Between Quine's Disquotationalism and Horwich's Minimalism

Many criticisms of the prevalent deflationary theories of truth stem from some misunderstanding. Clarification can be found from considering Quine's reasoning on the disquotational feature of the truth predicate. Quine's disquotationalism and Horwich's minimalism are similar theses with respect to the concept of truth, though the difference between the choices of the primary truth bearers and the divergence in their accounts of meaning and reference are striking. Chapter Two is devoted to making plain Quine's reasoning regarding the disquotational concept of truth, and to constructing a disquotational theory of truth. Also in this chapter, the topic of how to enhance the deductive power of this theory is discussed. The following chapter aims to square Quine's theses of inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity, with an account of the disquotational schema of reference. Whether or not a disquotational schema of reference and all its instances can be seen as providing a genuine reference scheme, as claimed by Horwich and most deflationists, is also discussed. In Chapter Four, after an introduction of Horwich's minimalist conception of truth, there are a number of issues considered, in particular Horwich’s use-theoretic account of meaning and compositionality, along with the divergence between his account of meaning and Quine's. The final chapter, Chapter Five, provides a thorough analysis of three important factors regarding the disquotational theory and the minimal theory of truth. Among them, the first factor discussed is what sort of equivalence relation occurs within each instance of the disquotational schema or each axiom of the equivalence schema. Following this, there is an analysis of in what way the disquotationalist and the minimalist can explain all general facts involving truth. The last factor involves considering the proper ascription of the disquotational or the minimal truth predicate. Along with the analysis of these three factors, the issue regarding which theory of truth is preferable is elaborated

Between Quine's Disquotationalism and Horwich's Minimalism

Many criticisms of the prevalent deflationary theories of truth stem from some misunderstanding. Clarification can be found from considering Quine's reasoning on the disquotational feature of the truth predicate. Quine's disquotationalism and Horwich's minimalism are similar theses with respect to the concept of truth, though the difference between the choices of the primary truth bearers and the divergence in their accounts of meaning and reference are striking. Chapter Two is devoted to making plain Quine's reasoning regarding the disquotational concept of truth, and to constructing a disquotational theory of truth. Also in this chapter, the topic of how to enhance the deductive power of this theory is discussed. The following chapter aims to square Quine's theses of inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity, with an account of the disquotational schema of reference. Whether or not a disquotational schema of reference and all its instances can be seen as providing a genuine reference scheme, as claimed by Horwich and most deflationists, is also discussed. In Chapter Four, after an introduction of Horwich's minimalist conception of truth, there are a number of issues considered, in particular Horwich’s use-theoretic account of meaning and compositionality, along with the divergence between his account of meaning and Quine's. The final chapter, Chapter Five, provides a thorough analysis of three important factors regarding the disquotational theory and the minimal theory of truth. Among them, the first factor discussed is what sort of equivalence relation occurs within each instance of the disquotational schema or each axiom of the equivalence schema. Following this, there is an analysis of in what way the disquotationalist and the minimalist can explain all general facts involving truth. The last factor involves considering the proper ascription of the disquotational or the minimal truth predicate. Along with the analysis of these three factors, the issue regarding which theory of truth is preferable is elaborated

Reverse Engineering Heterogeneous Applications

Nowadays a large majority of software systems are built using various technologies that in turn rely on different languages (e.g. Java, XML, SQL etc.). We call such systems heterogeneous applications (HAs). By contrast, we call software systems that are written in one language homogeneous applications. In HAs the information regarding the structure and the behaviour of the system is spread across various components and languages and the interactions between different application elements could be hidden. In this context applying existing reverse engineering and quality assurance techniques developed for homogeneous applications is not enough. These techniques have been created to measure quality or provide information about one aspect of the system and they cannot grasp the complexity of HAs. In this dissertation we present our approach to support the analysis and evolution of HAs based on: (1) a unified first-class description of HAs and, (2) a meta-model that reifies the concept of horizontal and vertical dependencies between application elements at different levels of abstraction. We implemented our approach in two tools, MooseEE and Carrack. The first is an extension of the Moose platform for software and data analysis and contains our unified meta-model for HAs. The latter is an engine to infer derived dependencies that can support the analysis of associations among the heterogeneous elements composing HA. We validate our approach and tools by case studies on industrial and open-source JEAs which demonstrate how we can handle the complexity of such applications and how we can solve problems deriving from their heterogeneous nature

Los Grupos and the Art of Intervention in 1960s and 1970s Mexico

Throughout the 1960s and 70s, Mexican artists employed art interventions in commercial galleries, cultural institutions, and city streets to facilitate a renegotiation of the role of art (and the artist) in society. The art intervention, a mode of conceptualism, served to circumvent traditional spaces for the display of art and to destabilize and expose the hierarchies or power structures that shaped the art world and society at large. Artists began to explore alternative definitions of the artist and the art object as early as 1961, when progenitors of conceptualism such as Mathias Goeritz, José Luis Cuevas, and Alejandro Jodorowsky produced art interventions in galleries, theaters, art schools, museums, and public spaces. These new interventionist practices were forged within the context of local and global social revolutions. In Mexico, widespread repression and censorship at the hands of the state culminated in the 1968 student and workers\u27 movements. Tragically marked by the government-initiated massacre of peaceful demonstrators in Tlatelolco, the movement accelerated incidents of protest, police and military brutality, and a crisis within cultural institutions. Though the Mexican government presented itself as aligned with socialist causes, the 1970s saw an unofficial dirty war launched against perceived radicals to quash the momentum activists had gained in 1968. This heated environment found artists in a continuing struggle to find new forms of expression as well as spaces for the display of their work. Many turned to collectivization and conceptualist tactics in what has come to be called the movimiento de los grupos or the \u27Group Movement\u27 that flourished between 1973 and 1979. Despite the proliferation of art interventions across the two decades (and within similar socio-political conditions) connections between the 1960s generation and the Grupos of the 1970s have not been adequately addressed. Accordingly, this project examines the ways in which strategies of intervention served as a form of resistance for both generations. I argue that the intervention served as a primary tool in the renegotiation of the social role of art and the artist. As a vehicle of conceptualism, interventionist practice served to introduce institutional critique, new media and mass communication, as well as performative actions as artistic modes, irreversibly altering the cultural landscape of Mexico

Reading material culture: An analysis of design as cultural form

Ankara : The Department of Graphic Design and The Institute of Fine Arts of Bilkent University, 2001.Thesis (Ph.D.) -- Bilkent University, 2001.Includes bibliographical references leaves 153-161The aim of this study is to explore the possibilities of how the product form conveys meaning, and then how this meaning can be the bearer of any kind of cultural information or inscription upon the object. The reading of the object is discussed within the framework that can be named as the ‘material culture of the everyday.’ Situating and defining design as a product of modernity, specific categories of objects and related theories about the possibility of the modern subject and his subjective relation with the world of objects is discussed. Last of all, following the route of identity, the Turkish tea-pot set and water-pipe is chosen for a deeper analysis for demonstrating the mechanisms or forces that shape these objects of cultural rituals within the dynamics of tradition and modernity.Timur, ŞebnemPh.D

The social imaginary in the context of social discontents: a conceptual model of the social imaginary, and its application to the amelioration of civilizational crises.

This thesis is premised on the idea that the manifold social discontents – including eco-climate collapse, the violent subjugation of non-human animals, and racial and gendered oppression – are all expressions of the current social imaginary. The concept of the social imaginary has the potential to help us understand the common pathology of these egregious social ills, and how the imaginary might be transformed. Although the field of social imaginaries has emerged in its own right over the last few years, there is as yet no conceptualisation of the social imaginary as a whole. I suggest that such an overarching model will be necessary if it is to be of ameliorative value to social ills. This thesis, therefore, seeks to present a model of social imaginaries that explains both their constitutive elements and their dynamics. It argues that each social imaginary possesses a unique character in virtue of which it coheres as a whole. The most important contributions of this thesis are: ● Positing the ‘keystone concept’, that is the ontological principle at the heart of each specific social imaginary in virtue of which that imaginary coheres and derives its unique character. ● Accounting for the twin dynamics of the social imaginary: the synthetic imagination that explains its reproduction; and the radical imagination that disrupts the synthetic imagination and creates opportunities for critical reflection and creative responses. ● Emphasising the responsibility of denizens in creating the imaginary world in which we live, and pointing to the ways in which this is most effectively done. ● Identifying the keystone concept of the current imaginary as entitlement; and suggesting that the most significant leverage point for the amelioration of social ills is veganism, because it directly rejects the most complete and salient expression of entitlement: taking the lives of others

The place of description natural method in the psychology of Franz Brentano

This work intends to examine the way in which Brentano makes a proper philosophical concept out of description. More specifically, the idea will be defended that description is the natural method of psychology as Brentano understands it; a method relying upon natural means of knowledge, as well as specifically suited for the investigation of psychological phenomena. In the first part, an examination will be carried out regarding the motives that led Brentano to his original conception of psychology and that, as a consequence, would determine the development of the method of descriptive psychology. In the second part, the development itself of this method will be analysed, and the many layers of its mechanism will be singled out: from inner perception as the source of its knowledge; through its methodical procedures such as noticing and fixating in language; up to its methodical core, which will be shown to consist in a very special sort of intuitive inductive generalization towards exact, apodictic laws. At the end, we will have a better grasp of the theoretical import of Brentano’s concept of description, as well as of this unique methodological configuration that he devises, whose broader philosophical – and historico-philosophical – implications remain to be assessed in all its significance.Este trabalho pretende examinar a maneira como Brentano faz da descrição um conceito propriamente filosófico a partir da descrição. Mais especificamente, será defendida a ideia de que a descrição é o método natural da psicologia como Brentano a entende; um método baseado em meios naturais de conhecimento, bem como especificamente adequado para a investigação de fenômenos psíquicos. Na primeira parte, será feito um exame sobre os motivos que levaram Brentano à sua concepção original de psicologia e que, por conseguinte, determinariam o desenvolvimento do método da psicologia descritiva. Na segunda parte, será analisado o desenvolvimento, propriamente dito, deste método, destacando-se as diversas camadas que compõe seu mecanismo: da percepção interna como sua fonte de conhecimento; passando por seus procedimentos metódicos (notar e fixar em linguagem); até seu núcleo metódico, que consistirá em um tipo muito especial de generalização indutiva intuitiva em direção a leis apodícticas exatas. No final, teremos uma melhor compreensão da importância teórica do conceito de descrição de Brentano, bem como desta configuração metodológica única que ele concebe, cujas implicações filosóficas – e histórico-filosóficas – mais amplas ainda precisam ser avaliadas em todo o seu significado

Neo-Quinean and neo-Aristotelian metaontology : on explanation, theory choice, and the viability of ontological inquiry

This thesis is an exercise in comparative metaontology. I am centrally concerned with how one might choose between competing metaontological theories. To make my project tractable, I compare two contemporary metaontological approaches dominant in the literature: neo-Quineanism (N-Q) and neo-Aristotelianism (N-A). Peter van Inwagen, a representative of N-Q, claims that ontological inquiry should be conducted in the quantifier-variable idiom of first-order predicate logic; to know what exists, or what a theory says exists, we read our commitments off the regimented sentences that we affirm as true. E.J. Lowe, a representative of N-A objects to N-Q and claims that ontology should be done directly; that it is a mostly a priori activity which is the indispensable intellectual foundation for all rational inquiry. Both metaontological accounts are questionable and there seems to be no decisive way to choose between them. I claim, however, that considerations concerning the explanatory nature of ontology is a key and under-studied factor with respect to ontological method, pointing a way to a possible candidate for metaontological theory choice. I conclude that van Inwagen’s N-Q metaontology is wanting in many respects and further, that he does not provide adequate reasons to dispense with explanation as a feature of ontological inquiry. While explanatory considerations are central to Lowe’s N-A metaontology, I claim that the best that can be hoped for with his particular approach is a form of explanatory antirealism

30th International Conference on Information Modelling and Knowledge Bases

Information modelling is becoming more and more important topic for researchers, designers, and users of information systems. The amount and complexity of information itself, the number of abstraction levels of information, and the size of databases and knowledge bases are continuously growing. Conceptual modelling is one of the sub-areas of information modelling. The aim of this conference is to bring together experts from different areas of computer science and other disciplines, who have a common interest in understanding and solving problems on information modelling and knowledge bases, as well as applying the results of research to practice. We also aim to recognize and study new areas on modelling and knowledge bases to which more attention should be paid. Therefore philosophy and logic, cognitive science, knowledge management, linguistics and management science are relevant areas, too. In the conference, there will be three categories of presentations, i.e. full papers, short papers and position papers