Product Market Competition and Lobbying Coordination in the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry

This paper empirically investigates market behavior and firms´ lobbying in a unified structural setup. In a sequential game, where firms lobby for regulation before they compete in the product market, we derive a destable measure of lobbying coordination. Applying the setting to the early U.S. cellular services industry, we find that lobbying expenditures, as measured by campaign contributions, and market conduct were consistent with a one-shot Nash equilibrium and that price caps were binding on average. Furthermore, campaign contributions from cellular firms effectively lowered the burden of the price caps and reduced production costs.

Product Market Competition and Lobbying Coordination in the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry

This paper empirically investigates market behavior and firms’ lobbying in a unified structural setup. In a sequential game, where firms lobby for regulation before they compete in the product market, we derive a testable measure of lobbying coordination. Applying the setting to the early U.S. cellular services industry, we find that lobbying expenditures, as measured by campaign contributions, and market conduct were consistent with a one-shot Nash equilibrium and that price caps were binding on average. Furthermore, campaign contributions from cellular firms effectively lowered the burden of the price caps and reduced production costs. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Produktmarktwettbewerb und Koordination im Lobbying in der U.S. Mobilfunkindustrie) Dieses Paper untersucht Marktverhalten und Lobbying durch Unternehmen empirisch in einem vereinheitlichten strukturellen Ansatz. In einem sequentiellen Spiel, wo die Firmen für Regulierung Lobbyismus betreiben, bevor sie im Produktmarkt konkurrieren, leiten wir ein testbares Maß für Lobbying- Koordination her. In einer Anwendung auf den frühen US Mobilfunkmarkt zeigen wir, dass Marktverhalten und Lobbying-Ausgaben (gemessen als Parteispenden) mit einem einfachen Nashgleichgewicht vereinbar sind und die Preisobergrenzen im Durchschnitt binden. Außerdem waren Parteispenden offenbar ein effektives Mittel um die Preisgrenzen zu lockern und kostenbezogene Regulierung abzumildern.Collusion, Lobbying, Price Cap, Regulation, Rent-Seeking, Interest, Groups, Telecommunication

Modeling with history-dependent Petri nets

Most information systems that are driven by process models (e.g., workflow management systems) record events in event logs, also known as transaction logs or audit trails. We consider processes that not only keep track of their history in a log, but also make decisions based on this log. Extending our previous work on history-dependent Petri nets we propose and evaluate a methodology for modelling processes by such nets and show how history-dependent nets can combine modelling comfort with analysability

Important Factors for the Design of Medical Devices for Developing Countries

The high failure rates of imported medical devices in developing countries represent a significant challenge in the fight against world diseases. Developing affordable devices designed with an understanding of health care systems in developing countries is imperative. This project outlines the necessary steps for the development of a lab-on-chip microfluidics test for the detection of diarrhoeal pathogens. A framework is outlined based on the lessons learnt in implementing medical devices and the successes of custom devices designed to meet the needs of the developing world such as auto-disable syringes

Product market competition and lobbying coordination in the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry

"This paper empirically investigates market behavior and firms' lobbying in a unified structural setup. In a sequential game, where firms lobby for regulation before they compete in the product market, we derive a testable measure of lobbying coordination. Applying the setting to the early U.S. cellular services industry, we find that lobbying expenditures, as measured by campaign contributions, and market conduct were consistent with a one-shot Nash equilibrium and that price caps were binding on average. Furthermore, campaign contributions from cellular firms effectively lowered the burden of the price caps and reduced production costs." (author's abstract)"Dieses Paper untersucht Marktverhalten und Lobbying durch Unternehmen empirisch in einem vereinheitlichten strukturellen Ansatz. In einem sequentiellen Spiel, wo die Firmen für Regulierung Lobbyismus betreiben, bevor sie im Produktmarkt konkurrieren, leiten wir ein testbares Maß für Lobbying-Koordination her. In einer Anwendung auf den frühen US Mobilfunkmarkt zeigen wir, dass Marktverhalten und Lobbying-Ausgaben (gemessen als Parteispenden) mit einem einfachen Nashgleichgewicht vereinbar sind und die Preisobergrenzen im Durchschnitt binden. Außerdem waren Parteispenden offenbar ein effektives Mittel um die Preisgrenzen zu lockern und kostenbezogene Regulierung abzumildern." (Autorenreferat

Asymptotics, structure, and integration of sound-proof atmospheric flow equations

Relative to the full compressible flow equations, sound-proof models filter acoustic waves while maintaining advection and internal waves. Two well-known sound-proof models, an anelastic model by Bannon and Durran's pseudo-incompressible model, are shown here to be structurally very close to the full compressible flow equations. Essentially, the anelastic model is obtained by suppressing @t in the mass continuity equation and slightly modifying the gravity term, whereas the pseudoincompressible model results from dropping @tp from the pressure equation. For length scales small compared to the density and pressure scale heights, the anelastic model reduces to the Boussinesq approximation, while the pseudo-incompressible model approaches the zero Mach number, variable density flow equations. Thus, for small scales, both models are asymptotically consistent with the full compressible flow equations, yet the pseudo-incompressible model is more general in that it remains valid in the presence of large density variations. For the relatively small density variations found in typical atmosphere-ocean flows, both models are found to yield very similar results, with deviations between models much smaller than deviations obtained when using different numerical schemes for the same model. This in agreement with Smolarkiewicz and Dörnbrack (2007). Despite these useful properties, neither model can be derived by a low-Mach number asymptotic expansion for length scales comparable to the pressure scale height, i.e., for the regime they were originally designed for. Derivations of these models via scale analysis ignore an asymptotic time scale separation between advection and internal waves. In fact, only the classical Ogura & Phillips model, which assumes weak stratication of the order of the Mach number squared, can be obtained as a leading-order model from systematic low Mach number asymptotic analysis. Issues of formal asymptotics notwithstanding, the close structural similarity of the anelastic and pseudo-incompressible models to the full compressible flow equations makes them useful limit systems in building computational models for atmospheric flows. In the second part of the paper we propose a second-order finite-volume projection method for the anelastic and pseudo-incompressible models that observes these structural similarities. The method is applied to test problems involving free convection in a neutral atmosphere, the breaking of orographic waves at high altitudes, and the descent of a cold air bubble in the small-scale limit. The scheme is meant to serve as a starting point for the development of a robust compressible atmospheric flow solver in future work

On globally static and stationary cosmologies with or without a cosmological constant and the Dark Energy problem

In the framework of spatially averaged inhomogeneous cosmologies in classical General Relativity, effective Einstein equations govern the regional and the global dynamics of averaged scalar variables of cosmological models. A particular solution may be characterized by a cosmic equation of state. In this paper it is pointed out that a globally static averaged dust model is conceivable without employing a compensating cosmological constant. Much in the spirit of Einstein's original model we discuss consequences for the global, but also for the regional properties of this cosmology. We then consider the wider class of globally stationary cosmologies that are conceivable in the presented framework. All these models are based on exact solutions of the averaged Einstein equations and provide examples of cosmologies in an out-of-equilibrium state, which we characterize by an information-theoretical measure. It is shown that such cosmologies preserve high-magnitude kinematical fluctuations and so tend to maintain their global properties. The same is true for a $\Lambda-$driven cosmos in such a state despite of exponential expansion. We outline relations to inflationary scenarios, and put the Dark Energy problem into perspective. Here, it is argued, on the grounds of the discussed cosmologies, that a classical explanation of Dark Energy through backreaction effects is theoretically conceivable, if the matter-dominated Universe emerged from a non-perturbative state in the vicinity of the stationary solution. We also discuss a number of caveats that furnish strong counter arguments in the framework of structure formation in a perturbed Friedmannian model.Comment: 33 pages, matches published version in Class. Quant. Gra