79,353 research outputs found
The Visible Hand: Race and Online Market Outcomes
We examine the effect of race on market outcomes by selling iPods through local online classified advertisements throughout the United States in a year-long field experiment. Each ad features a photograph of the product being held by a dark- or light-skinned (“black” or “white”) hand. To provide context, we also consider a group of sellers against whom buyers might statistically discriminate for similar reasons: white sellers with wrist tattoos. Black sellers do worse than white sellers on a variety of market outcome measures: They receive 13% fewer responses and 17% fewer offers. These effects are strongest in the Northeast, and are similar in magnitude to those associated with the display of a wrist tattoo. Conditional on receiving at least one offer, black sellers also receive 2–4% lower offers, despite the selfselected—and presumably less biased—pool of buyers. In addition, buyers corresponding with black sellers exhibit lower trust: They are 17% less likely to include their name in e-mails, 44% less likely to accept delivery by mail, and 56% more likely to express concern about making a long-distance payment. We find evidence that black sellers suffer particularly poor outcomes in thin markets; it appears that discrimination may not “survive” in the presence of significant competition among buyers. Furthermore, black sellers do worst in the most racially isolated markets and markets with high property crime rates, consistent with channels through which we might expect statistical discrimination to operate.race, advertising
A dynamic pricing model for unifying programmatic guarantee and real-time bidding in display advertising
There are two major ways of selling impressions in display advertising. They
are either sold in spot through auction mechanisms or in advance via guaranteed
contracts. The former has achieved a significant automation via real-time
bidding (RTB); however, the latter is still mainly done over the counter
through direct sales. This paper proposes a mathematical model that allocates
and prices the future impressions between real-time auctions and guaranteed
contracts. Under conventional economic assumptions, our model shows that the
two ways can be seamless combined programmatically and the publisher's revenue
can be maximized via price discrimination and optimal allocation. We consider
advertisers are risk-averse, and they would be willing to purchase guaranteed
impressions if the total costs are less than their private values. We also
consider that an advertiser's purchase behavior can be affected by both the
guaranteed price and the time interval between the purchase time and the
impression delivery date. Our solution suggests an optimal percentage of future
impressions to sell in advance and provides an explicit formula to calculate at
what prices to sell. We find that the optimal guaranteed prices are dynamic and
are non-decreasing over time. We evaluate our method with RTB datasets and find
that the model adopts different strategies in allocation and pricing according
to the level of competition. From the experiments we find that, in a less
competitive market, lower prices of the guaranteed contracts will encourage the
purchase in advance and the revenue gain is mainly contributed by the increased
competition in future RTB. In a highly competitive market, advertisers are more
willing to purchase the guaranteed contracts and thus higher prices are
expected. The revenue gain is largely contributed by the guaranteed selling.Comment: Chen, Bowei and Yuan, Shuai and Wang, Jun (2014) A dynamic pricing
model for unifying programmatic guarantee and real-time bidding in display
advertising. In: The Eighth International Workshop on Data Mining for Online
Advertising, 24 - 27 August 2014, New York Cit
Equality in Health: An Annotated Bibliography With Resources on Health Disparities and Cultural and Linguistic Competency
Provides citations for articles, reports, books, and online resources on racial/ethnic disparities in health and health care, strategies to reduce them, assessment tools for cultural and linguistic competency, training and education, and other issues
Spartan Daily April 4, 2013
Volume 140, Issue 32https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/spartandaily/1399/thumbnail.jp
Online advertising: analysis of privacy threats and protection approaches
Online advertising, the pillar of the “free” content on the Web, has revolutionized the marketing business in recent years by creating a myriad of new opportunities for advertisers to reach potential customers. The current advertising model builds upon an intricate infrastructure composed of a variety of intermediary entities and technologies whose main aim is to deliver personalized ads. For this purpose, a wealth of user data is collected, aggregated, processed and traded behind the scenes at an unprecedented rate. Despite the enormous value of online advertising, however, the intrusiveness and ubiquity of these practices prompt serious privacy concerns. This article surveys the online advertising infrastructure and its supporting technologies, and presents a thorough overview of the underlying privacy risks and the solutions that may mitigate them. We first analyze the threats and potential privacy attackers in this scenario of online advertising. In particular, we examine the main components of the advertising infrastructure in terms of tracking capabilities, data collection, aggregation level and privacy risk, and overview the tracking and data-sharing technologies employed by these components. Then, we conduct a comprehensive survey of the most relevant privacy mechanisms, and classify and compare them on the basis of their privacy guarantees and impact on the Web.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft
Preference-Informed Fairness
We study notions of fairness in decision-making systems when individuals have
diverse preferences over the possible outcomes of the decisions. Our starting
point is the seminal work of Dwork et al. which introduced a notion of
individual fairness (IF): given a task-specific similarity metric, every pair
of individuals who are similarly qualified according to the metric should
receive similar outcomes. We show that when individuals have diverse
preferences over outcomes, requiring IF may unintentionally lead to
less-preferred outcomes for the very individuals that IF aims to protect. A
natural alternative to IF is the classic notion of fair division, envy-freeness
(EF): no individual should prefer another individual's outcome over their own.
Although EF allows for solutions where all individuals receive a
highly-preferred outcome, EF may also be overly-restrictive. For instance, if
many individuals agree on the best outcome, then if any individual receives
this outcome, they all must receive it, regardless of each individual's
underlying qualifications for the outcome.
We introduce and study a new notion of preference-informed individual
fairness (PIIF) that is a relaxation of both individual fairness and
envy-freeness. At a high-level, PIIF requires that outcomes satisfy IF-style
constraints, but allows for deviations provided they are in line with
individuals' preferences. We show that PIIF can permit outcomes that are more
favorable to individuals than any IF solution, while providing considerably
more flexibility to the decision-maker than EF. In addition, we show how to
efficiently optimize any convex objective over the outcomes subject to PIIF for
a rich class of individual preferences. Finally, we demonstrate the broad
applicability of the PIIF framework by extending our definitions and algorithms
to the multiple-task targeted advertising setting introduced by Dwork and
Ilvento
- …