Corruption manual for beginners: "Corruption techniques" in public procurement with examples from Hungary

This paper develops 30 novel quantitative indicators of grand corruption that operationalize 20 distinct techniques of corruption in the context of public procurement. Each indicator rests on a thorough qualitative understanding of rent extraction from public contracts by corrupt networks as evidenced by academic literature, interviews and media content analysis. Feasibility and usefulness of the proposed indicators are demonstrated using micro-level public procurement data from Hungary in 2009-2012. While the prime value of this broad set of indicators is the possibility of combining them into a robust composite indicator of high-level corruption, the high degree of detail also reveals that many regulatory interventions have succeeded in changing the form of corruption, but not its overall incidence

Office of Anticorruption and Integrity: Annual Report 2013

[Excerpt] Corruption is not single-celled. It does not move in just one direction and has many causes and symptoms. It has no single cure and will continue to grow and fester unless addressed from multiple fronts. The Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) Office of Anticorruption and Integrity (OAI) recognizes that tackling corruption requires a multifaceted approach and a comprehensive network of partnerships and alliances. Tasked to ensure that the finite development funds entrusted to ADB are not misused as a result of fraud and corruption, OAI relies on close collaborations with internal and external partners and stakeholders to fulfill its mandate. OAI’s mandate is underpinned by ADB’s zero tolerance to corruption. It is aligned with ADB’s broader commitment to combat corruption and improve governance as a core strategic objective of ADB Strategy 2020, and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005—to which ADB is a signatory—in support of effective, transparent, and accountable aid. More than ever, in 2013 OAI’s anticorruption work focused on prevention, oversight, investigation, and deterrence through partnership, awareness raising, and outreach. Its achievements in 2013 reflect OAI’s close partnership and teamwork with ADB’s governance and operations departments as well as external partners to address fraud, corruption, abuse of resources, and other violations that undermine the integrity and effectiveness of ADB-funded activities

Bidding Markets

The existence of a ‘bidding market’ is commonly cited as a reason to tolerate the creation or maintenance of highly concentrated markets. We discuss three erroneous arguments to that effect: the ‘consultants’ fallacy’ that ‘market power is impossible’, the ‘academics’ fallacy’ that (often) ‘market power does not matter’, and the ‘regulators’ fallacy’ that ‘intervention against pernicious market power is unnecessary’, in markets characterized by auctions or bidding processes. Furthermore we argue that the term ‘bidding market’ as it is widely used in antitrust is unhelpful or misleading. Auctions and bidding processes do have some special features—including their price formation processes, common-values behaviour, and bid-taker power—but the significance of these features has been overemphasized, and they often imply a need for stricter rather than more lenient competition policy.Bidding Markets, Auctions, Antitrust, Competition Policy, Bidding, Market Power, Private Values, Common Values, Anti-trust

Evaluating Leniency with Missing Information on Undetected Cartels: Exploring Time-Varying Policy Impacts on Cartel Duration

This paper examines the effects of European Commission’s (EC) new leniency program on the EC’s capabilities in detecting and deterring cartels. As a supplementary analysis, the US leniency is studied. I discuss a dynamic model of cartel formation and dissolution to illustrate how changes in antitrust policies and economic conditions might affect cartel duration. Comparative statics results are then corroborated with empirical estimates of hazard functions adjusted to account for both the heterogeneity of cartels and the time-varying policy impacts suggested by theory. Contrary to earlier studies, my statistical tests are consistent with the theoretic predictions that following an efficacious leniency program, the average duration of discovered cartels rises in the short run and falls in the long run. The results shed light on the design of enforcement programs against cartels and other forms of conspiracy

Evaluating Leniency with Missing Information on Undetected Cartels: Exploring Time-Varying Policy Impacts on Cartel Duration

This paper examines the effects of European Commission’s (EC) new leniency program on the EC’s capabilities in detecting and deterring cartels. As a supplementary analysis, the US leniency is studied. I discuss a dynamic model of cartel formation and dissolution to illustrate how changes in antitrust policies and economic conditions might affect cartel duration. Comparative statics results are then corroborated with empirical estimates of hazard functions adjusted to account for both the heterogeneity of cartels and the time-varying policy impacts suggested by theory. Contrary to earlier studies, my statistical tests are consistent with the theoretic predictions that following an efficacious leniency program, the average duration of discovered cartels rises in the short run and falls in the long run. The results shed light on the design of enforcement programs against cartels and other forms of conspiracy.

Partnering to combat corruption in infrastructure services: a toolkit

Problems with corruption have long been recognized as key constraints to the development of sustainable infrastructure services. The objective of this Toolkit is to propose a framework and tools geared to understanding, exploring and acting on corruption in the delivery of services. The scope of the work covers infrastructure services in urban and rural areas of developed and developing countries. A number of Toolkits on corruption have been published in recent years; however, to date, these have not been focused on the infrastructure sector or the impacts of corruption on the poor. This Toolkit is intended to fill that gap. The Toolkit is cross-sectoral in its approach, making it of relevance to those working on water supply, sanitation, drainage, roads and paving, transport, solid waste management, street lighting and housing sectors. This Toolkit brings together, in a systematic way, a variety of individual tools, which support the process of combating corruption in infrastructure services. The tools themselves are synthesized from real world experience; derived from a review of literature, desk-based case surveys and country case studies. These are not academic concepts, but genuinely operational tools. This Toolkit avoids taking a blueprint or top-down approach, but rather takes the perspective of operators, regulators and service users, especially the poor. By taking these tools, and relating them systematically to various aspects of combating corruption, this Toolkit should fulfil the urgent need expressed by policy makers, professional staff, regulators and consumers

Actions Speak Louder than Words: Econometric Evidence to Target Tacit Collusion in Oligopolistic Markets

Tacit collusion reduces welfare comparably to explicit collusion but remains mostly unaddressed by antitrust enforcement which greatly depends on evidence of explicit communication. We propose to target specific elements of firms’ behavior that facilitate tacit collusion by providing quantitative evidence that links these actions to an anticompetitive market outcome. We apply our approach to incidents on the Italian gasoline market where the market leader unilaterally announced its commitment to a policy of sticky pricing and large price changes which facilitated price alignment and coordination of price changes. Antitrust policy has to distinguish such active promotion of a collusive strategy from passive (best response) alignment. Our results imply the necessity of stronger legal instruments which target unilateral conduct that aims at bringing about collusion

Endogenous Price Commitment, Sticky and Leadership Pricing: Evidence from the Italian Petrol Market

This article studies dynamic pricing strategies in the Italian gasoline market before and after the market leader unilaterally announced its commitment to adopt a sticky-pricing policy. Using daily Italian firm level prices and weekly average EU prices, we show that the effect of the new policy was twofold. First, it facilitated price alignment and coordination on price changes. After the policy change, the observed pricing pattern shifted from cost-based to sticky-leadership pricing. Second, using a dif-in-dif estimation and a synthetic control group, we show that the causal effect of the new policy was to significantly increase prices through sticky-leadership pricing. Our paper highlights the importance of price-commitment by a large firm in order to sustain (tacit) collusion