Outsourcing and acquisition models comparison related to IT supplier selection decision analysis

This paper presents a comparison of acquisition models related to decision analysis of IT supplier selection. The main standards are: Capability Maturity Model Integration for Acquisition (CMMI-ACQ), ISO / IEC 12207 Information Technology / Software Life Cycle Processes, IEEE 1062 Recommended Practice for Software Acquisition, the IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) and the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) guide. The objective of this paper is to compare the previous models to find the advantages and disadvantages of them for the future development of a decision model for IT supplier selection

Contract Design Choices and the Balance of Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Transaction Costs in Software Development Outsourcing

This paper examines multiple contract design choices in the context of transaction and relational attributes and consequent ex ante and ex post transaction costs. It focuses on two understudied themes in the IT outsourcing literature. First, while the literature is predominantly concerned with opportunism and consequent ex post hazard costs that contracts can safeguard against, parties to a contract also economize on ex ante transaction costs by their choice of contract type and contract extensiveness. Second, the literature studies the aggregate extensiveness of contracts rather than of distinct contract functions: safeguarding, coordination, and adaptability. Against this backdrop, our research model portrays a nuanced picture that is anchored in the following theoretical interpretation: transaction and relational attributes have implications on specific ex ante and ex post transaction costs, and these implications can be balanced by respective choices in both contract type and the extensiveness of specific contract functions. These two contract design choices complement and substitute for each other in their ability to economize on specific transaction costs. Our analysis of 210 software development outsourcing contracts finds that explanatory power increases when analyzing the extensiveness of individual contract functions rather than the aggregate contract extensiveness, highlighting subtle competing influences that are otherwise masked by an aggregate measure. Our analysis also shows that a preference for time-and-material contracts counteracts the effect of certain transaction attributes on contract extensiveness, and even cancels it out in the case of transaction uncertainty

IT Outsourcing Risk Management at British Petroleum

This paper reports the results of a study of three successive IT outsourcing contracts at British Petroleum (BP). We offer an operational definition of IT outsourcing risk and use it to assess the risk exposure associated with each contract. We then examine how the management at BP dealt with outsourcing risk. Our results show that careful and deliberate risk management can substantially attenuate the level of risk exposure, and that IT outsourcing risks can be managed. Ce document présente les résultats d'une étude de trois contrats d'impartition successifs. L'étude fut conduite chez British Petroleum. Une définition opérationnelle du risque d'impartition est donnée. Cette définition est ensuite utilisée pour déterminer le niveau de risque associé à chacun des contrats. Les mécanismes de gestion de risque sont également identifiés. Les résultats démontrent qu'une gestion active du risque permet de réduire sensiblement les niveau d'exposition au risque, notamment dans le cas de contrats d'impartition des technologies de l'information.Outsourcing of IS, IS risk management, agency theory, transaction cost economics, case study, Impartition des systèmes informatiques, gestion du risque d'impartition, gestion du risque, théories de l'agence et des coûts de transaction, étude de cas

What drives contract design in strategic alliances? Taking stock and how to proceed

We collect and assess prior empirical evidence on contract design in alliances that has been published since Parkhe’s (1993) seminal study on inter-firm contracts. We elaborate on the effects of transaction-related factors, experience gained from prior relationships, and deliberate learning efforts on contracts. Our paper offers three contributions. First, we systematically review the existing literature on alliance contracts and summarize our findings. Second, while prior research has traditionally focused on contractual complexity, we place the content of contracts center stage and identify three contractual functions. While existing studies on contractual functions predominantly refer to safeguarding as a response to appropriation concerns, we also consider coordination and contingency adaptability as outcomes of adaptation concerns. Third, we disentangle the differential influences of previous experiences on distinct contractual functions and show that experience gained from prior relationships has different effects on safeguarding and contingency adaptability than on coordination. Overall, we add to the systematization of the current debate on alliance contract design and trace promising avenues for future research on the impact of transaction- and experience-related factors on the complexity and content of alliance contracts

Choosing between Auctions and Negotiations in Online B2B Markets for IT Services: The Effect of Prior Relationships and Performance

The choice of contract allocation mechanism in procurement affects such aspects of transactions as information exchange between buyer and supplier, supplier competition, pricing and, eventually, performance. In this study we investigate the buyer’s choice between reverse auctions and bilateral negotiations as an allocation mechanism for IT services contracts. Prior studies into allocation mechanism choice focused on factors pertaining to discrete exchange situation, such as con-tract complexity or availability of suppliers. We broaden the research by focusing on buyers’ past exchange relationships with vendors. Based on the literature on the economics of contracting and agency theory, we hypothesize that prior re-peat interaction with vendors favors the use of negotiations over auctions in the next transaction, while the need to explore the marketplace due to buyer’s inexperience or dissatisfaction with vendor’s performance in the most recent project leads to the use of auctions instead of negotiations. We find support for these hypotheses in a longitudinal dataset of 2,081 IT projects realized by 91 repeat buyers at a leading online services marketplace over a period of eight years. Taken together, the results show that analyzing B2B auctions and negotiations should move beyond analyzing discrete instances and instead analyze them in the context of the individual firm’s history and supplier strategy.outsourcing;IT services;online marketplace;reverse auctions

Markets for technology (why do we see them, why don't we see more of them and why we should care)

This essay explores the nature, the functioning, and the economic and policy implications of markets for technology. Today, the outsourcing of research and development activities is more common than in the past, and specialized technology suppliers have emerged in many industries. In a sense, the Schumpeterian vision of integrating R&D with manufacturing and distribution is being confronted by the older Smithian vision of division of labor. The existence and efficacy of markets for technology can profoundly influence the creation and diffusion of new knowledge, and hence, economic growth of countries and the competitive position of companies. The economic and managerial literatures have touched upon some aspects of the nature of these markets. However, a thorough understanding of how markets for technology work is still lacking. In this essay we address two main questions. First, what are the factors that enable a market for technology to exist and function effectively? Specifically we look at the role of industry structure, the nature of knowledge, and intellectual property rights and related institutions. Second, we ask what the implications of such markets are for the boundaries of the firm, the specialization and division of labor in the economy, industry structure, and economic growth. We build on this discussion to develop the implications of our work for public policy and corporate strategy