34,334 research outputs found
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Definition of a Balancing Point for Electricity Transmission Contracts
Electricity transmission contracts allocate scarce resources, allow hedging against locational price differences and provide information to guide investment. Liquidity is increased if all transmission contracts are defined relative to one balancing point, then a set of two contracts can replicate any point to point contract. We propose an algorithm and apply it to the European electricity network to identify a well connected balancing point that exhibits minimal relative cross-price responses and hence reduces market power exercised by generation companies. Market level data which is difficult to obtain or model such as price levels in different regions or that is dependent on the time scale of interaction, as demand elasticity, is not required. The only critical input quantities are assumptions on future transmission constraint patterns
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A Comparison of Electricity Market Designs in Networks
In the real world two classes of market designs are implemented to trade electricity in transmission constrained networks. Analytical results show that in two node networks integrated market designs reduce the ability of electricity generators to exercise market power relative to separated market designs. In multi node networks countervailing effects make an analytic analysis difficult. We present a formulation of both market designs as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. We find that in a realistic network, prices are lower with the integrated market design
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Electricity transmission: an overview of the current debate
Electricity transmission has emerged as critical for successfully liberalising powermarkets. This paper surveys the issues currently under discussion and provides a framework for the remaining papers in this issue. We conclude that signalling the efficient location of generation investment might require even a competitive LMP system to be complemented with deep connection charges. Although a Europe-wide LMP system is desirable, it appears politically problematic, so an integrated system of market coupling, possibly evolving by voluntary participation, should have high priority. Merchant investors may be able to increase interconnector capacity, although this is not unproblematic and raises new regulatory issues. A key issue that needs further research is how to better incentivize TSOs, especially with respect to cross-border issues
Merchant Transmission Investment
We examine the performance attributes of a merchant transmission investment framework that relies on �market driven� transmission investment to provide the infrastructure to support competitive wholesale markets for electricity. Under a stringent set of assumptions, the merchant investment model appears to solve the natural monopoly problem and the associated need for regulating transmission companies traditionally associated with electric transmission networks. We expand the model to incorporate imperfection in wholesale electricity markets, lumpiness in transmission investment opportunities, stochastic attributes of transmission networks and associated property rights definition issues, the effects of the behaviour system operators and transmission owners on transmission capacity and reliability, co-ordination and bargaining considerations, forward contract, commitment and asset specificity issues. This significantly undermines the attractive properties of the merchant investment model. Relying primarily on a market driven investment framework to govern investment is likely to lead to inefficient investment decisions and undermine the performance of competitive markets
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Electricity Reform in Chile: Lessons for Developing Countries
Chile was the first country in the world to implement a comprehensive reform of itselectricity sector in the recent period. Among developing countries only Argentina hashad a comparably comprehensive and successful reform. This paper traces the history ofthe Chilean reform, which began in 1982, and assesses its progress and its lessons. Weconclude that the reform has been very successful. We suggest lessons for the generation,transmission and distribution sectors, as well as the economic regulation of electricity andthe general institutional environment favourable to reform. We note that while the initialmarket structure and regulatory arrangements did give rise to certain problems, theoverall experience argues strongly for the private ownership and operation of theelectricity industry
Market-based Investment in Electricity Transmission Networks: Controllable Flow
This paper discusses unregulated market-based electricity transmissio
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