Bovine respiratory disease diagnosis : what progress has been made in clinical diagnosis?

Bovine respiratory disease (BRD) complex is a worldwide health problem in cattle and is a major reason for antimicrobial use in young cattle. Several challenges may explain why it is difficult to make progress in the management of this disease. This article defines the limitation of BRD complex nomenclature, which may not easily distinguish upper versus lower respiratory tract infection and infectious bronchopneumonia versus other types of respiratory diseases. It then discusses the obstacles to clinical diagnosis and reviews the current knowledge of readily available diagnostic test to reach a diagnosis of infectious bronchopneumonia

What Can an Evolutionary Explanation Bring to The Demarcation of The Normal from The Pathological in Psychiatry? Nesse’s Case of Depression.

Randolph Nesse argues that evolutionary theory is the key element in elaborating a valid criterion demarcating the normal from the pathological in psychiatry (Nesse, 2001, 2009, 2015, 2017). By focusing on the application of Nesse’s criterion on the demarcation of normal low mood from pathological depression, I argue – contrary to Nesse’s claims – that evolutionary theory cannot generate a valid criterion from the differentiation of normal low mood states from pathological depression. Indeed, expression in conformity to evolved functions cannot constitute a sufficient condition for normality, as Nesse’s project should imply. Moreover, grounding normality in evolved functions presupposes a kind of fixity of our emotional states, which seems unwarranted in the light of a constantly changing environment. As a result of these limitations, I suggest that the relevant distinction in psychiatry should not be “normality” versus “abnormality”, but, rather, “that which requires intervention” versus “that which does not”

Healthy enough? A capability approach to sufficiency and equality

‘Sufficiency’ approaches to social and global justice stress that everyone must have enough. According to some advocates of this approach, only sufficiency is important, not equality. Martha Nussbaum, who is often classified as a sufficiency advocate, has defied this stricture against egalitarianism by contending that, in several domains, nothing is adequate short of equality. She cites political freedoms as her most persuasive example and suggests that the same may be true of the capability for health care. However, she does not explore this idea in depth: the idea that, in the domain of health, nothing short of equal capabilities is adequate. I explore this by clarifying the main concepts, such as adequacy and capability, in the domain of health. By these means I address three further questions. First, which is primary and which is derivative: capability for health care or capability for health? Second, does duration matter? If we can understand adequate health at a moment, in terms of ranges of physiological and psychological functioning, does adequacy not also imply durability? If so, then, third, is it possible to specify the length of an adequately healthy life, at least as a reasonable expectation? I argue that, due to human diversity and the imperfect state of medical knowledge, we cannot form a reasonable expectation of the length of an adequately healthy life for each person. Nevertheless, duration still matters. Therefore, we must recognize inadequately healthy lives in the only way that we can, by recognizing social disparities in health outcomes. In this sense, nothing short of equality is adequate