23,769 research outputs found
Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games
Delayed perfect monitoring in an in�nitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other player's action choice with a fixed, but finite delay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of belief-free equilibria is reduced under certain conditions. This model applies to any situation in which there is a heterogeneous delay between information generation and the players-reaction to it.Repeated Game, Delayed Perfect Monitoring, Folk Theorem
Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games.
Delayed perfect monitoring in an in�nitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other player's action choice with a fixed, but finite
delay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of belief-free equilibria is reduced under certain conditions. This model applies to any situation in which there is a heterogeneous delay between information generation and the players-reaction to it
Repeated Games Played in a Network
Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by letting the players form a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. This and the bilateral communication structure allow for limited results under strategic communication only. As a by-product this model produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network's diameter, and not on its clustering coefficient as in other models.Repeated Game, Network, Delayed Perfect Monitoring, Communication
Repeated Games Played in a Network
Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by allocating the players to a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game’s history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. Due to this and the bilateral communication structure, truthful communication arises endogenously only under additional conditions. The model also produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network’s diameter, and not on its clustering coefficient as in other models.Repeated Game, Delayed Perfect Monitoring, Network, Communication
Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags
We extend the folk theorem of repeated games to two settings in which players' information about others' play arrives with stochastic lags. In our first model, signals are almost-perfect if and when they do arrive, that is, each player either observes an almost-perfect signal of period-t play with some lag or else never sees a signal of period-t play. The second model has the same lag structure, but the information structure corresponds to a lagged form of imperfect public monitoring, and players are allowed to communicate via cheap-talk messages at the end of each period. In each case, we construct equilibria in “delayed-response strategies,” which ensure that players wait long enough to respond to signals that with high probability all relevant signals are received before players respond. To do so, we extend past work on private monitoring to obtain folk theorems despite the small residual amount of private information.EconomicsEngineering and Applied Science
Repeated games played in a network
Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by letting the players form a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. This and the bilateral communication structure allow for limited results under strategic communication only. As a by-product this model produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network's diameter, and not on its clustering coefficient as in other models
Games with Delays. A Frankenstein Approach
We investigate infinite games on finite graphs where the information flow is
perturbed by nondeterministic signalling delays. It is known that such
perturbations make synthesis problems virtually unsolvable, in the general
case. On the classical model where signals are attached to states, tractable
cases are rare and difficult to identify.
Here, we propose a model where signals are detached from control states, and
we identify a subclass on which equilibrium outcomes can be preserved, even if
signals are delivered with a delay that is finitely bounded. To offset the
perturbation, our solution procedure combines responses from a collection of
virtual plays following an equilibrium strategy in the instant- signalling game
to synthesise, in a Frankenstein manner, an equivalent equilibrium strategy for
the delayed-signalling game
Dynamic Non-Bayesian Decision Making
The model of a non-Bayesian agent who faces a repeated game with incomplete
information against Nature is an appropriate tool for modeling general
agent-environment interactions. In such a model the environment state
(controlled by Nature) may change arbitrarily, and the feedback/reward function
is initially unknown. The agent is not Bayesian, that is he does not form a
prior probability neither on the state selection strategy of Nature, nor on his
reward function. A policy for the agent is a function which assigns an action
to every history of observations and actions. Two basic feedback structures are
considered. In one of them -- the perfect monitoring case -- the agent is able
to observe the previous environment state as part of his feedback, while in the
other -- the imperfect monitoring case -- all that is available to the agent is
the reward obtained. Both of these settings refer to partially observable
processes, where the current environment state is unknown. Our main result
refers to the competitive ratio criterion in the perfect monitoring case. We
prove the existence of an efficient stochastic policy that ensures that the
competitive ratio is obtained at almost all stages with an arbitrarily high
probability, where efficiency is measured in terms of rate of convergence. It
is further shown that such an optimal policy does not exist in the imperfect
monitoring case. Moreover, it is proved that in the perfect monitoring case
there does not exist a deterministic policy that satisfies our long run
optimality criterion. In addition, we discuss the maxmin criterion and prove
that a deterministic efficient optimal strategy does exist in the imperfect
monitoring case under this criterion. Finally we show that our approach to
long-run optimality can be viewed as qualitative, which distinguishes it from
previous work in this area.Comment: See http://www.jair.org/ for any accompanying file
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