122 research outputs found
PADS: Privacy-preserving Auction Design forAllocating Dynamically Priced Cloud Resources
With the rapid growth of Cloud Computing technologies, enterprises are increasingly deploying their services in the Cloud. Dynamically priced cloud resources such as the Amazon EC2 Spot Instance provides an efficient mechanism for cloud service providers to trade resources with potential buyers using an auction mechanism. With the dynamically priced cloud resource markets, cloud consumers can buy resources at a significantly lower cost than statically priced cloud resources such as the on-demand instances in Amazon EC2. While dynamically priced cloud resources enable to maximize datacenter resource utilization and minimize cost for the consumers, unfortunately, such auction mechanisms achieve these benefits only at a cost significant of private information leakage. In an auction-based mechanism, the private information includes information on the demands of the consumers that can lead an attacker to understand the current computing requirements of the consumers and perhaps even allow the inference of the workload patterns of the consumers. In this paper, we propose PADS, a strategy-proof differentially private auction mechanism that allows cloud providers to privately trade resources with cloud consumers in such a way that individual bidding information of the cloud consumers is not exposed by the auction mechanism. We demonstrate that PADS achieves differential privacy and approximate truthfulness guarantees while maintaining good performance in terms of revenue gains and allocation efficiency. We evaluate PADS through extensive simulation experiments that demonstrate that in comparison to traditional auction mechanisms, PADS achieves relatively high revenues for cloud providers while guaranteeing the privacy of the participating consumers
Differential Privacy-Based Online Allocations towards Integrating Blockchain and Edge Computing
In recent years, the blockchain-based Internet of Things (IoT) has been
researched and applied widely, where each IoT device can act as a node in the
blockchain. However, these lightweight nodes usually do not have enough
computing power to complete the consensus or other computing-required tasks.
Edge computing network gives a platform to provide computing power to IoT
devices. A fundamental problem is how to allocate limited edge servers to IoT
devices in a highly untrustworthy environment. In a fair competition
environment, the allocation mechanism should be online, truthful, and privacy
safe. To address these three challenges, we propose an online multi-item double
auction (MIDA) mechanism, where IoT devices are buyers and edge servers are
sellers. In order to achieve the truthfulness, the participants' private
information is at risk of being exposed by inference attack, which may lead to
malicious manipulation of the market by adversaries. Then, we improve our MIDA
mechanism based on differential privacy to protect sensitive information from
being leaked. It interferes with the auction results slightly but guarantees
privacy protection with high confidence. Besides, we upgrade our
privacy-preserving MIDA mechanism such that adapting to more complex and
realistic scenarios. In the end, the effectiveness and correctness of
algorithms are evaluated and verified by theoretical analysis and numerical
simulations
Incentive mechanism design for mobile crowd sensing systems
The recent proliferation of increasingly capable and affordable mobile devices with a plethora of on-board and portable sensors that pervade every corner of the world has given rise to the fast development and wide deployment of mobile crowd sensing (MCS) systems. Nowadays, applications of MCS systems have covered almost every aspect of people's everyday living and working, such as ambient environment monitoring, healthcare, floor plan reconstruction, smart transportation, indoor localization, and many others.
Despite their tremendous benefits, MCS systems pose great new research challenges, of which, this thesis targets one important facet, that is, to effectively incentivize (crowd) workers to achieve maximum participation in MCS systems. Participating in crowd sensing tasks is usually a costly procedure for individual workers. On one hand, it consumes workers' resources, such as computing power, battery, and so forth. On the other hand, a considerable portion of sensing tasks require the submission of workers' sensitive and private information, which causes privacy leakage for participants. Clearly, the power of crowd sensing could not be fully unleashed, unless workers are properly incentivized to participate via satisfactory rewards that effectively compensate their participation costs.
Targeting the above challenge, in this thesis, I present a series of novel incentive mechanisms, which can be utilized to effectively incentivize worker participation in MCS systems. The proposed mechanisms not only incorporate workers' quality of information in order to selectively recruit relatively more reliable workers for sensing, but also preserve workers' privacy so as to prevent workers from being disincentivized by excessive privacy leakage. I demonstrate through rigorous theoretical analyses and extensive simulations that the proposed incentive mechanisms bear many desirable properties theoretically, and have great potential to be practically applied
Revealing the Landscape of Privacy-Enhancing Technologies in the Context of Data Markets for the IoT: A Systematic Literature Review
IoT data markets in public and private institutions have become increasingly
relevant in recent years because of their potential to improve data
availability and unlock new business models. However, exchanging data in
markets bears considerable challenges related to disclosing sensitive
information. Despite considerable research focused on different aspects of
privacy-enhancing data markets for the IoT, none of the solutions proposed so
far seems to find a practical adoption. Thus, this study aims to organize the
state-of-the-art solutions, analyze and scope the technologies that have been
suggested in this context, and structure the remaining challenges to determine
areas where future research is required. To accomplish this goal, we conducted
a systematic literature review on privacy enhancement in data markets for the
IoT, covering 50 publications dated up to July 2020, and provided updates with
24 publications dated up to May 2022. Our results indicate that most research
in this area has emerged only recently, and no IoT data market architecture has
established itself as canonical. Existing solutions frequently lack the
required combination of anonymization and secure computation technologies.
Furthermore, there is no consensus on the appropriate use of blockchain
technology for IoT data markets and a low degree of leveraging existing
libraries or reusing generic data market architectures. We also identified
significant challenges remaining, such as the copy problem and the recursive
enforcement problem that-while solutions have been suggested to some extent-are
often not sufficiently addressed in proposed designs. We conclude that
privacy-enhancing technologies need further improvements to positively impact
data markets so that, ultimately, the value of data is preserved through data
scarcity and users' privacy and businesses-critical information are protected.Comment: 49 pages, 17 figures, 11 table
- …