Determinacy of games with Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring

We consider an infinite two-player stochastic zero-sum game with a Borel winning set, in which the opponent's actions are monitored via stochastic private signals. We introduce two conditions of the signalling structure: Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (SEPM) and Weak Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring (WSEPM). When signals are deterministic these two conditions coincide and by a recent result due to Shmaya (2011) entail determinacy of the game. We generalize Shmaya's (2011) result and show that in the stochastic learning environment SEPM implies determinacy while WSEPM does not

Games with Delays. A Frankenstein Approach

We investigate infinite games on finite graphs where the information flow is perturbed by nondeterministic signalling delays. It is known that such perturbations make synthesis problems virtually unsolvable, in the general case. On the classical model where signals are attached to states, tractable cases are rare and difficult to identify. Here, we propose a model where signals are detached from control states, and we identify a subclass on which equilibrium outcomes can be preserved, even if signals are delivered with a delay that is finitely bounded. To offset the perturbation, our solution procedure combines responses from a collection of virtual plays following an equilibrium strategy in the instant- signalling game to synthesise, in a Frankenstein manner, an equivalent equilibrium strategy for the delayed-signalling game

Regularity of the minmax value and equilibria in multiplayer Blackwell games

A real-valued function j that is defined over all Borel sets of a topological space is regular if for every Borel set W, j(W) is the supremum of j(C), over all closed sets C that are contained in W, and the infimum of j(O), over all open sets O that contain W. We study Blackwell games with finitely many players. We show that when each player has a countable set of actions and the objective of a certain player is represented by a Borel winning set, that player’s minmax value is regular. We then use the regularity of the minmax value to establish the existence of #-equilibria in two distinct classes of Blackwell games. One is the class of n-player Blackwell games where each player has a finite action space and an analytic winning set, and the sum of the minmax values over the players exceeds n 1. The other class is that of Blackwell games with bounded upper semi-analytic payoff functions, history-independent finite action spaces, and history-independent minmax values. For the latter class, we obtain a characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs

Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games

International audienceThe survey presents recent results in the theory of two-person zero-sum repeated games and their connections with differential and continuous-time games. The emphasis is made on the following(1) A general model allows to deal simultaneously with stochastic and informational aspects.(2) All evaluations of the stage payoffs can be covered in the same framework (and not only the usual Cesàro and Abel means).(3) The model in discrete time can be seen and analyzed as a discretization of a continuous time game. Moreover, tools and ideas from repeated games are very fruitful for continuous time games and vice versa.(4) Numerous important conjectures have been answered (some in the negative).(5) New tools and original models have been proposed. As a consequence, the field (discrete versus continuous time, stochastic versus incomplete information models) has a much more unified structure, and research is extremely active

Metadata Schema x-econ Repository

Since May 2017, the x-hub project partners OVGU Magdeburg, University of Vienna, and GESIS dispose of a new repository, called x-econ (https://x-econ.org). The service is dedicated to all experimental economics research projects to disseminate user-friendly archiving and provision of experimental economics research data. The repository x-econ contains all necessary core functionalities of a modern repository and is in a continuous optimization process aiming at functionality enhancement and improvement. x-econ is also one pillar of the multidisciplinary repository x-science (https://x-science.org). The present documentation, which is primarily based on the GESIS Technical Reports on datorium 2014|03 and da|ra 4.0, lists and explains the metadata elements, used to describe research information

Computer Aided Verification

This open access two-volume set LNCS 11561 and 11562 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 31st International Conference on Computer Aided Verification, CAV 2019, held in New York City, USA, in July 2019. The 52 full papers presented together with 13 tool papers and 2 case studies, were carefully reviewed and selected from 258 submissions. The papers were organized in the following topical sections: Part I: automata and timed systems; security and hyperproperties; synthesis; model checking; cyber-physical systems and machine learning; probabilistic systems, runtime techniques; dynamical, hybrid, and reactive systems; Part II: logics, decision procedures; and solvers; numerical programs; verification; distributed systems and networks; verification and invariants; and concurrency

Computer Aided Verification

This open access two-volume set LNCS 13371 and 13372 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 34rd International Conference on Computer Aided Verification, CAV 2022, which was held in Haifa, Israel, in August 2022. The 40 full papers presented together with 9 tool papers and 2 case studies were carefully reviewed and selected from 209 submissions. The papers were organized in the following topical sections: Part I: Invited papers; formal methods for probabilistic programs; formal methods for neural networks; software Verification and model checking; hyperproperties and security; formal methods for hardware, cyber-physical, and hybrid systems. Part II: Probabilistic techniques; automata and logic; deductive verification and decision procedures; machine learning; synthesis and concurrency. This is an open access book

Computer Aided Verification

This open access two-volume set LNCS 11561 and 11562 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 31st International Conference on Computer Aided Verification, CAV 2019, held in New York City, USA, in July 2019. The 52 full papers presented together with 13 tool papers and 2 case studies, were carefully reviewed and selected from 258 submissions. The papers were organized in the following topical sections: Part I: automata and timed systems; security and hyperproperties; synthesis; model checking; cyber-physical systems and machine learning; probabilistic systems, runtime techniques; dynamical, hybrid, and reactive systems; Part II: logics, decision procedures; and solvers; numerical programs; verification; distributed systems and networks; verification and invariants; and concurrency