Learning from past bids to participate strategically in day-ahead electricity markets

We consider the process of bidding by electricity suppliers in a day-ahead market context, where each supplier bids a linear non-decreasing function of her generating capacity with the goal of maximizing her individual profit given other competing suppliers' bids. Based on the submitted bids, the market operator schedules suppliers to meet demand during each hour and determines hourly market clearing prices. Eventually, this game-theoretic process reaches a Nash equilibrium when no supplier is motivated to modify her bid. However, solving the individual profit maximization problem requires information of rivals' bids, which are typically not available. To address this issue, we develop an inverse optimization approach for estimating rivals' production cost functions given historical market clearing prices and production levels. We then use these functions to bid strategically and compute Nash equilibrium bids. We present numerical experiments illustrating our methodology, showing good agreement between bids based on the estimated production cost functions with the bids based on the true cost functions. We discuss an extension of our approach that takes into account network congestion resulting in location-dependent pricesFirst author draf

Learning from Past Bids to Participate Strategically in Day-Ahead Electricity Markets

We consider the process of bidding by electricity suppliers in a day-ahead market context where each supplier bids a linear non-decreasing function of her generating capacity with the goal of maximizing her individual profit given other competing suppliers' bids. Based on the submitted bids, the market operator schedules suppliers to meet demand during each hour and determines hourly market clearing prices. Eventually, this game-theoretic process reaches a Nash equilibrium when no supplier is motivated to modify her bid. However, solving the individual profit maximization problem requires information of rivals' bids, which are typically not available. To address this issue, we develop an inverse optimization approach for estimating rivals' production cost functions given historical market clearing prices and production levels. We then use these functions to bid strategically and compute Nash equilibrium bids. We present numerical experiments illustrating our methodology, showing good agreement between bids based on the estimated production cost functions with the bids based on the true cost functions. We discuss an extension of our approach that takes into account network congestion resulting in location-dependent prices

Greening Multi-Tenant Data Center Demand Response

Data centers have emerged as promising resources for demand response, particularly for emergency demand response (EDR), which saves the power grid from incurring blackouts during emergency situations. However, currently, data centers typically participate in EDR by turning on backup (diesel) generators, which is both expensive and environmentally unfriendly. In this paper, we focus on "greening" demand response in multi-tenant data centers, i.e., colocation data centers, by designing a pricing mechanism through which the data center operator can efficiently extract load reductions from tenants during emergency periods to fulfill energy reduction requirement for EDR. In particular, we propose a pricing mechanism for both mandatory and voluntary EDR programs, ColoEDR, that is based on parameterized supply function bidding and provides provably near-optimal efficiency guarantees, both when tenants are price-taking and when they are price-anticipating. In addition to analytic results, we extend the literature on supply function mechanism design, and evaluate ColoEDR using trace-based simulation studies. These validate the efficiency analysis and conclude that the pricing mechanism is both beneficial to the environment and to the data center operator (by decreasing the need for backup diesel generation), while also aiding tenants (by providing payments for load reductions).Comment: 34 pages, 6 figure

Rate of Price Discovery in Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

We study a class of iterative combinatorial auctions which can be viewed as subgradient descent methods for the problem of pricing bundles to balance supply and demand. We provide concrete convergence rates for auctions in this class, bounding the number of auction rounds needed to reach clearing prices. Our analysis allows for a variety of pricing schemes, including item, bundle, and polynomial pricing, and the respective convergence rates confirm that more expressive pricing schemes come at the cost of slower convergence. We consider two models of bidder behavior. In the first model, bidders behave stochastically according to a random utility model, which includes standard best-response bidding as a special case. In the second model, bidders behave arbitrarily (even adversarially), and meaningful convergence relies on properly designed activity rules

Are agent-based simulations robust? The wholesale electricity trading case

Agent-based computational economics is becoming widely used in practice. This paper explores the consistency of some of its standard techniques. We focus in particular on prevailing wholesale electricity trading simulation methods. We include different supply and demand representations and propose the Experience-Weighted Attractions method to include several behavioural algorithms. We compare the results across assumptions and to economic theory predictions. The match is good under best-response and reinforcement learning but not under fictitious play. The simulations perform well under flat and upward-slopping supply bidding, and also for plausible demand elasticity assumptions. Learning is influenced by the number of bids per plant and the initial conditions. The overall conclusion is that agent-based simulation assumptions are far from innocuous. We link their performance to underlying features, and identify those that are better suited to model wholesale electricity markets.Agent-based computational economics, electricity, market design, experience-weighted attraction (EWA), learning, supply functions, demand aggregation, initial beliefs.