67,451 research outputs found

    Overconfidence and Managers’ Responsibility Hoarding

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    Overconfidence is a well-established behavioral phenomenon that involves an overestimation of own capabilities. We introduce a model, in which managers and agents exert effort in a joint production, after the manager decides on the allocation of the tasks. A rational manager tends to delegate the critical task to the agent more often than given by the efficient task allocation. In contrast, an overconfident manager is more likely to hoard responsibility, i.e. to delegate the critical task less often than a rational manager. In fact, a manager with a sufficiently high ability and a moderate degree of overconfidence increases the total welfare by hoarding responsibility and exerting more effort than a rational manager. Finally, we derive the conditions under which responsibility hoarding can persist in an organization, showing that the bias survives as long as the overconfident manager can rationalize the observed output by underestimating the ability of the agent

    Analysing the power of the European Union’s diplomatic service : do the EU member states control the European external action service?

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    By applying the rational choice principal–agent model, this article examines the European Union member states’ principal control of the European External Action Service (EEAS) agent. More specifically, the article applies mechanisms of agency monitoring, control and sanctions that are inherent in the principal–agent model to analyse the establishment and functioning of the EEAS. These mechanisms aim to ensure the EEAS’s compliance with its mandate, thereby curtailing its ability to pursue own objectives that are independent from the principal. The findings reveal that the EEAS is tightly controlled by the EU member states. Moreover the European Commission has tools to exercise horizontal checks vis-à-vis the EEAS. The application of the principal–agent model to control the EEAS is not without its limits. The model falls short of conceptualizing the role of the European Parliament, which remains an outlier to this model

    A Mediated Definite Delegation Model allowing for Certified Grid Job Submission

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    Grid computing infrastructures need to provide traceability and accounting of their users" activity and protection against misuse and privilege escalation. A central aspect of multi-user Grid job environments is the necessary delegation of privileges in the course of a job submission. With respect to these generic requirements this document describes an improved handling of multi-user Grid jobs in the ALICE ("A Large Ion Collider Experiment") Grid Services. A security analysis of the ALICE Grid job model is presented with derived security objectives, followed by a discussion of existing approaches of unrestricted delegation based on X.509 proxy certificates and the Grid middleware gLExec. Unrestricted delegation has severe security consequences and limitations, most importantly allowing for identity theft and forgery of delegated assignments. These limitations are discussed and formulated, both in general and with respect to an adoption in line with multi-user Grid jobs. Based on the architecture of the ALICE Grid Services, a new general model of mediated definite delegation is developed and formulated, allowing a broker to assign context-sensitive user privileges to agents. The model provides strong accountability and long- term traceability. A prototype implementation allowing for certified Grid jobs is presented including a potential interaction with gLExec. The achieved improvements regarding system security, malicious job exploitation, identity protection, and accountability are emphasized, followed by a discussion of non- repudiation in the face of malicious Grid jobs

    Performance Pay, Delegation, and Multitasking under Uncertainty and Innovativeness An Empirical Investigation

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    The existing empirical evidence is somewhat inconclusive with respect to a number of the key predictions of the agency model. Although the reach of agency theory is considerably wider, the dominant portion of work has been taken up with examining the nature of the trade-off between risk and incentives, and the implications thereof for contractual design. More specifically, some researchers have recently noted that the predicted trade-off between risk and incentives turns out to be rather weak, and perhaps non-existent, when confronted with the available empirical evidence. In this paper, we examine the risk-incentives trade-off and related predictions from agency theory on the basis of data from a data set encompassing close to 1000 Danish firms. We find that the relation between the use of performance pay in these firms and the environmental uncertainty they confront which is one way to test the risk/incentives tradeoff is indeed weak and in many cases even perverse. We then suggest, in line with other recent contributions to the literature, that this may be caused by the widespread use of delegation. One effect of delegation is that it breaks the simple relation between risks and incentives. We examine the suggestion that that those firms that are more prone to use delegation of decision rights in their internal organization are facing an uncertain environment to a larger extent than the rest of the population. We argue that this constitutes an indirect confirmation of the hypothesis. We also examine the multi-tasking agency hypothesis that as risk increases, the flexibility of agents is restricted. We fail to find support for this hypothesis. It is suggested that the reason for this finding is also related to delegation.Uncertainty, pay-for-performance, delegation, innovation, competition

    The future obligations of "project manager" as construction integral director (DIPE) in the law of buildings construction in spain (LOE)

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    In the year 1999 approves the Law of Construction Building (LOE, in Spanish) to regulate a sector such as construction, which contained some shortcomings from the legal point of view. Currently, the LOE has been in force 12 years, changing the spanish world of the construction, due to influenced by internationalization. Within the LOE, there regulating the different actors involved in the construction building, as the Projects design, the Director of Construction, the developer, The builder, Director of execution of the construction (actor only in Spain, similar as construcion engineer and abroad in), control entities and the users, but lacks figure Project manager will assume the delegation of the promoter helping and you organize, direct and management the process. This figure assumes that the market and contracts are not legally regulated in Spain, then should define and establish its regulation in the LOE. (Spain Construction Law) The translation in spanish of the words "Project Manager is owed to Professor Rafael de Heredia in his book Integrated Project Management, as agent acting on behalf of the organization and promoter assuming control of the project, ie Integraded Project Management . Already exist in Spain, AEDIP (Spanish Association Integrated of Project Construction management) which comprises the major companies in “Project Management” in Spain, and MeDIP (Master in Integrated Construction Project) the largest and most advanced studies at the Polytechnic University of Madrid, in "Construction Project Management" they teach which is also in Argentina. The Integrated Project ("Project Management") applied to the construction process is a methodological technique that helps to organize, control and manage the resources of the promoters in the building process. When resources are limited (which is usually most situations) to manage them efficiently becomes very important. Well, we find that in this situation, the resources are not only limited, but it is limited, so a comprehensive control and monitoring of them becomes not only important if not crucial. The alternative of starting from scratch with a team that specializes in developing these follow directly intervening to ensure that scarce resources are used in the best possible way requires the use of a specific methodology (Manual DIP, Matrix Foreign EDR breakdown structure EDP Project, Risk Management and Control, Design Management, et ..), that is the methodology used by "Projects managers" to ensure that the initial objectives of the promoters or investors are met and all actors in process, from design to construction company have the mind aim of the project will do, trying to get their interests do not prevail over the interests of the project. Among the agents listed in the building process, "Project Management" or DIPE (Director Comprehensive building process, a proposed name for possible incorporation into the LOE, ) currently not listed as such in the LOE (Act on Construction Planning ), one of the agents that exist within the building process is not regulated from the legal point of view, no obligations, ie, as is required by law to have a project, a builder, a construction management, etc. DIPE only one who wants to hire you as have been advanced knowledge of their services by the clients they have been hiring these agents, there being no legal obligation as mentioned above, then the market is dictating its ruling on this new figure, as if it were necessary, he was not hired and eventually disappeared from the building process. As the aim of this article is regular the process and implement the name of DIPE in the Spanish Law of buildings construction (LOE

    Developing and Implementing Self-Direction Programs and Policies: A Handbook

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    Provides a guide to designing, implementing, and evaluating service delivery models that allow public program participants to manage their own care services and supports. Outlines elements of employer and budget authorities, enrollment, and counseling

    Institutional arrangements for public debt management

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    This paper analyzes institutional arrangements for public debt management by reviewing the experience of OECD countries during the late 1980s and 1990s. It discusses principal-agent issues arising from the delegation of authority from the Minister of Finance to the debt management office and describes how countries have designed governance structures and control and monitoring mechanisms to deal with these issues. The paper also discusses what lessons emerging market countries and transition countries can draw from the experience of advanced OECD countries. The OECD experience clearly indicates that-regardless of whether the debt management office is located inside or outside the Ministry of Finance-four issues are of vital importance: 1) Giving priority to strategic public policy objectives rather than tactical trading objectives. 2) Strengthening the institutional capacity to deal with financial portfolio management and with the public policy aspects of debt management. 3) Modernizing debt management. 4) Creating mechanisms to ensure successful delegation and accountability to the Ministry of Finance and Parliament.Public Sector Economics&Finance,Public&Municipal Finance,Strategic Debt Management,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Urban Economics,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Strategic Debt Management,Urban Economics,Public&Municipal Finance,Banks&Banking Reform
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