Weak and Strong Necessity Modals: On Linguistic Means of Expressing "A Primitive Concept OUGHT"

This paper develops an account of the meaning of `ought', and the distinction between weak necessity modals (`ought', `should') and strong necessity modals (`must', `have to'). I argue that there is nothing specially ``strong'' about strong necessity modals per se: uses of `Must p' predicate the (deontic/epistemic/etc.) necessity of the prejacent p of the actual world (evaluation world). The apparent ``weakness'' of weak necessity modals derives from their bracketing whether the necessity of the prejacent is verified in the actual world. `Ought p' can be accepted without needing to settle that the relevant considerations (norms, expectations, etc.) that actually apply verify the necessity of p. I call the basic account a modal-past approach to the weak/strong necessity modal distinction (for reasons that become evident). Several ways of implementing the approach in the formal semantics/pragmatics are critically examined. The account systematizes a wide range of linguistic phenomena: it generalizes across flavors of modality; it elucidates a special role that weak necessity modals play in discourse and planning; it captures contrasting logical, expressive, and illocutionary properties of weak and strong necessity modals; and it sheds light on how a notion of `ought' is often expressed in other languages. These phenomena have resisted systematic explanation. In closing I briefly consider how linguistic inquiry into differences among necessity modals may improve theorizing on broader philosophical issues

Computing Strong and Weak Permissions in Defeasible Logic

In this paper we propose an extension of Defeasible Logic to represent and compute three concepts of defeasible permission. In particular, we discuss different types of explicit permissive norms that work as exceptions to opposite obligations. Moreover, we show how strong permissions can be represented both with, and without introducing a new consequence relation for inferring conclusions from explicit permissive norms. Finally, we illustrate how a preference operator applicable to contrary-to-duty obligations can be combined with a new operator representing ordered sequences of strong permissions which derogate from prohibitions. The logical system is studied from a computational standpoint and is shown to have liner computational complexity

Designing Normative Theories for Ethical and Legal Reasoning: LogiKEy Framework, Methodology, and Tool Support

A framework and methodology---termed LogiKEy---for the design and engineering of ethical reasoners, normative theories and deontic logics is presented. The overall motivation is the development of suitable means for the control and governance of intelligent autonomous systems. LogiKEy's unifying formal framework is based on semantical embeddings of deontic logics, logic combinations and ethico-legal domain theories in expressive classic higher-order logic (HOL). This meta-logical approach enables the provision of powerful tool support in LogiKEy: off-the-shelf theorem provers and model finders for HOL are assisting the LogiKEy designer of ethical intelligent agents to flexibly experiment with underlying logics and their combinations, with ethico-legal domain theories, and with concrete examples---all at the same time. Continuous improvements of these off-the-shelf provers, without further ado, leverage the reasoning performance in LogiKEy. Case studies, in which the LogiKEy framework and methodology has been applied and tested, give evidence that HOL's undecidability often does not hinder efficient experimentation.Comment: 50 pages; 10 figure

I want to, but...

I want to see the concert, but I don’t want to take the long drive. Both of these desire ascriptions are true, even though I believe I’ll see the concert if and only if I take the drive.Yet they, and strongly conflicting desire ascriptions more generally, are predicted incompatible by the standard semantics, given two standard constraints. There are two proposed solutions. I argue that both face problems because they misunderstand how what we believe influences what we desire. I then sketch my own solution: a coarse-worlds semantics that captures the extent to which belief influences desire. My semantics models what I call some-things-considered desire. Considering what the concert would be like, but ignoring the drive, I want to see the concert; considering what the drive would be like, but ignoring the concert, I don’t want to take the drive

Two Ways to Want?

I present unexplored and unaccounted for uses of 'wants'. I call them advisory uses, on which information inaccessible to the desirer herself helps determine what she wants. I show that extant theories by Stalnaker, Heim, and Levinson fail to predict these uses. They also fail to predict true indicative conditionals with 'wants' in the consequent. These problems are related: intuitively valid reasoning with modus ponens on the basis of the conditionals in question results in unembedded advisory uses. I consider two fixes, and end up endorsing a relativist semantics, according to which desire attributions express information-neutral propositions. On this view, 'wants' functions as a precisification of 'ought', which exhibits similar unembedded and compositional behavior. I conclude by sketching a pragmatic account of the purpose of desire attributions that explains why it made sense for them to evolve in this way

FIVE STEPS TO RESPONSIBILITY

Responsibility has entered the academic discourse of logicians hardly more than few decades ago. I suggest a logical concept of responsibility which employs ideas both from a number of theories belonging to different branches of logic as well from other academic areas. As a comment to this concept, I suggest five steps narrative scenario in order to show how the logical dimension of responsibility emerges from diverse tendencies in logic and other sciences. Here are the five steps briefly stated: Step 1. Developing modal formalisms capable of evaluative analysis of situations (deontic, epistemic and etc.). Step 2. Drawing a conceptual borderline between normal and non-normal (weak) logical systems. Step 3. Using different kinds of models. Step 4. Agent- and action- friendly turn in logic. Step 5. Creating formalisms for modeling different types of agency. An idea advocated here within 5-Steps route to responsibility is that this concept is a complex causal and evaluative (axiological) relation. A logical account may be given for causal and normative aspects of this relation. Unfolding the responsibility back and forth through 5 Steps will result in different concepts. The technicalities are minimized for the sake of keeping the philosophical scope of the paper. For the same reason I also refrain from discussing legal and juridical ramifications of the issue

Metanormative Theory and the Meaning of Deontic Modals

Philosophical debate about the meaning of normative terms has long been pulled in two directions by the apparently competing ideas: (i) ‘ought’s do not describe what is actually the case but rather prescribe possible action, thought, or feeling, (ii) all declarative sentences deserve the same general semantic treatment, e.g. in terms of compositionally specified truth conditions. In this paper, I pursue resolution of this tension by rehearsing the case for a relatively standard truth-conditionalist semantics for ‘ought’ conceived as a necessity modal and proposing a revision to it motivated by the distinctively prescriptive character of some deontic modals. In my view, this puts pressure on a popular conception of one of the core debates of metanormative theory between realists and antirealists. To make good on this claim, I go on to explore two very general ways we might interpret the results of compositional semantics—“representationalism” and “inferentialism”—in order to argue that, contrary to what is generally assumed, both can capture the special prescriptivity of ‘ought’ and both can countenance compositionally specified and informative truth-conditions for ought-sentences. Hence, my main thesis is that the deciding factor between them should not be which of ideas (i) and (ii) we are more impressed by but rather what we think of the relative merits of how representationalism and inferentialism respect these ideas. I’m inclined to favor an antirealist form of inferentialism, but the task I’ve set myself here is mainly to articulate the view in the context of metanormative theory and the semantics of deontic modals rather than try to defend it fully. To this purpose, towards the end I also briefly compare and contrast inferentialism with a third “ideationalist” metasemantic view, which may be an attractive home for some sophisticated versions of metanormative expressivism. Depending on how expressivism is worked out, it may be completely compatible with and so perhaps usefully combined with inferentialism or it may offer a competing way to respect ideas (i) and (ii)

MODALNOŚĆ EPISTEMICZNA – ANALIZA KORPUSOWA WYKŁADNIKÓW MODALNOŚCI EPISTEMICZNEJ W WYROKACH UNIJNYCH I KRAJOWYCH

The aim of this paper is to establish the repertoire and distribution of verbal and adverbial exponents of epistemic modality in English- and Polish-language judgments passed by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and non-translated judgments passed by the Supreme Court of Poland (SN). The study applies a model for categorizing exponents of epistemicity with regard to their (i) level (high-, medium- and low-level of certainty, necessity or possibility expressed by the markers; primary dimension), (ii) perspective (own vs. reported perspective), (iii) opinion (based either on facts or beliefs) and (iv) time (the embedding of epistemic markers in sentences relating to the past, present or future) (contextual dimensions). It examines the degree of intra-generic convergence of translated EU judgments and non-translated national judgments in terms of the employment of epistemic markers, as well as the degree of authoritativeness of judicial argumentation, and determines whether the frequent use of epistemic markers constitutes a generic feature of judgments. The research material consists of a parallel corpus of English- and Polish-language versions of 200 EU judgments and a corpus of 200 non-translated domestic judgments. The results point to the high salience and differing patterns of use of epistemic markers in both EU and national judgments. The frequent use of high-level epistemic markers boosts the authoritativeness of judicial reasoning.Celem pracy jest ustalenie zasobu i dystrybucji czasownikowych i przysłówkowych wykładników modalności epistemicznej w angielsko- i polskojęzycznych tłumaczeniach wyroków Trybunału Sprawiedliwości UE (CJEU) i nietłumaczonych wyrokach Sądu Najwyższego RP (SN). W badaniu wykorzystano model kategoryzacji wykładników modalności epistemicznej pozwalający na ich klasyfikację ze względu na (i) intensywność (wysoką, średnią bądź niską, tj. stopień pewności, konieczności albo prawdopodobieństwa wyrażany przez poszczególne wykładniki; wymiar podstawowy), (ii) perspektywę (własną bądź przytaczaną), (iii) opinię (opartą na faktach albo przekonaniu), a także (iv) czas (przeszły, teraźniejszy, przyszły) (wymiary kontekstowe). Badanie miało na celu ustalenie wewnątrzgatunkowego stopnia dopasowania tłumaczonych wyroków unijnych do nietłumaczonych wyroków krajowych pod względem występowania wykładników modalności epistemicznej, określenie stopnia autorytatywności argumentacji sędziowskiej oraz stwierdzenie, czy częste występowanie wykładników stanowi cechę gatunkową wyroków. Materiał badawczy obejmuje równoległy korpus 200 wyroków unijnych przetłumaczonych na język angielski i polski oraz korpus 200 wyroków krajowych. Wyniki badania wskazują na istotną wagę wykładników o wysokiej intensywności zarówno w wyrokach unijnych, jak i krajowych. Stwierdzono, że częste użycie wykładników modalności epistemicznej o wysokiej intensywności podnosi poziom autorytatywności argumentacji sędziowskiej

Deontic modal use in American English

Master of ArtsDepartment of Modern LanguagesMary CoppleModality, a concept for which linguists have struggled to come to an agreed-upon, comprehensive definition, has been the subject of many linguistic studies over the last several decades. The contemporary English modal system has a long history of semantic and morphological development, or grammaticalization, which currently consists of auxiliary modals that function with lexical verbs to express levels of obligation, necessity, ability, permission, and degrees of certainty. For native speakers of English, determining the appropriate contexts and form of a specific modal verb is second nature. However, grasping the contextual complexity of the English modal system can be difficult for English language learners. Deontic modals such as must, have to, have (got) to and should are often presented to English language learners as relatively equal in meaning and contextual appropriateness, which makes gaining a native-like command of these modals even more difficult. This study, on a small scale, describes contemporary usage through a comparison of similar studies and data from a series of sociolinguistic interviews with native speakers of American English. The participants range from the ages of 25-50. They were chosen from the local population of Manhattan, KS and have lived in Kansas for a minimum of 10 years. Through a quantitative analysis of the tokens, patterns of dialogic use will be extrapolated from the linguistic data. The research questions will seek to find established patterns of deontic modal use that in order to identify practical applications of usage-based research for textbook publishers, curriculum designers, and educators