The Green Choice: Learning and Influencing Human Decisions on Shared Roads

Autonomous vehicles have the potential to increase the capacity of roads via platooning, even when human drivers and autonomous vehicles share roads. However, when users of a road network choose their routes selfishly, the resulting traffic configuration may be very inefficient. Because of this, we consider how to influence human decisions so as to decrease congestion on these roads. We consider a network of parallel roads with two modes of transportation: (i) human drivers who will choose the quickest route available to them, and (ii) ride hailing service which provides an array of autonomous vehicle ride options, each with different prices, to users. In this work, we seek to design these prices so that when autonomous service users choose from these options and human drivers selfishly choose their resulting routes, road usage is maximized and transit delay is minimized. To do so, we formalize a model of how autonomous service users make choices between routes with different price/delay values. Developing a preference-based algorithm to learn the preferences of the users, and using a vehicle flow model related to the Fundamental Diagram of Traffic, we formulate a planning optimization to maximize a social objective and demonstrate the benefit of the proposed routing and learning scheme.Comment: Submitted to CDC 201

On the interaction between Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand systems and the power network: models and coordination algorithms

We study the interaction between a fleet of electric, self-driving vehicles servicing on-demand transportation requests (referred to as Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand, or AMoD, system) and the electric power network. We propose a model that captures the coupling between the two systems stemming from the vehicles' charging requirements and captures time-varying customer demand and power generation costs, road congestion, battery depreciation, and power transmission and distribution constraints. We then leverage the model to jointly optimize the operation of both systems. We devise an algorithmic procedure to losslessly reduce the problem size by bundling customer requests, allowing it to be efficiently solved by off-the-shelf linear programming solvers. Next, we show that the socially optimal solution to the joint problem can be enforced as a general equilibrium, and we provide a dual decomposition algorithm that allows self-interested agents to compute the market clearing prices without sharing private information. We assess the performance of the mode by studying a hypothetical AMoD system in Dallas-Fort Worth and its impact on the Texas power network. Lack of coordination between the AMoD system and the power network can cause a 4.4% increase in the price of electricity in Dallas-Fort Worth; conversely, coordination between the AMoD system and the power network could reduce electricity expenditure compared to the case where no cars are present (despite the increased demand for electricity) and yield savings of up $147M/year. Finally, we provide a receding-horizon implementation and assess its performance with agent-based simulations. Collectively, the results of this paper provide a first-of-a-kind characterization of the interaction between electric-powered AMoD systems and the power network, and shed additional light on the economic and societal value of AMoD.Comment: Extended version of the paper presented at Robotics: Science and Systems XIV, in prep. for journal submission. In V3, we add a proof that the socially-optimal solution can be enforced as a general equilibrium, a privacy-preserving distributed optimization algorithm, a description of the receding-horizon implementation and additional numerical results, and proofs of all theorem

On the interaction between Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand systems and the power network: models and coordination algorithms

We study the interaction between a fleet of electric, self-driving vehicles servicing on-demand transportation requests (referred to as Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand, or AMoD, system) and the electric power network. We propose a model that captures the coupling between the two systems stemming from the vehicles' charging requirements and captures time-varying customer demand and power generation costs, road congestion, battery depreciation, and power transmission and distribution constraints. We then leverage the model to jointly optimize the operation of both systems. We devise an algorithmic procedure to losslessly reduce the problem size by bundling customer requests, allowing it to be efficiently solved by off-the-shelf linear programming solvers. Next, we show that the socially optimal solution to the joint problem can be enforced as a general equilibrium, and we provide a dual decomposition algorithm that allows self-interested agents to compute the market clearing prices without sharing private information. We assess the performance of the mode by studying a hypothetical AMoD system in Dallas-Fort Worth and its impact on the Texas power network. Lack of coordination between the AMoD system and the power network can cause a 4.4% increase in the price of electricity in Dallas-Fort Worth; conversely, coordination between the AMoD system and the power network could reduce electricity expenditure compared to the case where no cars are present (despite the increased demand for electricity) and yield savings of up $147M/year. Finally, we provide a receding-horizon implementation and assess its performance with agent-based simulations. Collectively, the results of this paper provide a first-of-a-kind characterization of the interaction between electric-powered AMoD systems and the power network, and shed additional light on the economic and societal value of AMoD.Comment: Extended version of the paper presented at Robotics: Science and Systems XIV and accepted by TCNS. In Version 4, the body of the paper is largely rewritten for clarity and consistency, and new numerical simulations are presented. All source code is available (MIT) at https://dx.doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.324165

Matroids are Immune to Braess Paradox

The famous Braess paradox describes the following phenomenon: It might happen that the improvement of resources, like building a new street within a congested network, may in fact lead to larger costs for the players in an equilibrium. In this paper we consider general nonatomic congestion games and give a characterization of the maximal combinatorial property of strategy spaces for which Braess paradox does not occur. In a nutshell, bases of matroids are exactly this maximal structure. We prove our characterization by two novel sensitivity results for convex separable optimization problems over polymatroid base polyhedra which may be of independent interest.Comment: 21 page