Ludics and its Applications to natural Language Semantics

Proofs, in Ludics, have an interpretation provided by their counter-proofs, that is the objects they interact with. We follow the same idea by proposing that sentence meanings are given by the counter-meanings they are opposed to in a dialectical interaction. The conception is at the intersection of a proof-theoretic and a game-theoretic accounts of semantics, but it enlarges them by allowing to deal with possibly infinite processes

Inferences and Dialogues in Ludics

International audience– We propose to use Ludics as a unified framework for the analysis of dialogue and as a reasoning system. Not only Ludics gives a denotational semantics for Linear Logic, but it uses interaction as a primitive notion. We first sketch a model for pragmatical and rhetorical aspects of dialogue after a brief review of the way the interactive aspect of dialogue may be represented in Ludics. Then we show how taking into account inferences that occur during a dialogue, with respect to a ISU-like model of dialogue. Through various examples we give an analysis of deductive inferences as well as processes making facts explicit that take place during knowledge updating

Ludics, dialogue and inferentialism

In this paper, we try to show that Ludics, a (pre-)logical framework invented by J-Y. Girard, enables us to rethink some of the relationships between Philosophy, Semantics and Pragmatics. In particular, Ludics helps to shed light on the nature of dialogue and to articulate features of Brandom\u27s inferentialism

Abstract machines for dialogue games

The notion of abstract Boehm tree has arisen as an operationally-oriented distillation of works on game semantics, and has been investigated in two papers. This paper revisits the notion, providing more syntactic support and more examples (like call-by-value evaluation) illustrating the generality of the underlying computing device. Precise correspondences between various formulations of the evaluation mechanism of abstract Boehm trees are established

Antilogic

This paper is an interim report of joint work begun in (Castelnérac & Marion 2009) on dialectic from Parmenides to Aristotle. In the first part we present rules for dialectical games, understood as a specific form of antilogikê developed by philosophers, and explain some of the key concepts of these dialectical games in terms of ideas from game semantics. In the games we describe, for a thesis A asserted by the answerer, a questioner must elicit the answerer’s assent to further assertions B1, B2,…, Bn, which form a scoreboard from which the questioner seeks to infer an impossibility (adunaton); we explain why the questioner must not insert any of his own assertions in the scoreboard, as well as the crucial role the Law of Non Contradiction, and why the games end with the inference to an impossibility, as opposed to the assertion of ¬A. In the second part we introduce some specific characteristics of Eleatic Antilogic as a method of enquiry. When Antilogic is used as a method of inquiry, then one must play not only the game beginning with a given thesis A, but also the game for ¬A as well as for A & ¬A, while using a peculiar set of opposite predicates to generate the arguments. In our discussion we hark back to Parmenides’ Poem, and illustrate our points with Zeno’s arguments about divisibility, Gorgias’ ontological argument from his treatise On Not-Being, and the second part of Plato’s Parmenides. We also identify numerous links to Aristotle, and conclude with some speculative comments on the origin of logic

Une introduction à la Ludique et à ses applications à la Pragmatique

Ce texte, écrit avec l'aide de spécialistes de la ludique (Marie-Renée Fleury et Myriam Quatrini) introduit à ce difficile sujet. En résumé, la ludique est une nouvelle manière de penser la logique, imaginée par Jean-Yves Girard, qui tente de dépasser le dualisme bien connu entre les preuves (objets syntaxiques) et les modèles (objets sémantiques). En ludique, les preuves s'opposent à des contre-preuves, le tout pouvant être subsumé sous le concept général d'épreuves (appellation proposée par Pierre Livet). On retrouve alors des notions mathématiques générales comme celle d'orthogonalité qui permettent de dessiner l'espace des "disputes". Les figures ainsi obtenues, appelées "dessins", peuvent être interprétées en termes de jeu et sont alors vues aussi comme des "desseins". La logique qu'on espère trouver au terme de cette exploration est celle qui possède les dessins les plus simples et les plus convaincants. Elle peut être la logique linéaire ou une de ses variantes (logique affine?). Le point de vue présenté dans ce papier introductif, qui sert de base à un programme financé par l'ANR (PRELUDE) est qu'on peut trouver dans la ludique un fondement commun à la logique et à la pragmatique des dialogues

All the world's a screen.

Charlotte Gould and Paul Sermon developed and presented this collaborative new artwork entitled 'All the World's a Screen', a live interactive telecommunications performance, to link public audiences in Manchester and Barcelona. On the evening of Saturday 28th May 2011 participants at MadLab in Manchester's Northern Quarter and Hangar Artist Studios in Poblenou, Barcelona were joined together on screen for the first time to create their very own interactive generative cinema experience, complete with sets, costumes and props. Employing the scenography techniques of Alfred Hitchcock the artists created a miniature film set in which the remote audiences acted and directed their own movie, transporting participants into animated environments and sets where they created unique personalised narratives

Variable types for meaning assembly: a logical syntax for generic noun phrases introduced by most

This paper proposes a way to compute the meanings associated with sentences with generic noun phrases corresponding to the generalized quantifier most. We call these generics specimens and they resemble stereotypes or prototypes in lexical semantics. The meanings are viewed as logical formulae that can thereafter be interpreted in your favourite models. To do so, we depart significantly from the dominant Fregean view with a single untyped universe. Indeed, our proposal adopts type theory with some hints from Hilbert \epsilon-calculus (Hilbert, 1922; Avigad and Zach, 2008) and from medieval philosophy, see e.g. de Libera (1993, 1996). Our type theoretic analysis bears some resemblance with ongoing work in lexical semantics (Asher 2011; Bassac et al. 2010; Moot, Pr\'evot and Retor\'e 2011). Our model also applies to classical examples involving a class, or a generic element of this class, which is not uttered but provided by the context. An outcome of this study is that, in the minimalism-contextualism debate, see Conrad (2011), if one adopts a type theoretical view, terms encode the purely semantic meaning component while their typing is pragmatically determined