Computer Aided Verification

This open access two-volume set LNCS 10980 and 10981 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 30th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification, CAV 2018, held in Oxford, UK, in July 2018. The 52 full and 13 tool papers presented together with 3 invited papers and 2 tutorials were carefully reviewed and selected from 215 submissions. The papers cover a wide range of topics and techniques, from algorithmic and logical foundations of verification to practical applications in distributed, networked, cyber-physical, and autonomous systems. They are organized in topical sections on model checking, program analysis using polyhedra, synthesis, learning, runtime verification, hybrid and timed systems, tools, probabilistic systems, static analysis, theory and security, SAT, SMT and decisions procedures, concurrency, and CPS, hardware, industrial applications

More Reflections on Consequence

This special issue collects together nine new essays on logical consequence :the relation obtaining between the premises and the conclusion of a logically valid argument. The present paper is a partial, and opinionated,introduction to the contemporary debate on the topic. We focus on two influential accounts of consequence, the model-theoretic and the proof-theoretic, and on the seeming platitude that valid arguments necessarilypreserve truth. We briefly discuss the main objections these accounts face, as well as Hartry Field’s contention that such objections show consequenceto be a primitive, indefinable notion, and that we must reject the claim that valid arguments necessarily preserve truth. We suggest that the accountsin question have the resources to meet the objections standardly thought to herald their demise and make two main claims: (i) that consequence, as opposed to logical consequence, is the epistemologically significant relation philosophers should be mainly interested in; and (ii) that consequence is a paradoxical notion if truth is

Computer Aided Verification

This open access two-volume set LNCS 10980 and 10981 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 30th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification, CAV 2018, held in Oxford, UK, in July 2018. The 52 full and 13 tool papers presented together with 3 invited papers and 2 tutorials were carefully reviewed and selected from 215 submissions. The papers cover a wide range of topics and techniques, from algorithmic and logical foundations of verification to practical applications in distributed, networked, cyber-physical, and autonomous systems. They are organized in topical sections on model checking, program analysis using polyhedra, synthesis, learning, runtime verification, hybrid and timed systems, tools, probabilistic systems, static analysis, theory and security, SAT, SMT and decisions procedures, concurrency, and CPS, hardware, industrial applications

Computer Aided Verification

The open access two-volume set LNCS 12224 and 12225 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 32st International Conference on Computer Aided Verification, CAV 2020, held in Los Angeles, CA, USA, in July 2020.* The 43 full papers presented together with 18 tool papers and 4 case studies, were carefully reviewed and selected from 240 submissions. The papers were organized in the following topical sections: Part I: AI verification; blockchain and Security; Concurrency; hardware verification and decision procedures; and hybrid and dynamic systems. Part II: model checking; software verification; stochastic systems; and synthesis. *The conference was held virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic

تحلیل منطقی فلسفی پارادوکس اسکولم

ریاضیدانان هرروز با مجموعههای ناشمارا، مجموعهی توانی، خوشترتیبی، تناهی و ... سروکار دارند و با این تصور که این مفاهیم همان چیزهایی هستند که در ذهن دارند، کتابها و اثباتهای ریاضی را میخوانند و میفهمند و درمورد آنها صحبت میکنند. اما آیا این مفاهیم همان چیزهایی هستند که ریاضیدانان تصور میکنند؟ اولینبار اسکولم با بیان یک پارادوکس شک خود را به این موضوع ابراز کرد. بنابر قضیهی لوونهایم اسکولم رو به پایین، نظریه مجموعهها مدلی شمارا دارد. این مدل قضیهی کانتور را که بیان میکند مجموعهای ناشمارا وجود دارد برآورده میکند؛ ولی مدل شمارا دارای دامنهای شامل شمارا عضو است. پس برای بیان وجود مجموعهای ناشمارا مانند ℝ تنها شمارا عضو داریم. این جمالت به پارادوکس اسکولم مشهور شدند. بنابرین مجموعهی ناشمارایمان در واقع شمارا بهنظر میرسد. از زمانی که پارادوکس فهمیده شد تا به امروز بحث های زیادی در رد و تایید آن بوده است. گروهی تا آنجا پیش رفتند که ادعا کردند همهی مجموعهها شمارا هستند. در این پایان نامه پرسش های مقابل بررسی شدهاند: آیا مجموعههای ناشمارا واقعا وجود دارند؟ آیا پارادوکس اسکولم نشان میدهد که نظریههای مرتبه دوم برای مدل کردن کاربرد ریاضیات مناسبتر هستند؟ پارادوکس اسکولم درمورد درک ما از نظریه مجموعهها و سمانتیک آن چه نتیجهای دارد؟ خواهیم دید بهتر است درمورد وجود مجموعههای ناشمارا، موضع الادری را برگزینیم، پارادوکس اسکولم نتیجه نمیدهد نظریههای مرتبه دوم برای مدل کردن کاربرد ریاضیات مناسب هستند و درمورد درک ما از نظریه مجموعهها نتیجهای نخواهد داش

Creationism and evolution

In Tower of Babel, Robert Pennock wrote that “defenders of evolution would help their case immeasurably if they would reassure their audience that morality, purpose, and meaning are not lost by accepting the truth of evolution.” We first consider the thesis that the creationists’ movement exploits moral concerns to spread its ideas against the theory of evolution. We analyze their arguments and possible reasons why they are easily accepted. Creationists usually employ two contradictive strategies to expose the purported moral degradation that comes with accepting the theory of evolution. On the one hand they claim that evolutionary theory is immoral. On the other hand creationists think of evolutionary theory as amoral. Both objections come naturally in a monotheistic view. But we can find similar conclusions about the supposed moral aspects of evolution in non-religiously inspired discussions. Meanwhile, the creationism-evolution debate mainly focuses — understandably — on what constitutes good science. We consider the need for moral reassurance and analyze reassuring arguments from philosophers. Philosophers may stress that science does not prescribe and is therefore not immoral, but this reaction opens the door for the objection of amorality that evolution — as a naturalistic world view at least — supposedly endorses. We consider that the topic of morality and its relation to the acceptance of evolution may need more empirical research

Metasemantics: on the limits of semantic theory

METASEMANTICS is a wake-up call for semantic theory: It reveals that some semantic questions have no adequate answer. (This is meant to be the epistemic point that certain semantic questions cannot be settled--not a metaphysical point about whether there is a fact-of-the-matter.) METASEMANTICS thus checks our default optimism that any well-formed semantic question can be settled (at least in principle). Chapter One argues that relative to certain assumptions, a question like What does 'Pollux' denote? has no adequate answer. If an answer is to be non-circular, then any answer ultimately depends on an uninterpreted term--meaning that this term occurs absent an answer to what it denotes. This, I argue, makes the answer uninformative in certain crucial respects. The lesson here essentially vindicates Quine's thesis of ontological relativity (though not his behaviorism or semantic nihilism). Chapter Two and Three build on this pessimism in considering ontic-idioms, such as 'exist', 'actual', etc. If Chapter One entails there is no saying what an ontic-idiom's extension is, these chapters show there is no saying what their intension is. Any attempt, I claim, will be equivocal. As corollaries, I show that a univocal statement of Realism about x is impossible--as well as a criterion of ontological commitment. Chapter Four considers truth-conditional semantics, generally speaking. After elaborating Davidson's claim about the folly of defining truth, I counter-balance his pessimism by showing that an informative analysis of 'true' is still possible (though only for certain translational purposes). Finally, Chapter Five evaluates a pessimistic argument concerning mental content. I argue that under externalism, a priori knowledge of content is impossible, at least for knowing whether a concept is about H2O versus XYZ. But this limit on the a priori should be unsurprising; I argue, moreover, that for other purposes we indeed know a priori what we think