480 research outputs found
Design and evaluation of countermeasures against fault injection attacks and power side-channel leakage exploration for AES block cipher
Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) and Power Analysis (PA) attacks, have become the main
methods for exploiting the vulnerabilities of physical implementations of block ciphers, currently used in
a multitude of applications, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). In order to minimize these
types of vulnerabilities, several mechanisms have been proposed to detect fault attacks. However, these
mechanisms can have a signi cant cost, not fully covering the implementations against fault attacks or not
taking into account the leakage of the information exploitable by the power analysis attacks. In this paper,
four different approaches are proposed with the aim of protecting the AES block cipher against DFA. The
proposed solutions are based on Hamming code and parity bits as signature generators for the internal state of
the AES cipher. These allow to detect DFA exploitable faults, from bit to byte level. The proposed solutions
have been applied to a T-box based AES block cipher implemented on Field Programmable Gate Array
(FPGA). Experimental results suggest a fault coverage of 98.5% and 99.99% with an area penalty of 9%
and 36% respectively, for the parity bit signature generators and a fault coverage of 100% with an area
penalty of 18% and 42% respectively when Hamming code signature generator is used. In addition, none
of the proposed countermeasures impose a frequency degradation, in respect to the unprotected cipher. The
proposed work goes further in the evaluation of the proposed DFA countermeasures by evaluating the impact
of these structures in terms of power side-channel. The obtained results suggest that no extra information
leakage is produced that can be exploited by PA. Overall, the proposed DFA countermeasures provide a
high fault coverage protection with a low cost in terms of area and power consumption and no PA security
degradation
Applying Grover's algorithm to AES: quantum resource estimates
We present quantum circuits to implement an exhaustive key search for the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and analyze the quantum resources required
to carry out such an attack. We consider the overall circuit size, the number
of qubits, and the circuit depth as measures for the cost of the presented
quantum algorithms. Throughout, we focus on Clifford gates as the
underlying fault-tolerant logical quantum gate set. In particular, for all
three variants of AES (key size 128, 192, and 256 bit) that are standardized in
FIPS-PUB 197, we establish precise bounds for the number of qubits and the
number of elementary logical quantum gates that are needed to implement
Grover's quantum algorithm to extract the key from a small number of AES
plaintext-ciphertext pairs.Comment: 13 pages, 3 figures, 5 tables; to appear in: Proceedings of the 7th
International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQCrypto 2016
Combined Attacks on the AES Key Schedule
We present new combined attacks on the AES key schedule based on the work of Roche et al. The main drawbacks of the original attack are: the need for high repeatability of the fault, a very particular fault model and a very high complexity of the key recovery algorithm. We consider more practical fault models, we obtain improved key recovery algorithms and we present more attack paths for combined attacks on AES. We propose to inject faults on the different operations of the key schedule instead of the key state of round 9 or the corresponding data state. We also consider fault injections in AES constants such as the RCON or the affine transformation of the SubWord. By corrupting these constants, the attacker can easily deduce the value of the error. The key recovery complexity can then be greatly improved. Notably, we can obtain a complexity identical to a classical differential side-channel attack. Our attacks defeat most AES implementations secure against both high-order side-channel attacks and fault attacks
Integrated Evaluation Platform for Secured Devices
International audienceIn this paper, we describe the structure of a FPGAsmart card emulator. The aim of such an emulator is to improvethe behaviour of the whole architecture when faults occur. Withinthis card, an embedded Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)protected against DFA is inserted as well as a fault injectionblock. We also present the microprocessor core which controlsthe whole card
Electromagnetic glitch on the AES round counter
International audienceThis article presents a Round Addition Analysis on a software implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm. The round keys are computed on-the-fly during each encryption. A non-invasive transient fault injection is achieved on the AES round counter. The attack is performed by injecting a very short electromagnetic glitch on a 32-bit microcontroller based on the arm Cortex-M3 processor. Using this experimental setup, we are able to disrupt the round counter increment at the end of the penultimate round and execute one additional round. This faulty execution enables us to recover the encryption key with only two pairs of corresponding correct and faulty ciphertexts
Efficient Error detection Architectures for Low-Energy Block Ciphers with the Case Study of Midori Benchmarked on FPGA
Achieving secure, high performance implementations for constrained applications such as implantable and wearable medical devices is a priority in efficient block ciphers. However, security of these algorithms is not guaranteed in presence of malicious and natural faults. Recently, a new lightweight block cipher, Midori, has been proposed which optimizes the energy consumption besides having low latency and hardware complexity. This algorithm is proposed in two energy-efficient varients, i.e., Midori64 and Midori128, with block sizes equal to 64 and 128 bits. In this thesis, fault diagnosis schemes for variants of Midori are proposed. To the best of the our knowledge, there has been no fault diagnosis scheme presented in the literature for Midori to date. The fault diagnosis schemes are provided for the nonlinear S-box layer and for the round structures with both 64-bit and 128-bit Midori symmetric key ciphers. The proposed schemes are benchmarked on field-programmable gate array (FPGA) and their error coverage is assessed with fault-injection simulations. These proposed error detection architectures make the implementations of this new low-energy lightweight block cipher more reliable
Physical functions : the common factor of side-channel and fault attacks ?
International audienceSecurity is a key component for information technologies and communication. Among the security threats, a very important one is certainly due to vulnerabilities of the integrated circuits that implement cryptographic algorithms. These electronic devices (such as smartcards) could fall into the hands of malicious people and then could be sub-ject to "physical attacks". These attacks are generally classified into two categories : fault and side-channel attacks. One of the main challenges to secure circuits against such attacks is to propose methods and tools to estimate as soundly as possible, the efficiency of protections. Numer-ous works attend to provide tools based on sound statistical techniques but, to our knowledge, only address side-channel attacks. In this article, a formal link between fault and side-channel attacks is presented. The common factor between them is what we called the 'physical' function which is an extension of the concept of 'leakage function' widely used in side-channel community. We think that our work could make possible the re-use (certainly modulo some adjustments) for fault attacks of the strong theoretical background developed for side-channel attacks. This work could also make easier the combination of side-channel and fault attacks and thus, certainly could facilitate the discovery of new attack paths. But more importantly, the notion of physical functions opens from now new challenges about estimating the protection of circuits
An Improved Differential Fault Attack on Camellia
The S-box lookup is one of the most important operations in cipher algorithm design, and also is the most effective part to prevent traditional linear and differential attacks, however, when the physical implementation of the algorithm is considered, it becomes the weakest part of cryptosystems. This paper studies an active fault based implementation attack on block ciphers with S-box. Firstly, it proposes the basic DFA model and then presents two DFA models for Feistel and SPN structure block ciphers. Secondly, based on the Feistel DFA model, it presents several improved attacks on Camellia encryption and proposes new attacks on Camellia key schedule. By injecting one byte random fault into the r-1th round left register or the the r-1th round key, after solving 8 equations to recover 5 or 6 propagated differential fault of the rth round left register, 5 or 6 bytes of the rth equivalent subkey can be recovered at one time. Simulation experiments demonstrate that about 16 faulty ciphertexts are enough to obtain Camellia-128 key, and about 32, 24 ciphertexts are required to obtain both Camellia-192/256 key with and without FL/FL-1 layer respectively. Compared with the previous study by ZHOU Yongbin et. al. by injecting one byte fault into the rth round left register to recover 1 equivalent subkey byte and obtaining Camellia-128 and Camellia-192/256 with 64 and 96 faulty ciphertexts respectively, our attacks not only extend the fault location, but also improve the fault injection efficiency and decrease the faulty ciphertexts number, besides, our DFA model on Camellia encryption can be easily extended to DFA on Camellia key schedule case, while ZHOU’s can not. The attack model proposed in this paper can be adapted into most of the block ciphers with S-boxes. Finally, the contradictions between traditional cryptography and implementation attacks are analyzed, the state of the art and future directions of the DFA on Block ciphers with S-boxes are discussed
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