particular multi-mode bosonic Gaussian channels. These convergence statements
have important implications for mathematical proofs that make use of the
teleportation simulation of bosonic Gaussian channels, some of which have to do
with bounding their non-asymptotic secret-key-agreement capacities. As a
byproduct of the discussion given here, I confirm the correctness of the proof
of such bounds from my joint work with Berta and Tomamichel from [Wilde,
Tomamichel, Berta, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 63(3):1792, March 2017].
Furthermore, I show that it is not necessary to invoke the energy-constrained
diamond distance in order to confirm the correctness of this proof.Comment: 19 pages, 3 figure
Classical Cryptographic Protocols in a Quantum World
Cryptographic protocols, such as protocols for secure function evaluation
(SFE), have played a crucial role in the development of modern cryptography.
The extensive theory of these protocols, however, deals almost exclusively with
classical attackers. If we accept that quantum information processing is the
most realistic model of physically feasible computation, then we must ask: what
classical protocols remain secure against quantum attackers?
Our main contribution is showing the existence of classical two-party
protocols for the secure evaluation of any polynomial-time function under
reasonable computational assumptions (for example, it suffices that the
learning with errors problem be hard for quantum polynomial time). Our result
shows that the basic two-party feasibility picture from classical cryptography
remains unchanged in a quantum world.Comment: Full version of an old paper in Crypto'11. Invited to IJQI. This is
authors' copy with different formattin
Four-Round Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments from One-Way Functions
How many rounds and which assumptions are required for concurrent non-malleable commitments? The above question has puzzled researchers for several years. Pass in [TCC 2013] showed a lower bound of 3 rounds for the case of black-box reductions to falsifiable hardness assumptions with respect to polynomial-time adversaries. On the other side, Goyal [STOC 2011], Lin and Pass [STOC 2011] and Goyal et al. [FOCS 2012] showed that one-way functions (OWFs) are sufficient with a constant number of rounds. More recently Ciampi et al. [CRYPTO 2016] showed a 3-round construction based on subexponentially strong one-way permutations. In this work we show as main result the first 4-round concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme assuming the existence of any one-way function. Our approach builds on a new security notion for argument systems against man-in-the-middle attacks: Simulation-Witness-Independence. We show how to construct a 4-round one-many simulation-witnesses-independent argument system from one-way functions. We then combine this new tool in parallel with a weak form of non-malleable commitments constructed by Goyal et al. in [FOCS 2014] obtaining the main result of our work
On Statistical Security in Two-Party Computation
There has been a large body of work characterizing the round complexity of general-purpose maliciously secure two-party computation (2PC) against probabilistic polynomial time adversaries. This is particularly true for zero-knowledge, which is a special case of 2PC. In fact, in the special case of zero knowledge, optimal protocols with unconditional security against one of the two players have also been meticulously studied and constructed.
On the other hand, general-purpose maliciously secure 2PC with statistical or unconditional security against one of the two participants has remained largely unexplored so far. In this work, we initiate the study of such protocols, which we refer to as 2PC with one-sided statistical security. We settle the round complexity of 2PC with one-sided statistical security with respect to black-box simulation by obtaining the following tight results: In a setting where only one party obtains an output, we design 2PC in rounds with statistical security against receivers and computational security against senders. In a setting where both parties obtain outputs, we design 2PC in rounds with computational security against the party that obtains output first and statistical security against the party that obtains output last.
Katz and Ostrovsky (CRYPTO 2004) showed that 2PC with black-box simulation requires at least rounds when one party obtains an output and rounds when both parties obtain outputs, even when only computational security is desired against both parties. Thus in these settings, not only are our results tight, but they also show that statistical security is achievable at no extra cost to round complexity. This still leaves open the question of whether 2PC can be achieved with black-box simulation in rounds with statistical security against senders and computational security against receivers. Based on a lower bound on computational zero-knowledge proofs due to Katz (TCC 2008), we observe that the answer is negative unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses
Predictable arguments of knowledge
We initiate a formal investigation on the power of predictability for argument of knowledge systems for NP. Specifically, we consider private-coin argument systems where the answer of the prover can be predicted, given the private randomness of the verifier; we call such protocols Predictable Arguments of Knowledge (PAoK).
Our study encompasses a full characterization of PAoK, showing that such arguments can be made extremely laconic, with the prover sending a single bit, and assumed to have only one round (i.e., two messages) of communication without loss of generality.
We additionally explore PAoK satisfying additional properties (including zero-knowledge and the possibility of re-using the same challenge across multiple executions with the prover), present several constructions of PAoK relying on different cryptographic tools, and discuss applications to cryptography
Some Words on Cryptanalysis of Stream Ciphers
In the world of cryptography, stream ciphers are known as primitives used to ensure privacy over a communication channel. One common way to build a stream cipher is to use a keystream generator to produce a pseudo-random sequence of symbols. In such algorithms, the ciphertext is the sum of the keystream and the plaintext, resembling the one-time pad principal. Although the idea behind stream ciphers is simple, serious investigation of these primitives has started only in the late 20th century. Therefore, cryptanalysis and design of stream ciphers are important. In recent years, many designs of stream ciphers have been proposed in an effort to find a proper candidate to be chosen as a world standard for data encryption. That potential candidate should be proven good by time and by the results of cryptanalysis. Different methods of analysis, in fact, explain how a stream cipher should be constructed. Thus, techniques for cryptanalysis are also important. This thesis starts with an overview of cryptography in general, and introduces the reader to modern cryptography. Later, we focus on basic principles of design and analysis of stream ciphers. Since statistical methods are the most important cryptanalysis techniques, they will be described in detail. The practice of statistical methods reveals several bottlenecks when implementing various analysis algorithms. For example, a common property of a cipher to produce n-bit words instead of just bits makes it more natural to perform a multidimensional analysis of such a design. However, in practice, one often has to truncate the words simply because the tools needed for analysis are missing. We propose a set of algorithms and data structures for multidimensional cryptanalysis when distributions over a large probability space have to be constructed. This thesis also includes results of cryptanalysis for various cryptographic primitives, such as A5/1, Grain, SNOW 2.0, Scream, Dragon, VMPC, RC4, and RC4A. Most of these results were achieved with the help of intensive use of the proposed tools for cryptanalysis
Round Optimal Concurrent Non-Malleability from Polynomial Hardness
Non-malleable commitments are a central cryptographic primitive that guarantee security against man-in-the-middle adversaries, and their exact round complexity has been a subject of great interest. Pass (TCC 2013, CC 2016) proved that non-malleable commitments with respect to commitment are impossible to construct in less than three rounds, via black-box reductions to polynomial hardness assumptions. Obtaining a matching positive result has remained an open problem so far.
While three-round constructions of non-malleable commitments have been achieved, beginning with the work of Goyal, Pandey and Richelson (STOC 2016), current constructions require super-polynomial assumptions.
In this work, we settle the question of whether three-round non-malleable commitments can be based on polynomial hardness assumptions. We give constructions based on polynomial hardness of Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption or Quadratic Residuosity or Nth Residuosity, together with ZAPs. Our protocols also satisfy concurrent non-malleability
- …