Anomalous monism and mental causality : on the debate of Donald Davidson’s philosophy of the mental

The English version of the first chapter of Erwin Rogler and Gerhard Preyer: Materialismus, anomaler Monismus und mentale Kausalität. Zur gegenwärtigen Philosophie des Mentalen bei Donald Davidson und David Lewis (2001) "Anomaler Monismus und Mentale Kausalität. Ein Beitrag zur Debatte über Donald Davidsons Philosophie des Mentalen" is a contribution to the current debates on the philosophy of the mental and mental causality initiated from Donald Davidson's philosophy with his article "Mental Events" (1970). It is the intent of the English version to give a response to the controversy among American, British and Australian philosophers in the context of a global exchange of ideas on problems understanding the mental. Contents 1. Preliminary Remarks 2. The Critique of Property-Epiphenomenalism and Counterarguments (a) The Enlargement of Nomological Reasoning (b) The Counterfactual Analysis (c) Supervenient Causality 3. Are Mental Properties real or unreal (fictive)? Abstract Things and events are fundamental entities in Davidson's ontology. Less distinct is the ontological status of properties, especially of mental types. Despite of some eliminative allusions there are weighty reasons to understand Davidson's philosophy of mind as including intentional realism. With it, the question of mental causality arises. There are two striking solutions to this problem: the epiphenomenalism of mental properties and the downward causation of mental events. Davidson cannot accept either. He claims to justify the mental as supervenient causality in order to thus integrate it into physicalism (his version of monism). But his argument at best proves the explanatory, not the causal relevance of mental properties. For this and for other reasons, Davidson fails the aspired synthesis of a sufficiently strong physicalism and the autonomy of the mental; a project whose realization is anyhow hard to achieve

Ceteris paribus conditionals and comparative normalcy

Our understanding of subjunctive conditionals has been greatly enhanced through the use of possible world semantics and, more precisely, by the idea that they involve variably strict quantification over possible worlds. I propose to extend this treatment to ceteris paribus conditionals – that is, conditionals that incorporate a ceteris paribus or ‘other things being equal’ clause. Although such conditionals are commonly invoked in scientific theorising, they traditionally arouse suspicion and apprehensiveness amongst philosophers. By treating ceteris paribus conditionals as a species of variably strict conditional I hope to shed new light upon their content and their logic

Where causality, conditionals and epistemology meet:A logical inquiry

This dissertation is an intellectual journey along topics at the intersection of the study of conditionals, causality and epistemology. It will focus on a couple of problems at this intersection pointed out in recent research. I will demonstrate how by combining knowledge and tools from all three fields we can make substantial progress on solving these issues. I will also show that this integrated approach provides us with a better understanding of the relation between conditionals, causality and epistemology

Bell's Theorem Without Hidden Variables

Experiments motivated by Bell's theorem have led some physicists to conclude that quantum theory is nonlocal. However, the theoretical basis for such claims is usually taken to be Bell's Theorem, which shows only that if certain predictions of quantum theory are correct, and a strong hidden-variable assumption is valid, then a certain locality condition must fail. This locality condition expresses the idea that what an experimenter freely chooses to measure in one spacetime region can have no effect of any kind in a second region situated spacelike relative to the first. The experimental results conform closely to the predictions of quantum theory in such cases, but the most reasonable conclusion to draw is not that locality fails, but rather that the hidden-variable assumption is false. For this assumption conflicts with the quantum precept that unperformed experiments have no outcomes. The present paper deduces the failure of this locality condition directly from the precepts of quantum theory themselves, in a way that generates no inconsistency or any conflict with the predictions of relativistic quantum field theory.Comment: This paper is a much simplified, yet still rigorous, version of quant-ph/0010047. The descriptive material is almost all new, and I believe very clear, but the rigorous formal argument, now relegated to Appendices, is the same as before. I consider it to be a new pape

Disjunctive antecedent conditionals

Disjunctive antecedent conditionals —conditionals of the form if A or B, C—sometimes seem to entail both of their simplifications and sometimes seem not to. I argue that this behavior reveals a genuine ambiguity in DACs. Along the way, I discuss a new observation about the role of focal stress in distinguishing the two interpretations of DACs. I propose a new theory, according to which the surface form of a DAC underdetermines its logical form: on one possible logical form, if A or B, C does entail both of its simplifications, while on the other, it does not