1,981 research outputs found

    The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Simple Stochastic Multiplayer Games

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    We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in simple stochastic multiplayer games. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval may lead to undecidability. In particular, we prove that the following problem is undecidable: Given a game G, does there exist a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of G where player 0 wins with probability 1. Moreover, this problem remains undecidable if it is restricted to strategies with (unbounded) finite memory. However, if mixed strategies are allowed, decidability remains an open problem. One way to obtain a provably decidable variant of the problem is restricting the strategies to be positional or stationary. For the complexity of these two problems, we obtain a common lower bound of NP and upper bounds of NP and PSPACE respectively.Comment: 23 pages; revised versio

    Limit Your Consumption! Finding Bounds in Average-energy Games

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    Energy games are infinite two-player games played in weighted arenas with quantitative objectives that restrict the consumption of a resource modeled by the weights, e.g., a battery that is charged and drained. Typically, upper and/or lower bounds on the battery capacity are part of the problem description. Here, we consider the problem of determining upper bounds on the average accumulated energy or on the capacity while satisfying a given lower bound, i.e., we do not determine whether a given bound is sufficient to meet the specification, but if there exists a sufficient bound to meet it. In the classical setting with positive and negative weights, we show that the problem of determining the existence of a sufficient bound on the long-run average accumulated energy can be solved in doubly-exponential time. Then, we consider recharge games: here, all weights are negative, but there are recharge edges that recharge the energy to some fixed capacity. We show that bounding the long-run average energy in such games is complete for exponential time. Then, we consider the existential version of the problem, which turns out to be solvable in polynomial time: here, we ask whether there is a recharge capacity that allows the system player to win the game. We conclude by studying tradeoffs between the memory needed to implement strategies and the bounds they realize. We give an example showing that memory can be traded for bounds and vice versa. Also, we show that increasing the capacity allows to lower the average accumulated energy.Comment: In Proceedings QAPL'16, arXiv:1610.0769

    The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Limit-Average Games

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    We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is decidable, even if we put a constraint on the payoff of the equilibrium. Our undecidability result holds even for a restricted class of concurrent games, where nonzero rewards occur only on terminal states. Moreover, we show that the constrained existence problem is undecidable not only for concurrent games but for turn-based games with the same restriction on rewards. Finally, we prove that the constrained existence problem for Nash equilibria in (pure or randomised) stationary strategies is decidable and analyse its complexity.Comment: 34 page

    Non-Zero Sum Games for Reactive Synthesis

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    In this invited contribution, we summarize new solution concepts useful for the synthesis of reactive systems that we have introduced in several recent publications. These solution concepts are developed in the context of non-zero sum games played on graphs. They are part of the contributions obtained in the inVEST project funded by the European Research Council.Comment: LATA'16 invited pape

    Tropically convex constraint satisfaction

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    A semilinear relation S is max-closed if it is preserved by taking the componentwise maximum. The constraint satisfaction problem for max-closed semilinear constraints is at least as hard as determining the winner in Mean Payoff Games, a notorious problem of open computational complexity. Mean Payoff Games are known to be in the intersection of NP and co-NP, which is not known for max-closed semilinear constraints. Semilinear relations that are max-closed and additionally closed under translations have been called tropically convex in the literature. One of our main results is a new duality for open tropically convex relations, which puts the CSP for tropically convex semilinaer constraints in general into NP intersected co-NP. This extends the corresponding complexity result for scheduling under and-or precedence constraints, or equivalently the max-atoms problem. To this end, we present a characterization of max-closed semilinear relations in terms of syntactically restricted first-order logic, and another characterization in terms of a finite set of relations L that allow primitive positive definitions of all other relations in the class. We also present a subclass of max-closed constraints where the CSP is in P; this class generalizes the class of max-closed constraints over finite domains, and the feasibility problem for max-closed linear inequalities. Finally, we show that the class of max-closed semilinear constraints is maximal in the sense that as soon as a single relation that is not max-closed is added to L, the CSP becomes NP-hard.Comment: 29 pages, 2 figure

    The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Multiplayer Games

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    We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in turn-based stochastic multiplayer games with omega-regular objectives. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval may lead to undecidability. In particular, we prove that the following problem is undecidable: Given a game G, does there exist a Nash equilibrium of G where Player 0 wins with probability 1? Moreover, this problem remains undecidable when restricted to pure strategies or (pure) strategies with finite memory. One way to obtain a decidable variant of the problem is to restrict the strategies to be positional or stationary. For the complexity of these two problems, we obtain a common lower bound of NP and upper bounds of NP and PSPACE respectively. Finally, we single out a special case of the general problem that, in many cases, admits an efficient solution. In particular, we prove that deciding the existence of an equilibrium in which each player either wins or loses with probability 1 can be done in polynomial time for games where the objective of each player is given by a parity condition with a bounded number of priorities

    Equilibria, Fixed Points, and Complexity Classes

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    Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games (stochastic and other games); stable configurations of neural networks; analysing basic stochastic models for evolution like branching processes and for language like stochastic context-free grammars; and models that incorporate the basic primitives of probability and recursion like recursive Markov chains. It is not known whether these problems can be solved in polynomial time. There are certain common computational principles underlying different types of equilibria, which are captured by the complexity classes PLS, PPAD, and FIXP. Representative complete problems for these classes are respectively, pure Nash equilibria in games where they are guaranteed to exist, (mixed) Nash equilibria in 2-player normal form games, and (mixed) Nash equilibria in normal form games with 3 (or more) players. This paper reviews the underlying computational principles and the corresponding classes

    Should Sports Professionals Consider Their Adversary's Strategy? A Case Study of Match Play in Golf

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    This study explores strategic considerations in professional golf's Match Play format, challenging the conventional focus on individual performance. Leveraging PGA Tour data, we investigate the impact of factoring in an adversary's strategy. Our findings suggest that while slight strategy adjustments can be advantageous in specific scenarios, the overall benefit of considering an opponent's strategy remains modest. This confirms the common wisdom in golf, reinforcing the recommendation to adhere to optimal stroke-play strategies due to challenges in obtaining precise opponent statistics. We believe that the methodology employed here could offer valuable insights into whether opponents' performances should also be considered in other two-player or team sports, such as tennis, darts, soccer, volleyball, etc. We hope that this research will pave the way for new avenues of study in these areas
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