Beyond the Iraq Study Group: The Elusive Goal of Sustained Growth; Strategic Insights, v. 6, issue 2 (March 2007)

This article appeared in Strategic Insights, v.6, issue 2 (March 2007)Since its release in early December 2006, the Iraq Study Group’s (ISG) military, political and diplomatic recommendations have generated wide-spread discussions. Unfortunately, the country’s economic recovery has received considerably less attention. Yet the country’s economic situation is quite dire. The ISG correctly notes that: (a) instead of meeting a target of 10 percent growth for 2006 only 4 percent was attained, (b) inflation is above 50 percent, (c) estimates of unemployment range from 20 to 60 percent, and (d) foreign investment is less than 1 percent of gross domestic product. In many regards the economic situation today has deteriorated from that under Saddam. In short “Too many Iraqis do not see tangible improvements in their economic situation.”Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing: Understanding Modern State-Building (and Counterinsurgency)

Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has become intimately involved in trying to strengthen weak and failed states. External actors, both multilaterally and unilaterally, have intervened in Europe, Asia, and Africa to bring internally conflicted parties together and to change the domestic authority structures of these countries. This dissertation explains how external actors can successfully contribute to the development of domestic authority structures in conflict-torn or post-conflict countries. Conventional state-building theories follow the Weberian conception of the modern state as an entity that maintains a monopoly over the legitimate use of violent coercion. Further, standard approaches to ending civil conflict recommend the use of population-centric strategies to achieve stability. These prevailing assumptions are problematic as they ignore a credible commitment problem that exists in conflict-torn societies: elites within the government and opposition have no incentive to disarm due to the rational fear that once they do so they will be taken advantage of by the opposing elites. This dissertation proposes a theory of self-enforcing stability to explain, from a rational-choice perspective, how it is possible to overcome this credible commitment problem. The theory contains four testable hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that an elite-centric, rather than population-centric, strategy will lead to greater success in establishing stability in conflict-torn states. Second, external actors contribute to the establishment of stability more successfully when they help nations establish limited access orders created by elite pacts rather than encouraging the creation of liberal democracies, or open access orders. Third, external actors must help internal actors overcome their underlying credible commitment problems by guaranteeing elite pacts. The final hypothesis is that the decentralization, or oligopolization, of violent means and rent-seeking opportunities balances power amongst elites, ensuring that competing elite groups can protect themselves from one another without threatening each other with overwhelming force. This dissertation finds support for the proposed theory’s hypotheses in its examination of two cases: the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960, and the stabilization effort in Iraq between 2006-2008, which includes the “Awakening Movement” and the “Surge. Both cases demonstrate how an external actor can contribute to developing enduring stability in conflict-torn societies by breaking from the standard Weberian conception of the state and population-centric focus. This dissertation concludes with a discussion of policy implications, based on the dissertation’s findings, for current state-building efforts in Afghanistan

Investigating the Complexities of Nation-building: A Sub-national Regional Perspective

Stabilization and reconstruction operations are necessary to secure and maintain the peace in the aftermath of conflict. The complexities of nation-building involve many different but interrelated systems and institutions. The basic structure of a country may or may not remain; its political, economic, and judicial systems, cultural, educational, medical, and military institutions, and critical infrastructure all vitally contribute to the overall progression of stability and prosperity. Understanding the significance of the dynamic relationships between the forces in play during stability and reconstruction operations is paramount to the successful conclusion of such missions. The system dynamics model proposed in this research functions as a support tool allowing decision makers and analysts to investigate different sets of decision approaches at a sub-national, regional level. Concentration on the regional level allows for specific identification and investigation of potentially troublesome regions, providing the model-user with more detailed information concerning the internal dynamics prevalent within the area of operations. Construction of two different measures via logistic regression, a probability of stabilization success and a probability of stabilization failure, provide indication as to the successful execution of stabilization and reconstruction operations. The proposed model is a general construct, widely adaptable to a variety of post-conflict nation-building scenarios. The model is notionally demonstrated using Operation Iraqi Freedom as a test case

Detention as a Peacemaking Strategy: The 2007-08 Iraq Surge and US Detention

The Surge in Iraq was one of the key foreign policy decisions of the past decade. Its success prompted a second surge into Afghanistan by a new president a few years later. The success of the Iraq surge has prompted work by academics and policymakers alike. One factor of the success of the surge has been understudied by both academics and policymakers is the role played by the detention of individuals and the changes in detention policy that accompanied the surge. In this paper I outline a brief informal model of how an intervening state can use detention to help alleviate some of the causes of intergroup conflict to increase the odds of successful intervention. I then show how the changes in US detention policy during the surge contributed to the success of the overall strategy. A key argument in this paper is that detention contributed to the success of the surge even though it was not a primary or public aspect of the surge strateg

Perception is Everything: Repairing the Image of American Drone Warfare

This thesis will trace the United States’ development of unmanned warfare from its initial use in the World Wars through the Cold War to its final maturation in the War on Terror. The examination will provide a summary of unmanned warfare’s history, its gradual adoption, and concerns regarding the proliferation of drones use to understand the emphasis on unmanned weapons in the American Military. In each phase of development, a single program will be focused on to highlight special areas of interest in the modern day. Finally, the modern era of unmanned systems will focus on the growing integration of new weapon systems which no longer fulfill niche roles in the armory but act as fully vetted frontline combatants. Brought together, this examination will show drones have earned their place as integral tools in the American military inventory as faithful defenders of democracy

Governance, Identity, and Counterinsurgency Strategy

The premise of most Western thinking on counterinsurgency is that success depends on establishing a perception of legitimacy among local populations. The path to legitimacy is often seen as the improvement of governance in the form of effective and efficient administration of government and public services. However, good governance is not the only possible basis for claims to legitimacy. Prompted by recent experience in Iraq, the research presented here formally considers whether in insurgencies where ethno-religious identities are politically salient, claims to legitimacy may rest more on the identity of who governs, rather than on how whoever governs governs. Specifically, this dissertation poses and tests the hypothesis that in the presence of major ethno-religious cleavages, good governance will contribute much less to counterinsurgent success than will efforts toward reaching political agreements that directly address those cleavages. The dissertation reviews and synthesizes the record of scholarship and policy regarding insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, the politics of ethnic identity, governance, and legitimacy. Building on this synthesis, it presents an analytic framework designed to formalize the terms of the main hypothesis sufficiently to enable empirical tests. It then applies that framework to brief analyses of counterinsurgent experiences in Malaya, Algeria, South Vietnam, and then of two detailed local cases studies of American counterinsurgency operations in Iraq: Ramadi from 2004-2005; and Tal Afar from 2005-2006. These Iraq case studies are based on primary research, including 37 interviews with participants and eyewitnesses. The cases examined yield ample evidence that ethno-religious identity politics do shape counterinsurgency outcomes in important ways, and also offer qualified support for the hypothesis about the relative importance to counterinsurgent success of identity politics versus good governance. However, the cases do not discredit the utility to counterinsurgents of providing good governance, and they corroborate the traditional view that population security is the most important element of successful counterinsurgency strategy. Key policy implications include the importance of making strategy development as sensitive as possible to the dynamics of identity politics, and to local variations and complexity in causal relationships among popular loyalties, grievances, and political violence

Detention as a Peacemaking Strategy: The 2007-08 Iraq Surge and US Detention

The Surge in Iraq was one of the key foreign policy decisions of the past decade. Its success prompted a second surge into Afghanistan by a new president a few years later. The success of the Iraq surge has prompted work by academics and policymakers alike. One factor of the success of the surge has been understudied by both academics and policymakers is the role played by the detention of individuals and the changes in detention policy that accompanied the surge. In this paper I outline a brief informal model of how an intervening state can use detention to help alleviate some of the causes of intergroup conflict to increase the odds of successful intervention. I then show how the changes in US detention policy during the surge contributed to the success of the overall strategy. A key argument in this paper is that detention contributed to the success of the surge even though it was not a primary or public aspect of the surge strateg

Modeling and Analysis of Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The forces at play in reconstruction operations are a complex system of time phased interlocking cause and effect relationships that are not thoroughly understood. A model capable of capturing the general dynamics involved in post-conflict reconstruction would provide insight to decision makers regarding potential policy alternatives. This research effort demonstrates the viability of using systems dynamics modeling techniques to simulate the establishment of public order and safety in a post-conflict reconstruction operation (Phase IV operations). A high level generic framework is developed that can be used as a general template for modeling post-conflict reconstruction. It is then demonstrated with a notional test case based on the OIF AOR

Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies

The author examines the British experience in building and training indigenous police and military forces during the Malaya and Cyprus insurgencies. These two insurgencies provide a dramatic contrast to the issue of training local security forces. In Malaya, the British developed a very successful strategy for training the Malayan Police and army. In Cyprus, the British strategy for building and training local security forces generally was ineffective. The author argues that some important lessons can be drawn from these case studies that are directly applicable to current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1719/thumbnail.jp

Counterinsurgency in the 21st century the foundation and implications of the new U.S. doctrine

In December 2006, the U.S. Army published its new counterinsurgency (COIN) Field Manual (FM 3-24). FM 3-24 is the much-anticipated capstone doctrinal COIN guide for the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Its intent is "to fill a doctrinal gap" for fighting COIN by delivering "a manual that provides principles and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations." The importance of developing a coherent, interdisciplinary approach that helps to fill the "doctrina" and capability gaps facing the U.S. military in the asymmetrical warfare spectrum, including COIN, cannot be overstated. In light of this, how well do the new guidelines in FM 3-24 for conducting a COIN campaign align with historical and social science lessons on counterinsurgency? FM 3-24 outlines U.S. COIN doctrine in the form of strategies called Logical Lines of Operation (LLOs). With this in mind, are there cases in the Middle East where FM 3-24's LLOs have been applied and produced their intended effects? If they were not used and the state power's desired "endstate" was achieved, what strategies were used to achieve the COIN campaign objectives? This thesis assesses the extent to which the field manual aligns with insights and practices from historical COIN campaigns in the Middle East as well as the new doctrine's ability to supply the United States with a COIN strategy that incorporates insights and conclusions from academia. Our findings indicate that FM 3-24 is a necessary step in developing an effective and coherent U.S. approach to COIN. However, it fails to incorporate some more contemporary social movement theory explanations into its strategies. For example, it fails to recognize the relative importance political inclusion in counterinsurgency strategies versus other variables, such as security, as a primary means of success in counterinsurgency campaigns.http://archive.org/details/counterinsurgenc109453099US Army (USA) authorsApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited