FLECS: Planning with a Flexible Commitment Strategy

There has been evidence that least-commitment planners can efficiently handle planning problems that involve difficult goal interactions. This evidence has led to the common belief that delayed-commitment is the "best" possible planning strategy. However, we recently found evidence that eager-commitment planners can handle a variety of planning problems more efficiently, in particular those with difficult operator choices. Resigned to the futility of trying to find a universally successful planning strategy, we devised a planner that can be used to study which domains and problems are best for which planning strategies. In this article we introduce this new planning algorithm, FLECS, which uses a FLExible Commitment Strategy with respect to plan-step orderings. It is able to use any strategy from delayed-commitment to eager-commitment. The combination of delayed and eager operator-ordering commitments allows FLECS to take advantage of the benefits of explicitly using a simulated execution state and reasoning about planning constraints. FLECS can vary its commitment strategy across different problems and domains, and also during the course of a single planning problem. FLECS represents a novel contribution to planning in that it explicitly provides the choice of which commitment strategy to use while planning. FLECS provides a framework to investigate the mapping from planning domains and problems to efficient planning strategies.Comment: See http://www.jair.org/ for an online appendix and other files accompanying this articl

Democracy, democratization and climate change : complex relationships

Relationships between democracy and more particularly democratization on the one side and climate change and responses to that on the other are underexplored in the two literatures on democratization and climate change. A complex web exists, characterised by interdependence and reciprocal effects. These must be plotted in as systematic and comprehensive a way as possible. Only then can we establish whether democratization really matters for climate change and for responding adequately to the challenges it poses. And only then can we assess the consequences that a changing climate might have for democracy and democratization. Implications follow for international efforts to support the spread of democracy around the world and for climate governance. This collection of theoretically-informed and empirically rooted studies combines insights from academics and more policy-oriented writers. A major objective is to facilitate dialogue among not just analysts of democracy, democratization and climate change but with actors in two fields: international democracy support and climate action

Learning From Experience With Performance Assessment Frameworks for General Budget Support

This report provides the findings of a study financed by SECO and undertaken under the auspices of the OECD-DAC multi-country evaluation of General Budget Support (GBS). The overall objective was to gather preliminary lessons on what could be good international practice in the development\ud of Performance Assessment Frameworks (PAFs) for GBS. The study is based on the experience of three countries which have adopted harmonised PAFs – namely Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania, and two which are moving in this direction – Benin and Nicaragua. In order to assess the effectiveness of these PAFs, the study employed a simplified, standard framework reflecting the OECD-DAC guiding principles for the provision of budget support.\u

Global Climate Policy Architecture and Political Feasibility: Specific Formulas and Emission Targets to Attain 460 ppm CO2 Concentrations

Three gaps in the Kyoto Protocol most badly need to be filled: the absence of emission targets extending far into the future, the absence of participation by the United States, China, and other developing countries, and the absence of reason to think that members will abide by commitments. To be politically acceptable, any new treaty that fills these gaps must, we believe, obey certain constraints regarding country-by-country economic costs. We offer a framework of formulas that assign quantitative allocations of emissions, across countries, one budget period at a time. The two-part plan: (i) China and other developing countries accept targets at BAU in the coming budget period, the same period in which the US first agrees to cuts below BAU; and (ii) all countries are asked in the future to make further cuts in accordance with a formula which sums up a Progressive Reductions Factor, a Latecomer Catch-up Factor, and a Gradual Equalization Factor. An earlier proposal for specific parameter values in the formulas – Frankel (2009), as analyzed by Bosetti, et al (2009) – achieved the environmental goal that concentrations of CO2 plateau at 500 ppm by 2100. It succeeded in obeying our political constraints, such as keeping the economic cost for every country below the thresholds of Y=1% of income in Present Discounted Value, and X=5% of income in the worst period. In pursuit of more aggressive environmental goals, we now advance the dates at which some countries are asked to begin cutting below BAU, within our framework. We also tinker with the values for the parameters in the formulas. The resulting target paths for emissions are run through the WITCH model to find their economic and environmental effects. We find that it is not possible to attain a 380 ppm CO2 goal (roughly in line with the 2°C target) without violating our political constraints. We were however, able to attain a concentration goal of 460 ppm CO2 with looser political constraints. The most important result is that we had to raise the threshold of costs above which a country drops out, to as high as Y =3.4% of income in PDV terms, or X =12 % in the worst budget period. Some may conclude from these results that the more aggressive environmental goals are not attainable in practice, and that our earlier proposal for how to attain 500 ppm CO2 is the better plan. We take no position on which environmental goal is best overall. Rather, we submit that, whatever the goal, our approach will give targets that are more practical economically and politically than approaches that have been proposed by others.International Climate Agreements

Responding to Agency Avoidance of OIRA

Concerns have recently been raised that US federal agencies may sometimes avoid regulatory review by the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). In this article, we assess the seriousness of such potential avoidance, and we recommend a framework for evaluating potential responses. After summarizing the system of presidential regulatory oversight through OIRA review, we analyze the incentives for agencies to cooperate with or avoid OIRA. We identify a wider array of agency avoidance tactics than has past scholarship, and a wider array of corresponding response options available to OIRA, the President, Congress, and the courts. We argue that, because the relationship between agencies and OIRA involves ongoing repeat player interactions, some of these avoidance tactics are less likely to occur (or to succeed) than has previously been alleged, and others are more likely; the difference depends significantly on how easy it is for OIRA to detect avoidance, and for OIRA, the courts, and others to respond. Further, we note that in this repeat player relationship, responses to agency avoidance tactics may induce further strategic moves and countermoves. Thus we further argue that the optimal response may not always be to try to eliminate the avoidance behavior; some avoidance may be worth tolerating where the benefits of trying to reduce agency avoidance would not justify the costs of response options and countermoves. We therefore conclude that responses to agency avoidance should be evaluated in a way similar to what OIRA asks of agencies evaluating proposed regulations: by weighing the pros and cons of alternative response options (including no action)

Responding to Agency Avoidance of OIRA

Concerns have recently been raised that US federal agencies may sometimes avoid regulatory review by the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). In this article, we assess the seriousness of such potential avoidance, and we recommend a framework for evaluating potential responses. After summarizing the system of presidential regulatory oversight through OIRA review, we analyze the incentives for agencies to cooperate with or avoid OIRA. We identify a wider array of agency avoidance tactics than has past scholarship, and a wider array of corresponding response options available to OIRA, the President, Congress, and the courts. We argue that, because the relationship between agencies and OIRA involves ongoing repeat player interactions, some of these avoidance tactics are less likely to occur (or to succeed) than has previously been alleged, and others are more likely; the difference depends significantly on how easy it is for OIRA to detect avoidance, and for OIRA, the courts, and others to respond. Further, we note that in this repeat player relationship, responses to agency avoidance tactics may induce further strategic moves and countermoves. Thus we further argue that the optimal response may not always be to try to eliminate the avoidance behavior; some avoidance may be worth tolerating where the benefits of trying to reduce agency avoidance would not justify the costs of response options and countermoves. We therefore conclude that responses to agency avoidance should be evaluated in a way similar to what OIRA asks of agencies evaluating proposed regulations: by weighing the pros and cons of alternative response options (including no action)

Economic and Religious Choice: A Case-Study from Early Christian Communities

The aim of this paper is to elaborate an evaluative framework of religious choice within the early Christian communities reconstructed through the narrative of a New Testament Epistle, 2Peter, based on an economic approach to moral dilemmas identified in this context. Thus the work concentrates on the stances, attitudes and social practices of deviant members who engaged in free-riding within early Christian congregations and were exposed to serious self-control problems. In our attempt to employ economic theories of religion, we are in a position to better assess the efficiency of early Christian responses to the entry of competing groups in the religious market of this era, as well as to identify and explore the sort of criteria that determine the intertemporal choices of distinct religious actors.choice and markets, religious consumption, free-riding

Precommitment and random exchange rates in symmetric duopoly: a new theory of multinational production

Recent volatility in real exchange rates has renewed interest in the nature of multinational firms. One increasingly common phenomenon involves the foreign sourcing of production, in which certain domestic firms choose to produce part or all of their product abroad and then export the commodity for domestic sale. Multinational production has been rationalized on the basis of inherent asymmetries between firms, such as the possession of certain firm-specific assets or differences between firms in their perceptions of foreign production costs, access to foreign subsidy programs, and the possibility of tariff preemption. Such behavior has also been rationalized in terms of corporate risk-aversion and a desire to hedge real exchange rate risk through the diversification of production locations. This paper presents an entirely novel explanation for the existence of multinational firms and the foreign sourcing of production. Rather than relying on exogenous asymmetries between firms or on assumptions about corporate aversion to risk, this explanation recognizes that exchange rate uncertainty may offer a purely strategic motive for symmetric and risk-neutral domestic oligopolists to precommit to foreign production in order to attain a position of industry leadership. This explanation is presented in the specific context of a two-period model of strategic foreign production by domestic duopolists. Strategically symmetric and risk-neutral firms are confronted by a unique source of uncertainty in the form of a randomly fluctuating exchange rate. Exchange rate uncertainty is resolved, for the purposes of current production decisions, between the two periods. Precommitted foreign production in the first period yields a leadership advantage relative to firms that do not precommit, but this decision must be evaluated against the value of the alternative of remaining flexible to adopt a production plan after the resolution of exchange rate uncertainty. A unique symmetric sequential equilibrium in mixed strategies is determined in this market, allowing a Stackelberg leader to endogenously emerge through a credible precommitment to the foreign sourcing of production.International business enterprises ; Foreign exchange rates

Parallel heuristic search in forward partial-order planning

[EN] Most of the current top-performing planners are sequential planners that only handle total-order plans. Although this is a computationally efficient approach, the management of total-order plans restrict the choices of reasoning and thus the generation of flexible plans. In this paper, we present FLAP2, a forward-chaining planner that follows the principles of the classical POCL (Partial-Order Causal-Link Planning) paradigm. Working with partial-order plans allows FLAP2 to easily manage the parallelism of the plans, which brings several advantages: more flexible executions, shorter plan durations (makespan) and an easy adaptation to support new features like temporal or multi-agent planning. However, one of the limitations of POCL planners is that they require far more computational effort to deal with the interactions that arise among actions. FLAP2 minimizes this overhead by applying several techniques that improve its performance: the combination of different state-based heuristics and the use of parallel processes to diversify the search in different directions when a plateau is found. To evaluate the performance of FLAP2, we have made a comparison with four state-of-the-art planners: SGPlan, YAHSP2, Temporal Fast Downward and OPTIC. Experimental results show that FLAP2 presents a very acceptable trade-off between time and quality and a high coverage on the current planning benchmarks.This work has been partially supported by the Spanish MINECO project TIN2014-55637-C2-2-R and cofounded by FEDER.Sapena Vercher, O.; Torreño Lerma, A.; Onaindia De La Rivaherrera, E. (2016). Parallel heuristic search in forward partial-order planning. Knowledge Engineering Review. 31(5):417-428. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0269888916000230S41742831