Why one would accept Voting Theory for Democracy and reject the Penrose Square Root Weights

Various scientists under the label of “Scientists for a democratic Europe” (SDE) sent a joint “Letter to the governments of the EU member states” (2007) advising the use of the Penrose Square Root Weights (PSRW) for the EU Council of Ministers. When we compare the SDE letter with Colignatus (2001, 2007b) “Voting theory for democracy” (VTFD) then we find that SDE does not fit voting theory for democracy. Inspection of the material upon which the SDE letter is based also shows a moral choice while the rigorous empirical analysis by Gelman, Katz and Bafumi (2007) is actually misrepresented. So the SDE letter can also be rejected on its own grounds. The PSRW approach seems not valid for (indivisible) individuals but may be applicable for divisible shares in shareholder meetings.voting theory; voting systems; elections; public choice; political economy; Borda Fixed Point; democracy; European Union; Penrose square root weights;

A Citizen's Guide to Redistricting

Provides a detailed overview of states' rules and processes for redrawing federal, state, and local legislative districts. Illustrates possible motives behind redistricting, effects on elections, implications for legislation, and reform recommendations

Politics, transaction costs, and the design of regulatory institutions

Providing a more complete framework for assessing the efficiency of government intervention requires moving away from the idealistic perspective typically found in the normative approach to traditional public economics, contend the authors. Such a move requires viewing the government not as a monolithic entity but as many different government bodies, each with its own constituency and regulatory tools. Not only is the"multitiered"government limited in its ability to commit, but interest groups influence the regulatory process and impose significant transaction costs on government interventions and on their outcome. The authors discuss the nature of those transaction costs and argue that the overall design of the government is the result of their minimization. Among the points they make in their conclusions: 1) Safeguards built into regulatory contracts sometimes reflect and sometimes imply transactions costs which influence, or should influence, the optimal tradeoff between rent and efficient in ways practitioners sometimes ignore. 2) Most of the literature on transaction costs arising from government failures would agree that to be sustainable, regulatory institutions should be independent, autonomous, and accountable. How these criteria are met is determined by the way transaction costs are minimized, which in turn drives the design of the regulatory framework. In practice, for example, if there at commitment problems, short-term institutional contracts between players are more likely to ensure autonomy and independence. This affects the duration of the nomination of the regulators. Short-term contracts may be best, but contracts for regulators typically last four to eight years and are often renewable. The empirical debate about the design of regulators'jobs is a possible source of tension. Practitioners typically recommend choosing regulators based on professional rather than political criteria, but that may not be the best way to minimize regulatory capture. Professional experts are likely to come from the sector they are supposed to regulate and are likely to return to it sooner or later (as typically happens in developing countries). On the other hand, electedregulators are unlikely to be much more independent than professional regulators; they will simply represent different interests. Practitioners and theorists alike emphasize different sources of capture and agree that one way to deal with its risk is to make sure the selection process involves both executive and legislative branches.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Labor Policies,Decentralization,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,National Governance,Administrative&Regulatory Law,Banks&Banking Reform

Ruling the Referendum?:European Integration Challenged by Direct Democracy

Referendums on European integration play a prominent role in the decision-making processes in current European democracies. Between 1972 and 2016, 61 EU-related referendums took place across 28 countries. In his dissertation, Joost van den Akker (1984) investigates under which conditions governments win such EU-related referendums. The fact that the government won in 46 cases demonstrates that overall governments have been quite successful in securing popular support for their EU policies. The study locates the EU-related referendum in the historical perspective of referendums in Europe after the French revolution. It develops a model to explain the current potential and practice of EU-related referendums in European democracies. The most prominent contribution lies in explaining the referendum result by politicalinstitutional and socio-economic conditions at the aggregate level. It is argued that a unifi ed majority government and economic development are the main drivers for winning referendums. If the economy is deteriorating, however, the government only wins if it is only recently in offi ce and backed by a wide consensus among elites. The dissertation explains why EU-related referendums are held, under which conditions governments win or lose them, and how governments cope with inconvenient outcomes. In this way, it contributes to the strategies which governments can deploy to win a referendum, or to deal best with a referendum defeat

Democratic innovations in Finnish local politics : essays on the varieties, causes and consequences of mechanisms for direct citizen participation

Democratic governments around the world have become interested in democratic innovations, i.e. mechanisms for citizens’ direct participation in decision-making. Typical examples include referendums, citizens’ initiatives, deliberative mini-publics, participatory budgeting, committees, surveys and online applications. This work examines the causes and consequences of democratic innovations in the context of Finnish local politics through an introductory chapter and three independent articles. The first article studies the linkage between political trust and support for democratic innovations by analyzing survey data from municipal residents in Southwest Finland in 2013. The results indicate that democratic innovations may not be able to attract the most skeptical citizens, regardless of whether participation takes place online or offline. The second article investigates factors explaining the occurrence of democratic innovations, namely referendum motions and advisory referendums, with a case-control study of Finnish municipalities in 1991-2012. It shows that their occurrence is influenced by various systemic factors, such as political support, municipal size, policy diffusion and party system factors. The third article addresses the question whether democratic innovations can influence the wider public. The analyses based on hierarchical data covering 9022 individuals in 30 Finnish municipalities in 2011 reveal that citizens’ evaluations of procedural fairness are higher in municipalities that offer possibilities for discursive participation. The availability of participatory mechanisms does not, however, affect satisfaction with outcomes of decision-making. Overall, the results of the three articles indicate that the details in institutional design matter for both favorable preconditions and potential consequences of democratic innovations. The introductory chapter lays out a framework for systematically analyzing the institutional design features of democratic innovations, and discusses a number of normative justifications for deepening citizen participation in democratic governance. Through theoretical discussion and reflection of empirical findings as well previous empirical research, the introductory chapter points out that participation should not be justified only by its positive effects on those who participate, but also by its epistemic and systemic value.Demokraattiset hallitukset ympäri maailmaa ovat viime aikoina kiinnostuneet demokraattisista innovaatioista, eli kansalaisten suoran osallistumisen mekanismeista. Tyypillisiä esimerkkejä ovat kansanäänestykset, kansalaisaloitteet, deliberatiiviset kansalaisfoorumit, osallistuva budjetointi, yhteistyöelimet, kyselyt ja sähköiset osallistumissovellukset. Tämä tutkimus tarkastelee demokraattisten innovaatioiden syitä ja seurauksia Suomen kuntatasolla johdantoluvun ja kolmen itsenäisen artikkelin kautta. Ensimmäisessä artikkelissa tutkitaan poliittisen luottamuksen ja demokraattisten innovaatioiden kannatuksen välistä yhteyttä analysoimalla Lounais-Suomessa vuonna 2013 kerättyä kuntalaiskyselyaineistoa. Tulosten mukaan demokraattiset innovaatiot eivät välttämättä houkuttele kaikkein skeptisimmin päätöksentekoon suhtautuvia kansalaisia. Toisessa artikkelissa tutkitaan tapaus-verrokkitutkimuksen menetelmin, mitkä tekijät selittävät demokraattisten innovaatioiden, erityisesti kansanäänestysaloitteiden ja neuvoa-antavien kansanäänestysten, esiintymistä Suomen kunnissa 1991-2012. Artikkelin tulokset osoittavat, että näiden demokraattisten innovaatioiden esiintymiseen vaikuttavat erilaiset kuntatason tekijät, kuten järjestelmän kannatus, kuntakoko, osallistumisen kulttuuri ja puolueiden voimasuhteet. Kolmannessa artikkelissa vastataan kysymykseen, voiko demokraattisilla innovaatioilla olla vaikutuksia kansalaisten laajempaan yleisöön, analysoimalla hierarkkista aineistoa, joka kattaa 9022 kuntalaista 30 kunnassa vuonna 2011. Tulosten mukaan keskusteluun pohjautuvat osallistumismuodot voivat vahvistaa kuntalaisten kokemuksia päätöksentekoprosessien oikeudenmukaisuudesta, mutta kunnan tarjoamilla suorilla osallistumiskanavilla ei ole yhteyttä siihen, miten tyytyväisiä kuntalaiset ovat julkisiin palveluihin. Kaikkien kolmen artikkelin tulokset osoittavat yleisellä tasolla, että osallistumismuotojen suunnittelun yksityiskohdat ovat yhteydessä sekä niiden käytön syihin että potentiaalisiin vaikutuksiin. Johdantoluvussa luodaan viitekehys demokraattisten innovaatioiden luokitteluun, ja keskustellaan kolmesta eri tavasta, joilla kansalaisten suora osallistuminen päätöksentekoon on oikeutettu normatiivisissa demokratiateorioissa. Arvioimalla näitä demokratiateoreettisia lähtökohtia ja peilaamalla niitä tämän tutkimuksen tuloksiin sekä aiempaan empiiriseen tutkimukseen johdantoluvussa osoitetaan, että kansalaisten suoraa osallistumista ei tulisi perustella pelkästään posiitivisilla vaikutuksilla osallistujiin, vaan tulisi huomioida myös osallistumisen arvo päätösten laadulle ja laajemmalle yleisölle

Rebuilding Contested States: A comparative study of institutional design during political transition in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, & Tunisia

Rebuilding a contested state following an authoritarian breakdown requires widespread support for the new political system from all communal groups. A central theoretical assertion of the institutional design literature is that inclusion of communal groups in institutional frameworks creates support for a political system. However, empirical evidence to either verify or refute this claim is inconclusive. A survey of institutional design literature reveals an implicit distinction between de jure inclusion (inclusive frameworks) and de facto inclusion (inclusion in practice). To date, this distinction has not been sufficiently differentiated and systematically examined, with large-N studies most often examining the impact solely of de jure inclusion on support, and case studies failing to make a clear conceptual distinction between these two elements of inclusion. To address this gap in the research, this study asks: during a period of political transition in a contested state, does de jure inclusion, de facto inclusion, or a combination of both, build support for a political system? To investigate this question, the study undertakes a small-N comparative study of institutional design during political transitions in the Middle East and North Africa region. Four countries are selected that underwent rebuilding of their political institutions following authoritarian breakdown: Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia. Four hypotheses are advanced that capture the expectation that either de jure inclusion, de facto inclusion, or a combination of both, will build support for a political system. The hypotheses are investigated in two key institutional design moments in the selected countries: electoral system design and constitution-making. The study finds that de jure inclusion is not a sufficient mechanism to create support of all communal groups for the political system, whilst de facto inclusion may be sufficient. In no case where de jure inclusion alone was observed, was support for the political system present. In all cases where de facto inclusion was present, there was support for the political system, regardless of whether or not there was de jure inclusion. The study contributes to our understanding of the rebuilding of contested states following authoritarian breakdown, suggesting that, alongside an emphasis on de jure inclusion in electoral system design and constitution-making, de facto inclusion deserves consideration

Models of Political Economy

Models of Political Economy will introduce students to the basic methodology of political economics. It covers all core theories as well as new developments including: decision theory game theory mechanism design games of asymmetric information. Hannu Nurmi's text will prove to be invaluable to all students who wish to understand this increasingly technical field

Why one would accept Voting Theory for Democracy and reject the Penrose Square Root Weights

Various scientists under the label of “Scientists for a democratic Europe” (SDE) sent a joint “Letter to the governments of the EU member states” (2007) advising the use of the Penrose Square Root Weights (PSRW) for the EU Council of Ministers. When we compare the SDE letter with Colignatus (2001, 2007b) “Voting theory for democracy” (VTFD) then we find that SDE does not fit voting theory for democracy. Inspection of the material upon which the SDE letter is based also shows a moral choice while the rigorous empirical analysis by Gelman, Katz and Bafumi (2007) is actually misrepresented. So the SDE letter can also be rejected on its own grounds. The PSRW approach seems not valid for (indivisible) individuals but may be applicable for divisible shares in shareholder meetings