The Two Inexical Uses Theory of Proper Names and Frege\u27s Puzzle

I formulate a novel theory of proper names that is neither Millian nor Fregean to solve Frege’s puzzle. I argue that proper names are used as two kinds of indexicals. Sometimes a name is used indexically just to refer to its bearer. I call this a ‘Millian use’ of a name. Other times, a name is used indexically to refer to its bearer and to contribute the speaker’s descriptive conception of that bearer to the proposition. I call this a ‘Conception-indicating use’ of a name. Names are always rigid designators, both on Millian and Conception-indicating uses. I explain the cognitive value difference between ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ and ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ by showing that they express different propositions. The propositional attitude ascription ‘Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is Superman’ comes out as true, not false as Millians maintain

Kaplan's Sloppy Thinker and the Demonstrative Origine of Indeicals

In this paper we give some suggestions from etymology on the contrast between Kaplan’s direct reference theory and a neo-Fregean view on indexicals. After a short summary of the philosophical debate on indexicals (§1), we use some remarks about the hidden presence of a demonstrative root in all indexicals to derive some provisional doubts concerning Kaplan’s criticism of what he calls “sloppy thinker” (§2). To support those doubts, we will summarise some etymological data on the derivation of the so-called “pure indexicals” from an original demonstrative root (§ 3). The aim of the paper is to consider etymological data as providing evidence for alternative theories of language and fostering new directions in linguistic and philosophical research on specific topics

Semantic monsters

This chapter provides a general overview of the issues surrounding so-called semantic monsters. In section 1, I outline the basics of Kaplan’s framework and spell out how and why the topic of “monsters” arises within that framework. In Section 2, I distinguish four notions of a monster that are discussed in the literature, and show why, although they can pull apart in different frameworks or with different assumptions, they all coincide within Kaplan’s framework. In Section 3, I discuss one notion that has spun off into the linguistics literature, namely “indexical shift”. In Section 4, I emphasize the connection between monsters and the compositionality of asserted content in Kaplan’s original discussion. Section 5 discusses monsters and the more general idea of re-interpretation or meaning-shift. Section 6 closes with a brief survey of where monsters may dwell, and pointers to avenues for future research

Reference and Indexicality

Tese arquivada ao abrigo da Portaria nº 227/2017 de 25 de Julho-Registo de Grau EstrangeiroThis thesis is a general defence of a context-dependent description theory of reference with special regards to indexical reference on the basis of a truth-conditional theory of meaning. It consists of two parts. In the first part, the roots of the Frege-Russell view are laid out and contrasted with various aspects of direct reference theory and the New Theory of Reference. Two description-based accounts of the reference of proper names, nominal and external description theory, are defended against various known counter-arguments such as Kripke’s circularity objection and the Church-Langford translation test. It is shown how the resulting analysis of de dicto belief ascriptions can be made compositional, but also argued that compositionality is not mandatory. The second part deals with forms of indexical and non-indexical contextdependence. Taking into account a range of typological data, referential features of indexical expressions like their egocentricity, token-reflexivity, and the vagueness of spatial and temporal indexicals are laid out. Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives is then reformulated, but following Cresswell (1990) it is argued that full quantification over modal indices is needed. Various indicators and demonstratives are analyzed on the basis of a description theory of reference in a variant of first-order predicate logic with non-traditional predication theory and two sorts of reified contexts. Examples analyzed include: I, now, here, actually, we, the former president, the left entrance, context-shifting indexicals, and demonstratives like Japanese are. Finally, essential indexicality is addressed and it is conceded that description theory cannot deal with attitudes de se. In defense of indirect reference it is argued that the cognitive phenomena underlying essential indexicality, as for example I-thoughts, aren’t aspects of the public meaning of natural language expressions and that speaking of a ‘language of thinking’ or ‘reference in thinking’ are unfitting metaphors for general semiotic reasons

From Semantics to Pragmatics

The topic of this thesis is the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Semantics is concerned with the literal meanings of expressions, what is explicitly expressed with expressions and providing truth conditions for sentences. While the subject matter of pragmatics, being the more nebulous one, is focused on non-literal meanings of expressions, what is implicitly conveyed with expressions and non-truth-conditional content. In this thesis I will present two theories: David Kaplan’s theory of indexicals and demonstratives and Robert Stalnaker’s assertion theory. The guiding question of this work is how these theorists distinguish semantics from pragmatics. How does the distinction appear in their theories? To point out, neither of the theories is aimed to specifically solve how the distinction is to be made. Kaplan’s aim is to create semantics for indexical expressions, whereas Stalnaker wants to explain how necessary a posteriori identity statements can be informative according to his two-dimensional semantic theory. Despite the differing goals underlying their theories, Kaplan and Stalnaker are not oblivious of the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. In fact, how the distinction is eventually made by these theorists, strongly depends on how each of the theories is built.Tutkielmassani käsittelen semantiikan ja pragmatiikan välistä erottelua. Karkeasti ottaen semantiikalla tarkoitetaan tutkimusalaa, joka käsittelee ilmaisujen kirjaimellista merkitystä, mitä ilmaisuilla eksplisiittisesti ilmaistaan sekä lauseiden totuusehtojen muodostamista. Pragmatiikan alaan lasketaan perinteisesti kuuluvan ilmaisujen ei-kirjaimellisen merkityksen tarkastelun, mitä ilmaisuilla implisiittisesti välitetään sekä lauseiden ei-totuusehdollisen sisällön tarkastelun. Esittelen tutkielmassani kaksi teoriaa: David Kaplanin teorian indeksikaaleista ja demonstratiiveista sekä Robert Stalnakerin teorian siitä, miten väittämä vaikuttaa kontekstiin. Tutkielmani keskeinen kysymys on, miten semantiikan ja pragmatiikan välinen erottelu ilmenee Kaplanin ja Stalnakerin teorioissa. Mainittakoon, että kumpikaan teoria ei ensisijaisesti pyri vastaamaan asettamaani kysymykseen. Kaplanin tarkoitus on osoittaa, että indeksikaalisille ilmaisuille voidaan luoda semantiikka. Stalnaker pyrkii puolestaan esittämään, miten välttämättömät a posteriori identiteettiväitteet voivat olla informatiivisia hänen kehittämän kaksiulotteisen semanttisen teorian mukaan. Erilaisista päämääristä huolimatta sekä Kaplan että Stalnaker ovat varsin tietoisia erottelusta semantiikan ja pragmatiikan välillä, mikä ilmenee erityisesti luvussa 4