3,696 research outputs found

    A Grey-Box Approach to Automated Mechanism Design

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    Auctions play an important role in electronic commerce, and have been used to solve problems in distributed computing. Automated approaches to designing effective auction mechanisms are helpful in reducing the burden of traditional game theoretic, analytic approaches and in searching through the large space of possible auction mechanisms. This paper presents an approach to automated mechanism design (AMD) in the domain of double auctions. We describe a novel parametrized space of double auctions, and then introduce an evolutionary search method that searches this space of parameters. The approach evaluates auction mechanisms using the framework of the TAC Market Design Game and relates the performance of the markets in that game to their constituent parts using reinforcement learning. Experiments show that the strongest mechanisms we found using this approach not only win the Market Design Game against known, strong opponents, but also exhibit desirable economic properties when they run in isolation.Comment: 18 pages, 2 figures, 2 tables, and 1 algorithm. Extended abstract to appear in the proceedings of AAMAS'201

    Evolution of a supply chain management game for the trading agent competition

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    TAC SCM is a supply chain management game for the Trading Agent Competition (TAC). The purpose of TAC is to spur high quality research into realistic trading agent problems. We discuss TAC and TAC SCM: game and competition design, scientific impact, and lessons learnt

    Born to trade: a genetically evolved keyword bidder for sponsored search

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    In sponsored search auctions, advertisers choose a set of keywords based on products they wish to market. They bid for advertising slots that will be displayed on the search results page when a user submits a query containing the keywords that the advertiser selected. Deciding how much to bid is a real challenge: if the bid is too low with respect to the bids of other advertisers, the ad might not get displayed in a favorable position; a bid that is too high on the other hand might not be profitable either, since the attracted number of conversions might not be enough to compensate for the high cost per click. In this paper we propose a genetically evolved keyword bidding strategy that decides how much to bid for each query based on historical data such as the position obtained on the previous day. In light of the fact that our approach does not implement any particular expert knowledge on keyword auctions, it did remarkably well in the Trading Agent Competition at IJCAI2009

    Environmental analysis for application layer networks

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    Die zunehmende Vernetzung von Rechnern über das Internet lies die Vision von Application Layer Netzwerken aufkommen. Sie umfassen Overlay Netzwerke wie beispielsweise Peer-to-Peer Netzwerke und Grid Infrastrukturen unter Verwendung des TCP/IP Protokolls. Ihre gemeinsame Eigenschaft ist die redundante, verteilte Bereitstellung und der Zugang zu Daten-, Rechen- und Anwendungsdiensten, während sie die Heterogenität der Infrastruktur vor dem Nutzer verbergen. In dieser Arbeit werden die Anforderungen, die diese Netzwerke an ökonomische Allokationsmechanismen stellen, untersucht. Die Analyse erfolgt anhand eines Marktanalyseprozesses für einen zentralen Auktionsmechanismus und einen katallaktischen Markt. --Grid Computing

    Real-time Tactical and Strategic Sales Management for Intelligent Agents Guided By Economic Regimes

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    Many enterprises that participate in dynamic markets need to make product pricing and inventory resource utilization decisions in real-time. We describe a family of statistical models that address these needs by combining characterization of the economic environment with the ability to predict future economic conditions to make tactical (short-term) decisions, such as product pricing, and strategic (long-term) decisions, such as level of finished goods inventories. Our models characterize economic conditions, called economic regimes, in the form of recurrent statistical patterns that have clear qualitative interpretations. We show how these models can be used to predict prices, price trends, and the probability of receiving a customer order at a given price. These “regime†models are developed using statistical analysis of historical data, and are used in real-time to characterize observed market conditions and predict the evolution of market conditions over multiple time scales. We evaluate our models using a testbed derived from the Trading Agent Competition for Supply Chain Management (TAC SCM), a supply chain environment characterized by competitive procurement and sales markets, and dynamic pricing. We show how regime models can be used to inform both short-term pricing decisions and longterm resource allocation decisions. Results show that our method outperforms more traditional shortand long-term predictive modeling approaches.dynamic pricing;trading agent competition;agent-mediated electronic commerce;dynamic markets;economic regimes;enabling technologies;price forecasting;supply-chain

    Designing smart markets

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    Electronic markets have been a core topic of information systems (IS) research for last three decades. We focus on a more recent phenomenon: smart markets. This phenomenon is starting to draw considerable interdisciplinary attention from the researchers in computer science, operations research, and economics communities. The objective of this commentary is to identify and outline fruitful research areas where IS researchers can provide valuable contributions. The idea of smart markets revolves around using theoretically supported computational tools to both understand the characteristics of complex trading environments and multiechelon markets and help human decision makers make real-time decisions in these complex environments. We outline the research opportunities for complex trading environments primarily from the perspective o

    Automated Auction Mechanism Design with Competing Markets

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    Resource allocation is a major issue in multiple areas of computer science. Despite the wide range of resource types across these areas, for example real commodities in e-commerce and computing resources in distributed computing, auctions are commonly used in solving the optimization problems involved in these areas, since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes. Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Auction mechanism design aims to manipulate the rules of an auction in order to achieve specific goals. Economists traditionally use mathematical methods, mainly game theory, to analyze auctions and design new auction forms. However, due to the high complexity of auctions, the mathematical models are typically simplified to obtain results, and this makes it difficult to apply results derived from such models to market environments in the real world. As a result, researchers are turning to empirical approaches. Following this line of work, we present what we call a grey-box approach to automated auction mechanism design using reinforcement learning and evolutionary computation methods. We first describe a new strategic game, called \cat, which were designed to run multiple markets that compete to attract traders and make profit. The CAT game enables us to address the imbalance between prior work in this field that studied auctions in an isolated environment and the actual competitive situation that markets face. We then define a novel, parameterized framework for auction mechanisms, and present a classification of auction rules with each as a building block fitting into the framework. Finally we evaluate the viability of building blocks, and acquire auction mechanisms by combining viable blocks through iterations of CAT games. We carried out experiments to examine the effectiveness of the grey-box approach. The best mechanisms we learnt were able to outperform the standard mechanisms against which learning took place and carefully hand-coded mechanisms which won tournaments based on the CAT game. These best mechanisms were also able to outperform mechanisms from the literature even when the evaluation did not take place in the context of CAT games. These results suggest that the grey-box approach can generate robust double auction mechanisms and, as a consequence, is an effective approach to automated mechanism design. The contributions of this work are two-fold. First, the grey-box approach helps to design better auction mechanisms which can play a central role in solutions to resource allocation problems in various application domains of computer science. Second, the parameterized view and the reinforcement learning-based search method can be used in other strategic, competitive situations where decision making processes are complex and difficult to design and evaluate manually

    Are agent-based simulations robust? The wholesale electricity trading case

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    Agent-based computational economics is becoming widely used in practice. This paper explores the consistency of some of its standard techniques. We focus in particular on prevailing wholesale electricity trading simulation methods. We include different supply and demand representations and propose the Experience-Weighted Attractions method to include several behavioural algorithms. We compare the results across assumptions and to economic theory predictions. The match is good under best-response and reinforcement learning but not under fictitious play. The simulations perform well under flat and upward-slopping supply bidding, and also for plausible demand elasticity assumptions. Learning is influenced by the number of bids per plant and the initial conditions. The overall conclusion is that agent-based simulation assumptions are far from innocuous. We link their performance to underlying features, and identify those that are better suited to model wholesale electricity markets.Agent-based computational economics, electricity, market design, experience-weighted attraction (EWA), learning, supply functions, demand aggregation, initial beliefs.
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