Multiple Bytes Differential Fault Analysis on CLEFIA

This paper examines the strength of CLEFIA against multiple bytes differential fault attack. Firstly, it presents the principle of CLEFIA algorithm and differential fault analysis; then, according to injecting faults into the rth,r-1th,r-2th CLEFIA round three conditions, proposes three fault models and corresponding analysis methods; finally, all of the fault model and analysis methods above have been verified through software simulation. Experiment results demonstrate that: CLEFIA is vulnerable to differential fault attack due to its Feistel structure and S-box feature, 5-6,6-8,2 faults are needed to recover CLEFIA-128 based on the three fault models in this paper respectively, multiple byte faults model can greatly improve the attack practicality and even the attack efficiency, and the fault analysis methods in this paper can provide some fault analysis ideas on other block ciphers using S-box

An analysis and a comparative study of cryptographic algorithms used on the internet of things (IoT) based on avalanche effect

Ubiquitous computing is already weaving itself around us and it is connecting everything to the network of networks. This interconnection of objects to the internet is new computing paradigm called the Internet of Things (IoT) networks. Many capacity and non-capacity constrained devices, such as sensors are connecting to the Internet. These devices interact with each other through the network and provide a new experience to its users. In order to make full use of this ubiquitous paradigm, security on IoT is important. There are problems with privacy concerns regarding certain algorithms that are on IoT, particularly in the area that relates to their avalanche effect means that a small change in the plaintext or key should create a significant change in the ciphertext. The higher the significant change, the higher the security if that algorithm. If the avalanche effect of an algorithm is less than 50% then that algorithm is weak and can create security undesirability in any network. In this, case IoT. In this study, we propose to do the following: (1) Search and select existing block cryptographic algorithms (maximum of ten) used for authentication and encryption from different devices used on IoT. (2) Analyse the avalanche effect of select cryptographic algorithms and determine if they give efficient authentication on IoT. (3) Improve their avalanche effect by designing a mathematical model that improves their robustness against attacks. This is done through the usage of the initial vector XORed with plaintext and final vector XORed with cipher tect. (4) Test the new mathematical model for any enhancement on the avalanche effect of each algorithm as stated in the preceding sentences. (5) Propose future work on how to enhance security on IoT. Results show that when using the proposed method with variation of key, the avalanche effect significantly improved for seven out of ten algorithms. This means that we have managed to improve 70% of algorithms tested. Therefore indicating a substantial success rate for the proposed method as far as the avalanche effect is concerned. We propose that the seven algorithms be replaced by our improved versions in each of their implementation on IoT whenever the plaintext is varied.Electrical and Mining EngineeringM. Tech. (Electrical Engineering

Differential Power Analysis attack of CLEFIA Block cipher

The objective of this research work is to mount Side channel attack particularly power analysis attack on FPGA Hardware implementation of CLEFIA block cipher. CLEFIA is claimed to be reliable cipher. CLEFIA specifications and design of algorithm is available to evaluation by public, cryptographers for performance and security analysis. CLEFIA is an international standardized cipher in ISO/IEC lightweight cryptography. It has four branch generalized Feistel network structure. This structure can be implemented compactly in both in hardware and software. CLEFIA consists of Diffusion Switching Mechanism, which ensures immunity against major attacks. Moreover, the similarity of functions between the data processing part and the key scheduling part of CLEFIA reduces the gate size

Further Improved Differential Fault Analysis on Camellia by Exploring Fault Width and Depth

In this paper, we present two further improved differential fault analysis methods on Camellia by exploring fault width and depth. Our first method broadens the fault width of previous Camellia attacks, injects multiple byte faults into the rth round left register to recover multiple bytes of the rth round equivalent key, and obtains Camellia-128,192/256 key with at least 8 and 12 faulty ciphertexts respectively; our second method extends fault depth of previous Camellia attacks, injects one byte fault into the r-2th round left register to recover full 8 bytes of the rth round equivalent key, 5-6 bytes of the r-1th round equivalent key, 1 byte of the r-2th round equivalent key, and obtains Camellia-128,192/256 key with 4 and 6 faulty ciphertexts respectively. Simulation experiments demonstrate: due to its reversible permutation function, Camellia is vulnerable to multiple bytes fault attack, the attack efficiency is increased with fault width, this feature greatly improves fault attack’s practicalities; and due to its Feistel structure, Camellia is also vulnerable to deep single byte fault attack, 4 and 6 faulty ciphertexts are enough to reduce Camellia-128 and Camellia-192/256 key hypotheses to 222.2 and 231.8 respectively

Improved Cache Trace Attack on AES and CLEFIA by Considering Cache Miss and S-box Misalignment

This paper presents an improved Cache trace attack on AES and CLEFIA by considering Cache miss trace information and S-box misalignment. In 2006, O. Acıiçmez et al. present a trace driven Cache attack on AES first two rounds, and point out that if the Cache element number of the Cache block is 16, at most 48-bit of AES key can be obtained in the first round attack. Their attack is based on the ideal case when S-box elements are perfected aligned in the Cache block. However, this paper discovers that, the S-box elements are usually misaligned, and due to this feature and by considering Cache miss trace information, about 200 samples are enough to obtain full 128-bit AES key within seconds. In 2010, Chester Rebeiro et al. present the first trace driven Cache attack on C LEFIA by considering Cache hit information and obtain 128-bit key with 243 CLEFIA encryptions. In this paper, we present a new attack on CLEFIA by considering Cache miss information and S-box misalignment features, finally successfully obtain CLEFIA-128 key for about 220 samples within seconds

An Improved Differential Fault Attack on Camellia

The S-box lookup is one of the most important operations in cipher algorithm design, and also is the most effective part to prevent traditional linear and differential attacks, however, when the physical implementation of the algorithm is considered, it becomes the weakest part of cryptosystems. This paper studies an active fault based implementation attack on block ciphers with S-box. Firstly, it proposes the basic DFA model and then presents two DFA models for Feistel and SPN structure block ciphers. Secondly, based on the Feistel DFA model, it presents several improved attacks on Camellia encryption and proposes new attacks on Camellia key schedule. By injecting one byte random fault into the r-1th round left register or the the r-1th round key, after solving 8 equations to recover 5 or 6 propagated differential fault of the rth round left register, 5 or 6 bytes of the rth equivalent subkey can be recovered at one time. Simulation experiments demonstrate that about 16 faulty ciphertexts are enough to obtain Camellia-128 key, and about 32, 24 ciphertexts are required to obtain both Camellia-192/256 key with and without FL/FL-1 layer respectively. Compared with the previous study by ZHOU Yongbin et. al. by injecting one byte fault into the rth round left register to recover 1 equivalent subkey byte and obtaining Camellia-128 and Camellia-192/256 with 64 and 96 faulty ciphertexts respectively, our attacks not only extend the fault location, but also improve the fault injection efficiency and decrease the faulty ciphertexts number, besides, our DFA model on Camellia encryption can be easily extended to DFA on Camellia key schedule case, while ZHOU’s can not. The attack model proposed in this paper can be adapted into most of the block ciphers with S-boxes. Finally, the contradictions between traditional cryptography and implementation attacks are analyzed, the state of the art and future directions of the DFA on Block ciphers with S-boxes are discussed

Efficient Methods for Exploiting Faults Induced at AES Middle Rounds

Faults occurred during the operations in a hardware device cause many problems such as performance deterioration, unreliable output, etc. If a fault occurs in a cryptographic hardware device, the effect can be even serious because an adversary may exploit it to find the secret information stored in the device. More precisely, the adversary can find the key of a block cipher using differential information between correct and faulty ciphertexts obtained by inducing faults during the computation of ciphertexts. This kind of attack is called \emph{Differential Fault Analysis} (DFA). Among many ciphers \emph{Advanced Encryption Standard} (AES) has been the main target of DFA due to its popularity. AES is widely used in different platforms and systems including Intel and AMD microprocessors. Normally DFA on AES exploits faults induced at the last few rounds. Hence, a general countermeasure is to recompute the last few rounds of AES and compare it with the original output. As redundancy is a costly countermeasure, one should ascertain exactly which rounds need to be protected. In 2006, Phan and Yen introduced a new type of DFA, so called Square-DFA, that works even when faults are induced into some middle rounds. However, it is impractical as it requires several hundreds of faulty ciphertexts as well as a bit fault model. In this article, we propose new attacks that need only dozens of faulty ciphertexts in a byte fault model. Normally it is believed that randomly corrupting a byte is easier than corrupting a specific bit. In addition, we extend the attacks to the AES-192 and AES-256, which is the first result in the literature

Differential Fault Analysis on AES with 192 and 256-Bit Keys

This paper describes a differential fault analysis (DFA) on AES with 192 and 256-bit keys. We show a new attack in which both 192 and 256-bit keys are retrieved within a feasible computational time. In order to verify the proposed attack and estimate the calculation time, we implement the proposed attack using C code on a PC. As a result, we successfully recover the original 192-bit key using 3 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts within 5 minutes, and 256-bit key using 2 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts and 2 pairs of correct and faulty plaintexts within 10 minutes