Evaluating the replicability and specificity of evidence for natural pedagogy theory

Do infants understand that they are being communicated to? This thesis first outlines issues facing the field of infancy research that affect confidence in the literature on this (and any) topic to date. Following this, an introductory chapter evaluates evidence for the three core claims of Natural Pedagogy (NP), and the compatibility of this evidence with alternative theories. This is followed by three experimental chapters. In Study 1, we attempted two replications of the study with the highest theoretical value for NP (Yoon et al., 2008). This study has high stakes theoretically, as it is the only study providing evidence for the most specific claim of NP that is difficult to explain by low-level mechanisms. Therefore, a replication of this result that included a reduction of possible confounds and a more sophisticated measure of attention throughout the task was of great theoretical value. In this study, we were unable to replicate the original findings. In Study 2 we went beyond the evidence for the claims made in the outline of NP, and instead generated a new, specific prediction that we believe NP would make. This is important, as theories are only useful if they can make clear, testable predictions. In this study, we pitted pedagogically demonstrated actions and simple actions against each other and evaluated infants’ transmission of these actions to someone else. We found no evidence for NP, finding evidence for preferential transmission of simple actions instead. In Study 3 we went beyond NP, and tested a clear prediction stemming from an alternative low-level theory for how infants develop gaze-following ability. We found evidence that infants learn to gaze-follow through reinforcement. Overall, this thesis contributes to the vast literature on infants as recipients of communication, as well as highlighting methods for conducting open and reproducible infancy research

Measuring and Modulating Mimicry: Insights from Virtual Reality and Autism

Mimicry involves the unconscious imitation of other people’s behaviour. The social top-down response modulation (STORM) model has suggested that mimicry is a socially strategic behaviour which is modulated according to the social context, for example, we mimic more when someone is looking at us or if we want to affiliate with them. There has been a long debate over whether mimicry is different in autism, a condition characterised by differences in social interaction. STORM predicts that autistic people can and do mimic but do not change their mimicry behaviour according to the social context. Using a range of mimicry measures this thesis aimed to test STORM’s predictions. The first study employed a traditional reaction time measure of mimicry and demonstrated that direct gaze socially modulated mimicry responses in non-autistic adults but did not do so in autistic participants, in line with STORM’s predictions. In the next two studies, I found that non-autistic participants mimicked the movement trajectory of both virtual characters and human actors during an imitation game. Autistic participants also mimicked but did so to a lesser extent. However, this type of mimicry was resistant to the effects of social cues, such as eye-gaze and animacy, contrary to the predictions of STORM. In a fourth study, I manipulated the rationality of an actor’s movement trajectory and found that participants mimicked the trajectory even when the trajectory was rated as irrational. In a fifth study, I showed that people’s tendency to mimic the movements of others could change the choices that participants had previously made in private. This tendency was modulated by the kinematics of the character’s pointing movements. This thesis provides mixed support for STORM’s predictions and I discuss the reasons why this might be. I also make suggestions for how to better measure and modulate mimicry

Constructing an understanding of mind : the development of children's social understanding within social interaction

Theories of children's developing understanding of mind tend to emphasize either individualistic processes of theory formation, maturation, or introspection, or the process of enculturation. However, such theories must be able to account for the accumulating evidence of the role of social interaction in the development of social understanding. We propose an alternative account, according to which the development of children's social understanding occurs within triadic interaction involving the child's experience of the world as well as communicative interaction with others about their experience and beliefs (Chapman 1991; 1999). It is through such triadic interaction that children gradually construct knowledge of the world as well as knowledge of other people. We contend that the extent and nature of the social interaction children experience will influence the development of children's social understanding. Increased opportunity to engage in cooperative social interaction and exposure to talk about mental states should facilitate the development of social understanding. We review evidence suggesting that children's understanding of mind develops gradually in the context of social interaction. Therefore, we need a theory of development in this area that accords a fundamental role to social interaction, yet does not assume that children simply adopt socially available knowledge but rather that children construct an understanding of mind within social interaction

Proceedings of the Seventh Congress of the European Society for Research in Mathematics Education

International audienceThis volume contains the Proceedings of the Seventh Congress of the European Society for Research in Mathematics Education (ERME), which took place 9-13 February 2011, at Rzeszñw in Poland