38,894 research outputs found
Dichotomy for voting systems
AbstractScoring protocols are a broad class of voting systems. Each is defined by a vector (α1,α2,…,αm), α1⩾α2⩾⋯⩾αm, of integers such that each voter contributes α1 points to his/her first choice, α2 points to his/her second choice, and so on, and any candidate receiving the most points is a winner.What is it about scoring-protocol election systems that makes some have the desirable property of being NP-complete to manipulate, while others can be manipulated in polynomial time? We find the complete, dichotomizing answer: Diversity of dislike. Every scoring-protocol election system having two or more point values assigned to candidates other than the favorite—i.e., having ‖{αi|2⩽i⩽m}‖⩾2—is NP-complete to manipulate. Every other scoring-protocol election system can be manipulated in polynomial time. In effect, we show that—other than trivial systems (where all candidates alway tie), plurality voting, and plurality voting's transparently disguised translations—every scoring-protocol election system is NP-complete to manipulate
Aggregation of Votes with Multiple Positions on Each Issue
We consider the problem of aggregating votes cast by a society on a fixed set
of issues, where each member of the society may vote for one of several
positions on each issue, but the combination of votes on the various issues is
restricted to a set of feasible voting patterns. We require the aggregation to
be supportive, i.e. for every issue the corresponding component of
every aggregator on every issue should satisfy . We prove that, in such a set-up, non-dictatorial
aggregation of votes in a society of some size is possible if and only if
either non-dictatorial aggregation is possible in a society of only two members
or a ternary aggregator exists that either on every issue is a majority
operation, i.e. the corresponding component satisfies , or on every issue is a minority operation, i.e.
the corresponding component satisfies We then introduce a notion of uniformly non-dictatorial
aggregator, which is defined to be an aggregator that on every issue, and when
restricted to an arbitrary two-element subset of the votes for that issue,
differs from all projection functions. We first give a characterization of sets
of feasible voting patterns that admit a uniformly non-dictatorial aggregator.
Then making use of Bulatov's dichotomy theorem for conservative constraint
satisfaction problems, we connect social choice theory with combinatorial
complexity by proving that if a set of feasible voting patterns has a
uniformly non-dictatorial aggregator of some arity then the multi-sorted
conservative constraint satisfaction problem on , in the sense introduced by
Bulatov and Jeavons, with each issue representing a sort, is tractable;
otherwise it is NP-complete
Exponential quantum enhancement for distributed addition with local nonlinearity
We consider classical and entanglement-assisted versions of a distributed
computation scheme that computes nonlinear Boolean functions of a set of input
bits supplied by separated parties. Communication between the parties is
restricted to take place through a specific apparatus which enforces the
constraints that all nonlinear, nonlocal classical logic is performed by a
single receiver, and that all communication occurs through a limited number of
one-bit channels. In the entanglement-assisted version, the number of channels
required to compute a Boolean function of fixed nonlinearity can become
exponentially smaller than in the classical version. We demonstrate this
exponential enhancement for the problem of distributed integer addition.Comment: To appear in Quantum Information Processin
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