435 research outputs found
Complexity of Conformant Election Manipulation
It is important to study how strategic agents can affect the outcome of an
election. There has been a long line of research in the computational study of
elections on the complexity of manipulative actions such as manipulation and
bribery. These problems model scenarios such as voters casting strategic votes
and agents campaigning for voters to change their votes to make a desired
candidate win. A common assumption is that the preferences of the voters follow
the structure of a domain restriction such as single peakedness, and so
manipulators only consider votes that also satisfy this restriction. We
introduce the model where the preferences of the voters define their own
restriction and strategic actions must ``conform'' by using only these votes.
In this model, the election after manipulation will retain common domain
restrictions. We explore the computational complexity of conformant
manipulative actions and we discuss how conformant manipulative actions relate
to other manipulative actions.Comment: A version of this paper will appear in the Proceedings of FCT 202
Election-Attack Complexity for More Natural Models
Elections are arguably the best way that a group of agents with preferences over a set of choices can reach a decision. This can include political domains, as well as multiagent systems in artificial-intelligence settings. It is well-known that every reasonable election system is manipulable, but determining whether such a manipulation exists may be computationally infeasible. We build on an exciting line of research that considers the complexity of election-attack problems, which include voters misrepresenting their preferences (manipulation) and attacks on the structure of the election itself (control). We must properly model such attacks and the preferences of the electorate to give us insight into the difficulty of election attacks in natural settings. This includes models for how the voters can state their preferences, their structure, and new models for the election attack itself.
We study several different natural models on the structure of the voters. In the computational study of election attacks it is generally assumed that voters strictly rank all of the candidates from most to least preferred. We consider the very natural model where voters are able to cast votes with ties, and the model where they additionally have a single-peaked structure. Specifically, we explore how voters with varying amounts of ties and structure in their preferences affect the computational complexity of different election attacks and the complexity of determining whether a given electorate is single-peaked.
For the representation of the voters, we consider how representing the voters succinctly affects the complexity of election attacks and discuss how approaches for the nonsuccinct case can be adapted.
Control and manipulation are two of the most commonly studied election-attack problems. We introduce a model of electoral control in the setting where some of the voters act strategically (i.e., are manipulators), and consider both the case where the agent controlling the election and the manipulators share a goal, and the case where they have competing goals.
The computational study of election-attack problems allows us to better understand how different election systems compare to one another, and it is important to study these problems for natural settings, as this thesis does
Modern Day Bucket Shops? Fantasy Sports and Illegal Exchanges
The rapid emergence of online daily fantasy sports has raised questions as to why the contests are allowed, while other forms of gambling are restricted. Historically, “bucket shops” were banned enterprises where businesses would effectively accept wagers on whether companies’ stock prices would go up or down. There was never an underlying investment in companies themselves, only a deposit into a “bucket.” While bucket shops have largely faded, we examine whether they have disappeared in name only. Our analysis opens up another avenue for regulators beyond the antiquated skill-versus-chance evaluation typically applied to gambling activities and suggests that certain fantasy contests may run counter to Commodity Futures Trading Commission regulations. Applying this existing regulatory framework would likely enhance consumer protection and market integrity
Disinformation and propaganda – impact on the functioning of the rule of law in the EU and its Member States. Study Requested by the LIBE committee. CEPS Special Report, February 2019
This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs and requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, assesses the impact of disinformation and strategic political propaganda disseminated through online social media sites. It examines effects on the functioning of the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights in the EU and its Member States.
The study formulates recommendations on how to tackle this threat to human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It specifically addresses the role of social media platform providers in this regard
Deliberative Democracy in the EU. Countering Populism with Participation and Debate. CEPS Paperback
Elections are the preferred way to freely transfer power from one
term to the next and from one political party or coalition to another.
They are an essential element of democracy. But if the process of
power transfer is corrupted, democracy risks collapse. Reliance on
voters, civil society organisations and neutral observers to fully
exercise their freedoms as laid down in international human rights
conventions is an integral part of holding democratic elections.
Without free, fair and regular elections, liberal democracy is
inconceivable.
Elections are no guarantee that democracy will take root and
hold, however. If the history of political participation in Europe over
the past 800 years is anything to go by, successful attempts at gaining
voice have been patchy, while leaders’ attempts to silence these
voices and consolidate their own power have been almost constant
(Blockmans, 2020).
Recent developments in certain EU member states have again
shown us that democratically elected leaders will try and use
majoritarian rule to curb freedoms, overstep the constitutional limits
of their powers, protect the interests of their cronies and recycle
themselves through seemingly free and fair elections. In their recent
book How Democracies Die, two Harvard professors of politics write:
“Since the end of the Cold War, most democratic breakdowns have
been caused not by generals and soldiers but by elected governments
themselves” (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018)
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