1,722 research outputs found

    An Alternative Conception of Tree-Adjoining Derivation

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    The precise formulation of derivation for tree-adjoining grammars has important ramifications for a wide variety of uses of the formalism, from syntactic analysis to semantic interpretation and statistical language modeling. We argue that the definition of tree-adjoining derivation must be reformulated in order to manifest the proper linguistic dependencies in derivations. The particular proposal is both precisely characterizable through a definition of TAG derivations as equivalence classes of ordered derivation trees, and computationally operational, by virtue of a compilation to linear indexed grammars together with an efficient algorithm for recognition and parsing according to the compiled grammar.Comment: 33 page

    Introduction to clarithmetic I

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    "Clarithmetic" is a generic name for formal number theories similar to Peano arithmetic, but based on computability logic (see http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~giorgi/cl.html) instead of the more traditional classical or intuitionistic logics. Formulas of clarithmetical theories represent interactive computational problems, and their "truth" is understood as existence of an algorithmic solution. Imposing various complexity constraints on such solutions yields various versions of clarithmetic. The present paper introduces a system of clarithmetic for polynomial time computability, which is shown to be sound and complete. Sound in the sense that every theorem T of the system represents an interactive number-theoretic computational problem with a polynomial time solution and, furthermore, such a solution can be efficiently extracted from a proof of T. And complete in the sense that every interactive number-theoretic problem with a polynomial time solution is represented by some theorem T of the system. The paper is written in a semitutorial style and targets readers with no prior familiarity with computability logic

    Deductive Systems in Traditional and Modern Logic

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    The book provides a contemporary view on different aspects of the deductive systems in various types of logics including term logics, propositional logics, logics of refutation, non-Fregean logics, higher order logics and arithmetic

    Learning from Experience: A Philosophical Perspective

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    This work examines philosophical solutions to David Hume’s problem of induction—a skeptical attack on our ability to learn from experience. I explore the logical, ontological, and epistemic difficulties behind the everyday assumption that the future will resemble the past. While historical solutions by philosophers such as Bertrand Russell and Karl Popper have been unsuccessful at tackling these complications, combining recent work on natural kinds and naturalistic epistemology has promise. Ultimately, I expand on work done by Howard Sankey, Hilary Kornblith, and Brian Ellis to create an account of nature and epistemology that explains why objects in nature have predictable behavior. I find Sankey\u27s solution incomplete, but I fix the major I identify and show why the work by Sankey builds into a powerful solution to Hume\u27s problem

    Pierre Duhem’s philosophy and history of science

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    LEITE (FĂĄbio Rodrigo) – STOFFEL (Jean-François), Introduction (pp. 3-6). BARRA (Eduardo Salles de O.) – SANTOS (Ricardo Batista dos), Duhem’s analysis of Newtonian method and the logical priority of physics over metaphysics (pp. 7-19). BORDONI (Stefano), The French roots of Duhem’s early historiography and epistemology (pp. 20-35). CHIAPPIN (JosĂ© R. N.) – LARANJEIRAS (CĂĄssio Costa), Duhem’s critical analysis of mecha­ni­cism and his defense of a formal conception of theoretical phy­sics (pp. 36-53). GUEGUEN (Marie) – PSILLOS (Stathis), Anti-­scepticism and epistemic humility in Pierre Duhem’s philosophy of science (pp. 54-72). LISTON (Michael), Duhem : images of science, historical continuity, and the first crisis in physics (pp. 73-84). MAIOCCHI (Roberto), Duhem in pre-war Italian philos­ophy : the reasons of an absence (pp. 85-92). HERNÁNDEZ MÁRQUEZ (VĂ­ctor Manuel), Was Pierre Duhem an «esprit de finesse» ? (pp. 93-107). NEEDHAM (Paul), Was Duhem justified in not distinguishing between physical and chemical atomism ? (pp. 108-111). OLGUIN (Roberto Estrada), «Bon sens» and «noĂ»s» (pp. 112-126). OLIVEIRA (Amelia J.), Duhem’s legacy for the change in the historiography of science : An analysis based on Kuhn’s writings (pp. 127-139). PRÍNCIPE (JoĂŁo), PoincarĂ© and Duhem : Resonances in their first epistemological reflec­tions (pp. 140-156). MONDRAGON (DamiĂĄn Islas), Book review of «Pierre Duhem : entre fĂ­sica y metafĂ­sica» (pp. 157-159). STOFFEL (Jean-François), Book review of P. Duhem : «La thĂ©orie physique : son objet, sa structure» / edit. by S. Roux (pp. 160-162). STOFFEL (Jean-François), Book review of St. Bordoni : «When historiography met epistemology» (pp. 163-165)

    Farewell to Suppression-Freedom

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    Val Plumwood and Richard Sylvan argued from their joint paper The Semantics of First Degree Entailment (Routley and Routley in NoĂ»s 6(4):335–359, 1972, https://doi.org/10.2307/2214309) and onward that the variable sharing property is but a mere consequence of a good entailment relation, indeed they viewed it as a mere negative test of adequacy of such a relation, the property itself being a rather philosophically barren concept. Such a relation is rather to be analyzed as a sufficiency relation free of any form of premise suppression. Suppression of premises, therefore, gained center stage. Despite this, however, no serious attempt was ever made at analyzing the concept. This paper shows that their suggestions for how to understand it, either as the Anti-Suppression Principle or as the Joint Force Principle, turn out to yield properties strictly weaker than that of variable sharing. A suggestion for how to understand some of their use of the notion of suppression which clearly is not in line with these two mentioned principles is given, and their arguments to the effect that the Anderson and Belnap logics T, E and R are suppressive are shown to be both technically and philosophically wanting. Suppression-freedom, it is argued, cannot do the job Plumwood and Sylvan intended it to do.publishedVersio

    Proofs, intuitions and diagrams : Kant and the mathematical method of proof

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    Hoe bewijs je idealiter een stelling uit de wiskunde? Volgens vele filosofen is de wiskundige bewijsmethode exclusief een zaak van de logica. Een wiskundige zou uitsluitend gevolgtrekkingen maken volgens algemeen geldende logische redeneerprincipes. Volgens de beroemde Duitse filosoof Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is bewijsvoering in de wiskunde essenti?een zaak van mentale constructies. De producten van dergelijke constructies noemt Kant intuities. Voor zover het de meetkunde betreft, beargumenteer ik dat intuities het karakter hebben van een beeld, of een diagram. In Kants optiek bewijs je een stelling door bijvoorbeeld de constructie van een driehoek, waar vervolgens, middels verdere constructies, allerlei hulplijnen aan toegevoegd worden. Op een dergelijke wijze wordt, via een keten van voortschrijdende inzichten, de waarheid van een stelling vastgesteld. Kant volgt in zijn opvattingen nauwgezet de bewijzen uit elementaire meetkundeboeken. Dit maakt Kants visie op het eerste gezicht buitengewoon geloofwaardig. Wat Kants visie bijzonder maakt is dat hij wiskundige bewijsvoering vooral in termen van een specifiek wiskundige bewijsmethode ziet, en niet als een zaak van algemeen geldende logische redeneerprincipes. In mijn proefschrift geef ik een reconstructie van deze bewijsmethode. Kants bewijsconceptie is niet alleen om historische redenen van belang, al was het maar omdat zij tot op de dag van vandaag nog steeds niet goed begrepen is. Kants visie is ook van systematisch belang. Zo stelt Kant het vaak nauw geachte verband tussen logica en methodologie ter discussie. Ook stelt Kant fundamentele vragen bij de verhouding tussen redeneren en taal.Jong, W.R. de [Promotor

    Proof theoretic criteria for logical constancy

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    Logic concerns inference, and some inferences can be distinguished from others by their holding as a matter of logic itself, rather than say empirical factors. These inferences are known as logical consequences and have a special status due to the strong level of confidence they inspire. Given this importance, this dissertation investigates a method of separating the logical from the non-logical. The method used is based on proof theory, and builds on the work of Prawitz, Dummett and Read. Requirements for logicality are developed based on a literature review of common philosophical use of the term, with the key factors being formality, and the absolute generality / topic neutrality of interpretations of logical constants. These requirements are used to generate natural deduction criteria for logical constancy, resulting in the classification of certain predicates, truth functional propositional operators, first order quantifiers, second order quantifiers in sound and complete formal systems using Henkin semantics, and modal operators from the systems K and S5 as logical constants. Semantic tableaux proof systems are also investigated, resulting in the production of semantic tableaux-based criteria for logicality
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