An analytics-based heuristic decomposition of a bilevel multiple-follower cutting stock problem

This paper presents a new class of multiple-follower bilevel problems and a heuristic approach to solving them. In this new class of problems, the followers may be nonlinear, do not share constraints or variables, and are at most weakly constrained. This allows the leader variables to be partitioned among the followers. We show that current approaches for solving multiple-follower problems are unsuitable for our new class of problems and instead we propose a novel analytics-based heuristic decomposition approach. This approach uses Monte Carlo simulation and k-medoids clustering to reduce the bilevel problem to a single level, which can then be solved using integer programming techniques. The examples presented show that our approach produces better solutions and scales up better than the other approaches in the literature. Furthermore, for large problems, we combine our approach with the use of self-organising maps in place of k-medoids clustering, which significantly reduces the clustering times. Finally, we apply our approach to a real-life cutting stock problem. Here a forest harvesting problem is reformulated as a multiple-follower bilevel problem and solved using our approachThis publication has emanated from research conducted with the financial support of Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) under Grant Number SFI/12/RC/228

A Metaheuristic Framework for Bi-level Programming Problems with Multi-disciplinary Applications

Bi-level programming problems arise in situations when the decision maker has to take into account the responses of the users to his decisions. Several problems arising in engineering and economics can be cast within the bi-level programming framework. The bi-level programming model is also known as a Stackleberg or leader-follower game in which the leader chooses his variables so as to optimise his objective function, taking into account the response of the follower(s) who separately optimise their own objectives, treating the leader’s decisions as exogenous. In this chapter, we present a unified framework fully consistent with the Stackleberg paradigm of bi-level programming that allows for the integration of meta-heuristic algorithms with traditional gradient based optimisation algorithms for the solution of bi-level programming problems. In particular we employ Differential Evolution as the main meta-heuristic in our proposal.We subsequently apply the proposed method (DEBLP) to a range of problems from many fields such as transportation systems management, parameter estimation and game theory. It is demonstrated that DEBLP is a robust and powerful search heuristic for this class of problems characterised by non smoothness and non convexity

Analytics-based decomposition of a class of bilevel problems

This paper proposes a new class of multi-follower bilevel problems. In this class the followers may be nonlinear, do not share constraints or variables, and are at most weakly constrained. This allows the leader variables to be partitioned among the followers. The new class is formalised and compared with existing problems in the literature. We show that approaches currently in use for solving multi-follower problems are unsuitable for this class. Evolutionary algorithms can be used, but these are computationally intensive and do not scale up well. Instead we propose an analytics-based decomposition approach. Two example problems are solved using our approach and two evolutionary algorithms, and the decomposition approach produces much better and faster results as the problem size increases

Development of Methods for Solving Bilevel Optimization Problems

Bilevel optimization, also referred to as bilevel programming, involves solving an upper level problem subject to the optimality of a corresponding lower level problem. The upper and lower level problems are also referred to as the leader and follower problems, respectively. Both levels have their associated objective(s), variable(s) and constraint(s). Such problems model real-life scenarios of cases where the performance of an upper level authority is realizable/sustainable only if the corresponding lower level objective is optimum. A number of practical applications in the field of engineering, logistics, economics and transportation have inherent nested structure that are suited to this type of modelling. The range of applications as well as a rapid increase in the size and complexity of such problems has prompted active interest in the design of efficient algorithms for bilevel optimization. Bilevel optimization problems present a number of unique and interesting challenges to algorithm design. The nested nature of the problem requires optimization of a lower level problem to evaluate each upper level solution, which makes it computationally exorbitant. Theoretically, an upper level solution is considered valid/feasible only if the corresponding lower level variables are the true global optimum of the lower level problem. Global optimality can be reliably asserted in very limited cases, for example convex and linear problems. In deceptive cases, an inaccurate lower level optimum may result in an objective value better than true optimum at the upper level, which poses a severe challenge for ranking/selection strategies used within any optimization technique. In turn, this also makes the performance evaluation very difficult since the performance cannot be judged based on the objective values alone. While the area of bilevel (or more generally, multilevel) programming itself is not very new, most reports in this direction up until about a decade ago considered solving linear or at most quadratic problems at both levels. Correspondingly, the focus on was on development of exact methods to solve such problems. However, such methods typically require assumptions on mathematical properties, which may not always hold in practical applications. With increasing use of computer simulation-based evaluations in a number of disciplines in science and engineering, there is more need than ever to handle problems that are highly nonlinear or even black-box in nature. Metaheuristic algorithms, such as evolutionary algorithms are more suited to this emerging paradigm. The foray of evolutionary algorithms in bilevel programming is relatively recent and there remains scope of substantial development in the field in terms of addressing the aforementioned challenges. The work presented in this thesis is directed towards improving evolutionary techniques to enable them solve generic bilevel problems more accurately using lower number of function evaluations compared to the existing methods. Three key approaches are investigated towards accomplishing this: (a) e active hybridization of global and local search methods during dierent stages of the overall search; (b) use of surrogate models to guide the search using approximations in lieu of true function evaluations, and (c) use of a non-nested re-formulation of the problem. While most of the work is focused on single-objective problems, preliminary studies are also presented on multi-objective bilevel problems. The performance of the proposed approaches is evaluated on a comprehensive suite of mathematical test problems available in the literature, as well as some practical problems. The proposed approaches are observed to achieve a favourable balance between accuracy and computational expense for solving bilevel optimization problems, and thus exhibit suitability for use in real-life applications

A Coevolutionary Particle Swarm Algorithm for Bi-Level Variational Inequalities: Applications to Competition in Highway Transportation Networks

A climate of increasing deregulation in traditional highway transportation, where the private sector has an expanded role in the provision of traditional transportation services, provides a background for practical policy issues to be investigated. One of the key issues of interest, and the focus of this chapter, would be the equilibrium decision variables offered by participants in this market. By assuming that the private sector participants play a Nash game, the above problem can be described as a Bi-Level Variational Inequality (BLVI). Our problem differs from the classical Cournot-Nash game because each and every player’s actions is constrained by another variational inequality describing the equilibrium route choice of users on the network. In this chapter, we discuss this BLVI and suggest a heuristic coevolutionary particle swarm algorithm for its resolution. Our proposed algorithm is subsequently tested on example problems drawn from the literature. The numerical experiments suggest that the proposed algorithm is a viable solution method for this problem

Special Topics in Information Technology

This open access book presents thirteen outstanding doctoral dissertations in Information Technology from the Department of Electronics, Information and Bioengineering, Politecnico di Milano, Italy. Information Technology has always been highly interdisciplinary, as many aspects have to be considered in IT systems. The doctoral studies program in IT at Politecnico di Milano emphasizes this interdisciplinary nature, which is becoming more and more important in recent technological advances, in collaborative projects, and in the education of young researchers. Accordingly, the focus of advanced research is on pursuing a rigorous approach to specific research topics starting from a broad background in various areas of Information Technology, especially Computer Science and Engineering, Electronics, Systems and Control, and Telecommunications. Each year, more than 50 PhDs graduate from the program. This book gathers the outcomes of the thirteen best theses defended in 2019-20 and selected for the IT PhD Award. Each of the authors provides a chapter summarizing his/her findings, including an introduction, description of methods, main achievements and future work on the topic. Hence, the book provides a cutting-edge overview of the latest research trends in Information Technology at Politecnico di Milano, presented in an easy-to-read format that will also appeal to non-specialists

Toll competition in highway transportation networks

Within a highway transportation network, the social welfare implications of two different groups of agents setting tolls in competition for revenues are studied. The first group comprises private sector toll road operators aiming to maximise revenues. The second group comprises local governments or jurisdictions who may engage in tax exporting. Extending insights from the public economics literature, jurisdictions tax export because when setting tolls to maximise welfare for their electorate, they simultaneously benefit from revenues from extra-jurisdictional users. Hence the tolls levied by both groups will be higher than those intended solely to internalise congestion, which then results in welfare losses. Therefore the overarching question investigated is the extent of welfare losses stemming from such competition for toll revenues. While these groups of agents are separately studied, the interactions between agents in each group in competition can be modelled within the common framework of Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints. Several solution algorithms, adapting methodologies from microeconomics as well as evolutionary computation, are proposed to identify Nash Equilibrium toll levels. These are demonstrated on realistic transportation networks. As an alternative paradigm to competition, the possibilities for co-operation between agents in each group are also explored. In the case of toll road operators, the welfare consequences of competition could be positive or adverse depending on the interrelationships between the toll roads in competition. The results therefore generalise those previously obtained to a more realistic setting investigated here. In the case of competition between jurisdictions, it is shown that the fiscal externality of tax exporting resulting from their toll setting decisions can substantially reduce the welfare gains from internalising congestion. The ability of regulation, co-operation and bilateral bargaining to reduce the welfare losses are assessed. The research thus contributes to informing debates regarding the appropriate level of institutional governance for toll pricing policies

A game theoretic framework for strategic production planning

A game theoretic framework for strategic refinery production planning is presented in which strategic planning problems are formulated as non-cooperative potential games whose solutions represent Nash equilibria. The potential game model takes the form of a nonconvex nonlinear program (NLP) and we examine an additional scenario extending this to a nonconvex mixed integer nonlinear program (MINLP). Tactical planning decisions are linked to strategic decision processes through a potential game structure derived from a Cournot oligopoly-type game in which multiple crude oil refineries supply several markets. The resulting production planning decisions are rational in a game theoretic sense and are robust to deviations in competitor strategies. These solutions are interpreted as mutual best responses yielding 2 maximum profit in the competitive planning game. Two scenarios are presented which illustrate the utility of the game theoretic framework in the analysis of production planning problems in competitive scenarios