Distinctive features of persuasion and deliberation dialogues

The distinction between action persuasion dialogues and deliberation dialogues is not always obvious at first sight. In this paper, we provide a characterisation of both types of dialogues that draws out the distinctive features of each. It is important to recognise the distinctions since participants in both types of dialogues will have different aims, which in turn affects whether a successful outcome can be reached. Such dialogues are typically conducted by exchanging arguments for and against certain options. The moves of the dialogue are designed to facilitate such exchanges. In particular, we show how the pre- and post-conditions for the use of particular moves in the dialogues are very different depending upon whether they are used as part of a persuasion over action or a deliberation dialogue. We draw out the distinctions with reference to a running example that we also present as a logic program in order to give a clear characterisation of the two types of dialogues, which is intended to enable them to be used more effectively within systems requiring automated communication

The Informal Logic of Mathematical Proof

Informal logic is a method of argument analysis which is complementary to that of formal logic, providing for the pragmatic treatment of features of argumentation which cannot be reduced to logical form. The central claim of this paper is that a more nuanced understanding of mathematical proof and discovery may be achieved by paying attention to the aspects of mathematical argumentation which can be captured by informal, rather than formal, logic. Two accounts of argumentation are considered: the pioneering work of Stephen Toulmin [The uses of argument, Cambridge University Press, 1958] and the more recent studies of Douglas Walton, [e.g. The new dialectic: Conversational contexts of argument, University of Toronto Press, 1998]. The focus of both of these approaches has largely been restricted to natural language argumentation. However, Walton's method in particular provides a fruitful analysis of mathematical proof. He offers a contextual account of argumentational strategies, distinguishing a variety of different types of dialogue in which arguments may occur. This analysis represents many different fallacious or otherwise illicit arguments as the deployment of strategies which are sometimes admissible in contexts in which they are inadmissible. I argue that mathematical proofs are deployed in a greater variety of types of dialogue than has commonly been assumed. I proceed to show that many of the important philosophical and pedagogical problems of mathematical proof arise from a failure to make explicit the type of dialogue in which the proof is introduced.Comment: 14 pages, 1 figure, 3 tables. Forthcoming in Perspectives on Mathematical Practices: Proceedings of the Brussels PMP2002 Conference (Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of the Sciences Series), J. P. Van Bendegem & B. Van Kerkhove, edd. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004

Commentary on: Ionana Cionea, Dale Hample, and Edward Fink\u27s Dialogue types: A scale development study

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Speech Acts and Burden of Proof in Computational Models of Deliberation Dialogue

We argue that burden of proof (BoP) of the kind present in persuasion does not apply to deliberation. We analyze existing computational models showing that in deliberation agents may answer a critique but there is no violation of the protocol if they choose not to. We propose a norm-­‐‑governed dialogue where BoP in persuasion is modeled as an obligation to respond, and permissions capture the different types of constraint observed in deliberation

In memoriam Douglas N. Walton: the influence of Doug Walton on AI and law

Doug Walton, who died in January 2020, was a prolific author whose work in informal logic and argumentation had a profound influence on Artificial Intelligence, including Artificial Intelligence and Law. He was also very interested in interdisciplinary work, and a frequent and generous collaborator. In this paper seven leading researchers in AI and Law, all past programme chairs of the International Conference on AI and Law who have worked with him, describe his influence on their work

Burdens of Proposing: On the Burden of Proof in Deliberation Dialogues

This paper considers the probative burdens of proposing action or policy options in deliberation dialogues. Do proposers bear a burden of proof? Building on pioneering work by Douglas Walton (2010), and following on a growing literature within computer science, the prevailing answer seems to be “No.” Instead, only recommenders—agents who put forward an option as the one to be taken—bear a burden of proof. Against this view, we contend that proposers have burdens of proof with respect to their proposals. Specifically, we argue that, while recommenders that Φ bear a burden of proof to show that □Φ (We should / ought to / must Φ), proposers that Φ have a burden of proof to show that ◇Φ (We may / can Φ). A burden of proposing may be defined as , which reads: Those who propose that we might Φ are obliged, if called upon, to show that Φ is possible in any of four ways which we call worldly, deontic, instrumental, and practical. So understood, burdens of proposing satisfy the standard formal definition of burden of proof

Intelligent Practical Reasoning for Autonomous Agents: An Introduction

This paper is an introduction to recent work on practical (means-end, goal-direct ed) reasoning in artificial intelligence. By using an example of community deliberation concerning whether to change to a no-fault system of insurance, it is explained how practical reasoning is used in public deliberation. It is shown how argument mapping and argumentation schemes are useful tools for modeling the structure of the argumentation in such cases. The distinction between instrumental practical reasoning and value-based practical reasoning is modeled using argumentation schemes

Teaching critical thinking virtues and vices: the case for Twelve Angry Men

In the film and play Twelve Angry Men, Juror 8 confronts the prejudices and poor reasoning of his fellow jurors, exhibiting an unwavering capacity not just to formulate and challenge arguments, but to be open-minded, stay calm, tolerate uncertainty, and negotiate in the face of considerable group pressures. In a perceptive and detailed portrayal of a group deliberation a ‘wheel of virtue’ is presented by the characters of Twelve Angry Men that allows for critical thinking virtues and vices to be analysed in context. This article makes the case for (1) the film being an exceptional teaching resource, and (2), drawing primarily on the ideas of Martha Nussbaum concerning contextualised detail, emotional engagement, and aesthetic distance, its educational value being intimately related to its being a work of fiction