207 research outputs found
The Impatient May Use Limited Optimism to Minimize Regret
Discounted-sum games provide a formal model for the study of reinforcement
learning, where the agent is enticed to get rewards early since later rewards
are discounted. When the agent interacts with the environment, she may regret
her actions, realizing that a previous choice was suboptimal given the behavior
of the environment. The main contribution of this paper is a PSPACE algorithm
for computing the minimum possible regret of a given game. To this end, several
results of independent interest are shown. (1) We identify a class of
regret-minimizing and admissible strategies that first assume that the
environment is collaborating, then assume it is adversarial---the precise
timing of the switch is key here. (2) Disregarding the computational cost of
numerical analysis, we provide an NP algorithm that checks that the regret
entailed by a given time-switching strategy exceeds a given value. (3) We show
that determining whether a strategy minimizes regret is decidable in PSPACE
Non-Zero Sum Games for Reactive Synthesis
In this invited contribution, we summarize new solution concepts useful for
the synthesis of reactive systems that we have introduced in several recent
publications. These solution concepts are developed in the context of non-zero
sum games played on graphs. They are part of the contributions obtained in the
inVEST project funded by the European Research Council.Comment: LATA'16 invited pape
Limit Your Consumption! Finding Bounds in Average-energy Games
Energy games are infinite two-player games played in weighted arenas with
quantitative objectives that restrict the consumption of a resource modeled by
the weights, e.g., a battery that is charged and drained. Typically, upper
and/or lower bounds on the battery capacity are part of the problem
description. Here, we consider the problem of determining upper bounds on the
average accumulated energy or on the capacity while satisfying a given lower
bound, i.e., we do not determine whether a given bound is sufficient to meet
the specification, but if there exists a sufficient bound to meet it.
In the classical setting with positive and negative weights, we show that the
problem of determining the existence of a sufficient bound on the long-run
average accumulated energy can be solved in doubly-exponential time. Then, we
consider recharge games: here, all weights are negative, but there are recharge
edges that recharge the energy to some fixed capacity. We show that bounding
the long-run average energy in such games is complete for exponential time.
Then, we consider the existential version of the problem, which turns out to be
solvable in polynomial time: here, we ask whether there is a recharge capacity
that allows the system player to win the game.
We conclude by studying tradeoffs between the memory needed to implement
strategies and the bounds they realize. We give an example showing that memory
can be traded for bounds and vice versa. Also, we show that increasing the
capacity allows to lower the average accumulated energy.Comment: In Proceedings QAPL'16, arXiv:1610.0769
SYNERGY OF BUILDING CYBERSECURITY SYSTEMS
The development of the modern world community is closely related to advances in computing resources and cyberspace. The formation and expansion of the range of services is based on the achievements of mankind in the field of high technologies. However, the rapid growth of computing resources, the emergence of a full-scale quantum computer tightens the requirements for security systems not only for information and communication systems, but also for cyber-physical systems and technologies.
The methodological foundations of building security systems for critical infrastructure facilities based on modeling the processes of behavior of antagonistic agents in security systems are discussed in the first chapter.
The concept of information security in social networks, based on mathematical models of data protection, taking into account the influence of specific parameters of the social network, the effects on the network are proposed in second chapter.
The nonlinear relationships of the parameters of the defense system, attacks, social networks, as well as the influence of individual characteristics of users and the nature of the relationships between them, takes into account.
In the third section, practical aspects of the methodology for constructing post-quantum algorithms for asymmetric McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems on algebraic codes (elliptic and modified elliptic codes), their mathematical models and practical algorithms are considered. Hybrid crypto-code constructions of McEliece and Niederreiter on defective codes are proposed. They can significantly reduce the energy costs for implementation, while ensuring the required level of cryptographic strength of the system as a whole. The concept of security of corporate information and educational systems based on the construction of an adaptive information security system is proposed.
ISBN 978-617-7319-31-2 (on-line)ISBN 978-617-7319-32-9 (print)
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How to Cite: Yevseiev, S., Ponomarenko, V., Laptiev, O., Milov, O., Korol, O., Milevskyi, S. et. al.; Yevseiev, S., Ponomarenko, V., Laptiev, O., Milov, O. (Eds.) (2021). Synergy of building cybersecurity systems. Kharkiv: РС ТЕСHNOLOGY СЕNTЕR, 188. doi: http://doi.org/10.15587/978-617-7319-31-2
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Indexing:
Розвиток сучасної світової спільноти тісно пов’язаний з досягненнями в області обчислювальних ресурсів і кіберпростору. Формування та розширення асортименту послуг базується на досягненнях людства у галузі високих технологій. Однак стрімке зростання обчислювальних ресурсів, поява повномасштабного квантового комп’ютера посилює вимоги до систем безпеки не тільки інформаційно-комунікаційних, але і до кіберфізичних систем і технологій.
У першому розділі обговорюються методологічні основи побудови систем безпеки для об'єктів критичної інфраструктури на основі моделювання процесів поведінки антагоністичних агентів у систем безпеки.
У другому розділі пропонується концепція інформаційної безпеки в соціальних мережах, яка заснована на математичних моделях захисту даних, з урахуванням впливу конкретних параметрів соціальної мережі та наслідків для неї.
Враховуються нелінійні взаємозв'язки параметрів системи захисту, атак, соціальних мереж, а також вплив індивідуальних характеристик користувачів і характеру взаємовідносин між ними.
У третьому розділі розглядаються практичні аспекти методології побудови постквантових алгоритмів для асиметричних криптосистем Мак-Еліса та Нідеррейтера на алгебраїчних кодах (еліптичних та модифікованих еліптичних кодах), їх математичні моделі та практичні алгоритми. Запропоновано гібридні конструкції криптокоду Мак-Еліса та Нідеррейтера на дефектних кодах. Вони дозволяють істотно знизити енергетичні витрати на реалізацію, забезпечуючи при цьому необхідний рівень криптографічної стійкості системи в цілому. Запропоновано концепцію безпеки корпоративних інформаційних та освітніх систем, які засновані на побудові адаптивної системи захисту інформації.
ISBN 978-617-7319-31-2 (on-line)ISBN 978-617-7319-32-9 (print)
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Як цитувати: Yevseiev, S., Ponomarenko, V., Laptiev, O., Milov, O., Korol, O., Milevskyi, S. et. al.; Yevseiev, S., Ponomarenko, V., Laptiev, O., Milov, O. (Eds.) (2021). Synergy of building cybersecurity systems. Kharkiv: РС ТЕСHNOLOGY СЕNTЕR, 188. doi: http://doi.org/10.15587/978-617-7319-31-2
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Індексація:
 
Incentive Stackelberg Mean-payoff Games
We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff
games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as
Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria).
Recall that a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player can improve
his payoff by changing his strategy unilaterally. In the setting of incentive
and leader equilibria, there is a distinguished player called the leader who
can assign strategies to all other players, referred to as her followers. A
strategy profile is a leader strategy profile if no player, except for the
leader, can improve his payoff by changing his strategy unilaterally, and a
leader equilibrium is a leader strategy profile with a maximal return for the
leader. In the proposed case of incentive equilibria, the leader can
additionally influence the behaviour of her followers by transferring parts of
her payoff to her followers. The ability to incentivise her followers provides
the leader with more freedom in selecting strategy profiles, and we show that
this can indeed improve the payoff for the leader in such games. The key
fundamental result of the paper is the existence of incentive equilibria in
mean-payoff games. We further show that the decision problem related to
constructing incentive equilibria is NP-complete. On a positive note, we show
that, when the number of players is fixed, the complexity of the problem falls
in the same class as two-player mean-payoff games. We also present an
implementation of the proposed algorithms, and discuss experimental results
that demonstrate the feasibility of the analysis of medium sized games.Comment: 15 pages, references, appendix, 5 figure
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