36 research outputs found
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Next Generation Attacks on the Internet
Over the past few years we have seen the use of Internet worms, i.e., malicious self-replicating programs, as a mechanism to rapidly invade and compromise large numbers of remote computers. Although the first worms released on the Internet were large-scale easy to- spot massive security incidents, also known as flash worms, it is currently envisioned that future worms will be increasingly difficult to detect, and will be known as stealth worms. This is partly because the motives of the first worm developers were centered around the self-gratification brought by the achievement of compromising large numbers of remote computers, the motives of recent worm and malware developers are centered around financial and political gains. Therefore, although recent attackers still want to be able to control a large number of compromised computers, they prefer to compromise these computers as quietly as possible, over a longer period of time, so as not to be detected by any security defenses. Thus, to achieve a stealthy behavior, these attackers have started using, or at least have the capacity to use a wide variety of mechanisms that will make their worms more difficult to detect
PROVIDE: hiding from automated network scans with proofs of identity
Network scanners are a valuable tool for researchers and administrators, however they are also used by malicious actors to identify vulnerable hosts on a network. Upon the disclosure of a security vulnerability, scans are launched within hours. These opportunistic attackers enumerate blocks of IP addresses in hope of discovering an exploitable host. Fortunately, defensive measures such as port knocking protocols (PKPs) allow a service to remain stealth to unauthorized IP addresses. The service is revealed only when a client includes a special authentication token (AT) in the IP/TCP header. However this AT is generated from a secret shared between the clients/servers and distributed manually to each endpoint. As a result, these defense measures have failed to be widely adopted by other protocols such as HTTP/S due to challenges in distributing the shared secrets. In this paper we propose a scalable solution to this problem for services accessed by domain name. We make the following observation: automated network scanners access servers by IP address, while legitimate clients access the server by name. Therefore a service should only reveal itself to clients who know its name. Based on this principal, we have created a proof of the verifierβs identity (a.k.a. PROVIDE) protocol that allows a prover (legitimate user) to convince a verifier (service) that it is knowledgeable of the verifierβs identity. We present a PROVIDE implementation using a PKP and DNS (PKP+DNS) that uses DNS TXT records to distribute identification tokens (IDT) while DNS PTR records for the serviceβs domain name are prohibited to prevent reverse DNS lookups. Clients are modified to make an additional DNS TXT query to obtain the IDT which is used by the PKP to generate an AT. The inclusion of an AT in the packet header, generated from the DNS TXT query, is proof the client knows the serviceβs identity. We analyze the effectiveness of this mechanism with respect to brute force attempts for various strength ATs and discuss practical considerations.This work has been supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) awards #1430145, #1414119, and #1012798
Towards automated distributed containment of zero-day network worms
Worms are a serious potential threat to computer network security. The high potential speed of propagation of worms and their ability to self-replicate make them highly infectious. Zero-day worms represent a particularly challenging class of such malware, with the cost of a single worm outbreak estimated to be as high as US$2.6 Billion. In this paper, we present a distributed automated worm detection and containment scheme that is based on the correlation of Domain Name System (DNS) queries and the destination IP address of outgoing TCP SYN and UDP datagrams leaving the network boundary. The proposed countermeasure scheme also utilizes cooperation between different communicating scheme members using a custom protocol, which we term Friends. The absence of a DNS lookup action prior to an outgoing TCP SYN or UDP datagram to a new destination IP addresses is used as a behavioral signature for a rate limiting mechanism while the Friends protocol spreads reports of the event to potentially vulnerable uninfected peer networks within the scheme. To our knowledge, this is the first implementation of such a scheme. We conducted empirical experiments across six class C networks by using a Slammer-like pseudo-worm to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme. The results show a significant reduction in the worm infection, when the countermeasure scheme is invoked
Model-driven situational awareness for moving target defense
Moving Target Defense (MTD) presents dynamically changing attack surfaces and system configurations to attackers. This approach decreases the success probabilities of attacks and increases attacker's workload since she must continually re-assess, re-engineer and re-launch her attacks. Existing research has provided a number of MTD techniques but approaches for gaining situational awareness and deciding when/how to apply these techniques are not well studied. In this paper, we present a conceptual framework that closely integrates a set of models with the system and obtains up-to-date situational awareness following the OODA loop methodology. To realize the framework, as the first step, we propose a modelling approach that provides insights about the dynamics between potential attacks and defenses, impact of attacks and adaptations on the system, and the state of the system. Based on these models, we demonstrate techniques to quantitatively assess the effectiveness of MTD and show how to formulate decision-making problems
Geometry-based Detection of Flash Worms
While it takes traditional internet worms hours to infect all the vulnerable hosts on the Internet, a flash worm takes seconds. Because of the rapid rate with which flash worms spread, the existing worm defense mechanisms cannot respond fast enough to detect and stop the flash worm infections. In this project, we propose a geometric-based detection mechanism that can detect the spread of flash worms in a short period of time. We tested the mechanism on various simulated flash worm traffics consisting of more than 10,000 nodes. In addition to testing on flash worm traffics, we also tested the mechanism on non-flash worm traffics to see if our detection mechanism produces false alarms. In order to efficiently analyze bulks of various network traffics, we implemented an application that can be used to convert the network traffic data into graphical notations. Using the application, the analysis can be done graphically as it displays the large amount of network relationships as tree structures
Characterizing the Power of Moving Target Defense via Cyber Epidemic Dynamics
Moving Target Defense (MTD) can enhance the resilience of cyber systems
against attacks. Although there have been many MTD techniques, there is no
systematic understanding and {\em quantitative} characterization of the power
of MTD. In this paper, we propose to use a cyber epidemic dynamics approach to
characterize the power of MTD. We define and investigate two complementary
measures that are applicable when the defender aims to deploy MTD to achieve a
certain security goal. One measure emphasizes the maximum portion of time
during which the system can afford to stay in an undesired configuration (or
posture), without considering the cost of deploying MTD. The other measure
emphasizes the minimum cost of deploying MTD, while accommodating that the
system has to stay in an undesired configuration (or posture) for a given
portion of time. Our analytic studies lead to algorithms for optimally
deploying MTD.Comment: 12 pages; 4 figures; Hotsos 14, 201
ΠΠ»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌ ΠΈ ΡΠ΅Ρ Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π΄ΠΈΠ½Π°ΠΌΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠΈΠ³ΡΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΠ»ΠΈΠ΅Π½Ρ-ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠ½ΡΡ Π²ΡΡΠΈΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΉ
ΠΡΠΎΠ°Π½Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Ρ ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π½ΡΠ΅ ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΎΡΡ, ΠΎΠ±ΡΡΠ»Π°Π²Π»ΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΡΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Π²ΠΎΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΠΉ ΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΠ²ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ΅Π·ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π²ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ°Π·Π²Π΅Π΄ΠΊΠΈ ΠΏΠΎ ΠΈΠ΄Π΅Π½ΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΡΠΎΡΡΠ°Π²Π° ΠΈ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΡ ΠΊΠ»ΠΈΠ΅Π½Ρ-ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π²ΡΡΠΈΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΉ Π²ΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΡΡΠ²ΠΈΠ΅ ΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΈΡ
ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΠ½ΠΎ-ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΊ. ΠΡΠΊΡΡΡΡΠ΅ ΠΎΡΠΎΠ±Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ Π·Π°ΡΠΈΡΡ ΠΊΠ»ΠΈΠ΅Π½Ρ-ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π²ΡΡΠΈΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΉ, ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π½ΡΡ
Π½Π° ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ½ΡΠΈΠΏΠΎΠ² ΠΏΡΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π½ΡΡΠ²Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΎΠ±Π΅ΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π±Π΅Π·ΠΎΠΏΠ°ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ, Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡ ΠΈ Π²Π½Π΅Π΄ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΌΠ½ΠΎΠΆΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π° Π·Π°ΠΏΡΠ΅ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΈΡ
ΡΠ΅Π³Π»Π°ΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΠΎΠ² ΠΎΠ±ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²ΡΠ²Π°ΡΡ Π°ΠΊΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡ Π·Π°Π΄Π°ΡΠΈ Π΄ΠΈΠ½Π°ΠΌΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΠ½ΠΎ-ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠΌΠΈ Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΊΠ°ΠΌΠΈ ΠΊΠ»ΠΈΠ΅Π½Ρ-ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π²ΡΡΠΈΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΉ, ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½ΠΈΡΡΡΡΠΈΡ
Π² ΡΡΠ»ΠΎΠ²ΠΈΡΡ
ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π²ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ°Π·Π²Π΅Π΄ΠΊΠΈ.
ΠΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½Π° ΠΌΠ°ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠ°Ρ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»Ρ, ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΡΠ°Ρ Π½Π°Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΡ ΠΎΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΅ΠΆΠΈΠΌΡ Π΄ΠΈΠ½Π°ΠΌΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠΈΠ³ΡΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΠ½ΠΎ-ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΊ ΠΊΠ»ΠΈΠ΅Π½Ρ-ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π²ΡΡΠΈΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΉ Π΄Π»Ρ ΡΠ°Π·Π»ΠΈΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠΈΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΉ. ΠΡΠΈΠ²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½Ρ ΡΠ΅Π·ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΡΡ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ². ΠΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π·Π°Π΄Π°ΡΠΈ Π΄ΠΈΠ½Π°ΠΌΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠΈΠ³ΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΠ½ΠΎ-ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΊ ΠΊΠ»ΠΈΠ΅Π½Ρ-ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ Π²ΡΡΠΈΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ΅ΡΠΈ, ΠΎΠ±Π΅ΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΡΠΈΠΉ ΡΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Π²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅Π½ΠΈ Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ Π΄ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ²Π°Π΅ΠΌΡΡ
ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π²ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ°Π·Π²Π΅Π΄ΠΊΠΎΠΉ Π΄Π°Π½Π½ΡΡ
. ΠΠΎΠΊΠ°Π·Π°Π½Ρ ΡΠ΅Π·ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΡΡ ΠΏΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΈΡΠΏΡΡΠ°Π½ΠΈΠΉ ΡΠ°Π·ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠ°Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π½Π° ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π΅ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΠ° Π΄ΠΈΠ½Π°ΠΌΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠΈΠ³ΡΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΠ»ΠΈΠ΅Π½Ρ-ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π²ΡΡΠΈΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΉ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ³ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΌΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΎΠ±Π΅ΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ. ΠΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΅Π·ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΡΡ ΡΠ²ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΡΠ²ΡΡΡ, ΡΡΠΎ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΠΎ Π΄ΠΈΠ½Π°ΠΌΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠΌΡ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠΈΠ³ΡΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΊΠ»ΠΈΠ΅Π½Ρ-ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π²ΡΡΠΈΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΉ ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π²ΠΎΠ»ΡΠ΅Ρ ΠΏΠΎΠ²ΡΡΠΈΡΡ ΡΠ΅Π·ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΡΡΡ Π·Π°ΡΠΈΡΡ Π·Π° ΡΡΠ΅Ρ ΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΠ½ΠΎ-ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΊ ΠΊΠ»ΠΈΠ΅Π½Ρ-ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π²ΡΡΠΈΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΉ Π² ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΊΠ°Ρ
Π½Π΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ»ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΏΠΎΠ΄ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΉ. ΠΡΠΈ ΡΡΠΎΠΌ Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠ³Π½ΡΡΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π΄Π΅ΡΠΆΠ°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈ Π²Π°ΠΆΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠΎΠ΅Π΄ΠΈΠ½Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ, Π° ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π°Π»Ρ Π²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅Π½ΠΈ ΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΠ½ΠΎ-ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΊ Π°Π΄Π°ΠΏΡΠΈΠ²Π½Ρ ΠΊ ΡΡΠ»ΠΎΠ²ΠΈΡΠΌ ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΈ Π΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΡΠΌ Π·Π»ΠΎΡΠΌΡΡΠ»Π΅Π½Π½ΠΈΠΊΠ°.
ΠΠΎΠ²ΠΈΠ·Π½Π° ΡΠ°Π·ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠ°Π½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈ Π·Π°ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠ°Π΅ΡΡΡ Π² ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΈ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π°ΠΏΠΏΠ°ΡΠ°ΡΠ° ΡΠ΅ΠΎΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΊΠΎΠ²ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΠΉΠ½ΡΡ
ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΡΠΎΠ² ΠΈ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΈ ΡΡΠ°Π²Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΉ ΠΠΎΠ»ΠΌΠΎΠ³ΠΎΡΠΎΠ²Π° Π΄Π»Ρ ΠΎΠ±ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ Π²ΡΠ±ΠΎΡΠ° ΡΠ΅ΠΆΠΈΠΌΠΎΠ² Π΄ΠΈΠ½Π°ΠΌΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠΈΠ³ΡΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΠ½ΠΎ-ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΊ ΠΊΠ»ΠΈΠ΅Π½Ρ-ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π²ΡΡΠΈΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΉ. ΠΠΎΠ²ΠΈΠ·Π½Π° ΡΠ°Π·ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠ°Π½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π°Π»Π³ΠΎΡΠΈΡΠΌΠ° ΡΠΎΡΡΠΎΠΈΡ Π² ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΠΈ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈ Π΄ΠΈΠ½Π°ΠΌΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠΈΠ³ΡΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΠ½ΠΎ-ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΊ ΠΊΠ»ΠΈΠ΅Π½Ρ-ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠ½ΡΡ
Π²ΡΡΠΈΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΠΉ Π΄Π»Ρ Π΄ΠΈΠ½Π°ΠΌΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΡΡΡΠΊΡΡΡΠ½ΠΎ-ΡΡΠ½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠΌΠΈ Ρ
Π°ΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΊΠ°ΠΌΠΈ ΠΊΠ»ΠΈΠ΅Π½Ρ-ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ Π²ΡΡΠΈΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ΅ΡΠΈ Π² ΡΡΠ»ΠΎΠ²ΠΈΡΡ
ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π²ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ°Π·Π²Π΅Π΄ΠΊΠΈ
Evaluating the Effectiveness of IP Hopping via an Address Routing Gateway
This thesis explores the viability of using Internet Protocol (IP) address hopping in front of a network as a defensive measure. This research presents a custom gateway-based IP hopping solution called Address Routing Gateway (ARG) that acts as a transparent IP address hopping gateway. This thesis tests the overall stability of ARG, the accuracy of its classifications, the maximum throughput it can support, and the maximum rate at which it can change IPs and still communicate reliably. This research is accomplished on a physical test network with nodes representing the types of hosts found on a typical, corporate-style network. Direct measurement is used to obtain all results for each factor level. Tests demonstrate ARG classifies traffic correctly, with no false negatives and less than a 0.15% false positive rate on average. The test environment conservatively shows this to be true as long as the IP address change interval exceeds two times the network\u27s round-trip latency; real-world deployments may allow for more frequent hopping. Results show ARG capably handles traffic of at least four megabits per second with no impact on packet loss. Fuzz testing validates the stability of ARG itself, although additional packet loss of around 23% appears when under attack