2,633 research outputs found
PlaceRaider: Virtual Theft in Physical Spaces with Smartphones
As smartphones become more pervasive, they are increasingly targeted by
malware. At the same time, each new generation of smartphone features
increasingly powerful onboard sensor suites. A new strain of sensor malware has
been developing that leverages these sensors to steal information from the
physical environment (e.g., researchers have recently demonstrated how malware
can listen for spoken credit card numbers through the microphone, or feel
keystroke vibrations using the accelerometer). Yet the possibilities of what
malware can see through a camera have been understudied. This paper introduces
a novel visual malware called PlaceRaider, which allows remote attackers to
engage in remote reconnaissance and what we call virtual theft. Through
completely opportunistic use of the camera on the phone and other sensors,
PlaceRaider constructs rich, three dimensional models of indoor environments.
Remote burglars can thus download the physical space, study the environment
carefully, and steal virtual objects from the environment (such as financial
documents, information on computer monitors, and personally identifiable
information). Through two human subject studies we demonstrate the
effectiveness of using mobile devices as powerful surveillance and virtual
theft platforms, and we suggest several possible defenses against visual
malware
Defending against Sybil Devices in Crowdsourced Mapping Services
Real-time crowdsourced maps such as Waze provide timely updates on traffic,
congestion, accidents and points of interest. In this paper, we demonstrate how
lack of strong location authentication allows creation of software-based {\em
Sybil devices} that expose crowdsourced map systems to a variety of security
and privacy attacks. Our experiments show that a single Sybil device with
limited resources can cause havoc on Waze, reporting false congestion and
accidents and automatically rerouting user traffic. More importantly, we
describe techniques to generate Sybil devices at scale, creating armies of
virtual vehicles capable of remotely tracking precise movements for large user
populations while avoiding detection. We propose a new approach to defend
against Sybil devices based on {\em co-location edges}, authenticated records
that attest to the one-time physical co-location of a pair of devices. Over
time, co-location edges combine to form large {\em proximity graphs} that
attest to physical interactions between devices, allowing scalable detection of
virtual vehicles. We demonstrate the efficacy of this approach using
large-scale simulations, and discuss how they can be used to dramatically
reduce the impact of attacks against crowdsourced mapping services.Comment: Measure and integratio
MobileAppScrutinator: A Simple yet Efficient Dynamic Analysis Approach for Detecting Privacy Leaks across Mobile OSs
Smartphones, the devices we carry everywhere with us, are being heavily
tracked and have undoubtedly become a major threat to our privacy. As "tracking
the trackers" has become a necessity, various static and dynamic analysis tools
have been developed in the past. However, today, we still lack suitable tools
to detect, measure and compare the ongoing tracking across mobile OSs. To this
end, we propose MobileAppScrutinator, based on a simple yet efficient dynamic
analysis approach, that works on both Android and iOS (the two most popular OSs
today). To demonstrate the current trend in tracking, we select 140 most
representative Apps available on both Android and iOS AppStores and test them
with MobileAppScrutinator. In fact, choosing the same set of apps on both
Android and iOS also enables us to compare the ongoing tracking on these two
OSs. Finally, we also discuss the effectiveness of privacy safeguards available
on Android and iOS. We show that neither Android nor iOS privacy safeguards in
their present state are completely satisfying
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