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Traffic Analysis Attacks and Defenses in Low Latency Anonymous Communication
The recent public disclosure of mass surveillance of electronic communication, involving powerful government authorities, has drawn the public's attention to issues regarding Internet privacy. For almost a decade now, there have been several research efforts towards designing and deploying open source, trustworthy and reliable systems that ensure users' anonymity and privacy. These systems operate by hiding the true network identity of communicating parties against eavesdropping adversaries. Tor, acronym for The Onion Router, is an example of such a system. Such systems relay the traffic of their users through an overlay of nodes that are called Onion Routers and are operated by volunteers distributed across the globe. Such systems have served well as anti-censorship and anti-surveillance tools. However, recent publications have disclosed that powerful government organizations are seeking means to de-anonymize such systems and have deployed distributed monitoring infrastructure to aid their efforts.
Attacks against anonymous communication systems, like Tor, often involve trac analysis. In such attacks, an adversary, capable of observing network traffic statistics in several different networks, correlates the trac patterns in these networks, and associates otherwise seemingly unrelated network connections. The process can lead an adversary to the source of an anonymous connection. However, due to their design, consisting of globally distributed relays, the users of anonymity networks like Tor, can route their traffic virtually via any network; hiding their tracks and true identities from their communication peers and eavesdropping adversaries. De-anonymization of a random anonymous connection is hard, as the adversary is required to correlate traffic patterns in one network link to those in virtually all other networks. Past research mostly involved reducing the complexity of this process by rst reducing the set of relays or network routers to monitor, and then identifying the actual source of anonymous traffic among network connections that are routed via this reduced set of relays or network routers to monitor. A study of various research efforts in this field reveals that there have been many more efforts to reduce the set of relays or routers to be searched than to explore methods for actually identifying an anonymous user amidst the network connections using these routers and relays. Few have tried to comprehensively study a complete attack, that involves reducing the set of relays and routers to monitor and identifying the source of an anonymous connection. Although it is believed that systems like Tor are trivially vulnerable to traffic analysis, there are various technical challenges and issues that can become obstacles to accurately identifying the source of anonymous connection. It is hard to adjudge the vulnerability of anonymous communication systems without adequately exploring the issues involved in identifying the source of anonymous traffic.
We take steps to ll this gap by exploring two novel active trac analysis attacks, that solely rely on measurements of network statistics. In these attacks, the adversary tries to identify the source of an anonymous connection arriving to a server from an exit node. This generally involves correlating traffic entering and leaving the Tor network, linking otherwise unrelated connections. To increase the accuracy of identifying the victim connection among several connections, the adversary injects a traffic perturbation pattern into a connection arriving to the server from a Tor node, that the adversary wants to de-anonymize. One way to achieve this is by colluding with the server and injecting a traffic perturbation pattern using common traffic shaping tools. Our first attack involves a novel remote bandwidth estimation technique to conrm the identity of Tor relays and network routers along the path connecting a Tor client and a server by observing network bandwidth fluctuations deliberately injected by the server. The second attack involves correlating network statistics, for connections entering and leaving the Tor network, available from existing network infrastructure, such as Cisco's NetFlow, for identifying the source of an anonymous connection. Additionally, we explored a novel technique to defend against the latter attack. Most research towards defending against traffic analysis attacks, involving transmission of dummy traffic, have not been implemented due to fears of potential performance degradation. Our novel technique involves transmission of dummy traffic, consisting of packets with IP headers having small Time-to-Live (TTL) values. Such packets are discarded by the routers before they reach their destination. They distort NetFlow statistics, without degrading the client's performance. Finally, we present a strategy that employs transmission of unique plain-text decoy traffic, that appears sensitive, such as fake user credentials, through Tor nodes to decoy servers under our control. Periodic tallying of client and server logs to determine unsolicited connection attempts at the server is used to identify the eavesdropping nodes. Such malicious Tor node operators, eavesdropping on users' traffic, could be potential traffic analysis attackers
Framework for Industrial Control System Honeypot Network Traffic Generation
Defending critical infrastructure assets is an important but extremely difficult and expensive task. Historically, decoys have been used very effectively to distract attackers and in some cases convince an attacker to reveal their attack strategy. Several researchers have proposed the use of honeypots to protect programmable logic controllers, specifically those used to support critical infrastructure. However, most of these honeypot designs are static systems that wait for a would-be attacker. To be effective, honeypot decoys need to be as realistic as possible. This paper introduces a proof-of-concept honeypot network traffic generator that mimics genuine control systems. Experiments are conducted using a Siemens APOGEE building automation system for single and dual subnet instantiations. Results indicate that the proposed traffic generator is capable of honeypot integration, traffic matching and routing within the decoy building automation network
Defensive Cyber Maneuvers to Disrupt Cyber Attackers
erimeter based defenses are limited in deterring and defeating cyberattacks. Multi-layered approaches are needed to provide robust cybersecurity and defend against Advanced Persistent Threats. Proactive defensive cyber actions can provide positional or temporal advantages over an adversary in the cognitive, technical, and physical domains. These actions comprise cyber maneuvers, which are implemented reconfigurations to a network that aim to make attackers more visible and detectable, impede attacker progress, and reduce attackers’ chances of mission success. Technical actions and response are the primary focus of most current cyber defense frameworks with little attention on adversary behavioral and cognitive effects. We describe the enhanced cyber maneuver framework which addresses cognitive and behavioral responses to cyber effects. We present experimental results that demonstrate the framework and a testing approach to collect supporting findings on the effects of cyber maneuvers
Mecanismos dinâmicos de segurança para redes softwarizadas e virtualizadas
The relationship between attackers and defenders has traditionally been
asymmetric, with attackers having time as an upper hand to devise an exploit
that compromises the defender. The push towards the Cloudification of
the world makes matters more challenging, as it lowers the cost of an attack,
with a de facto standardization on a set of protocols. The discovery of a vulnerability
now has a broader impact on various verticals (business use cases),
while previously, some were in a segregated protocol stack requiring independent
vulnerability research. Furthermore, defining a perimeter within a cloudified
system is non-trivial, whereas before, the dedicated equipment already
created a perimeter. This proposal takes the newer technologies of network
softwarization and virtualization, both Cloud-enablers, to create new dynamic
security mechanisms that address this asymmetric relationship using novel
Moving Target Defense (MTD) approaches. The effective use of the exploration
space, combined with the reconfiguration capabilities of frameworks like
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) and Management and Orchestration
(MANO), should allow for adjusting defense levels dynamically to achieve the
required security as defined by the currently acceptable risk. The optimization
tasks and integration tasks of this thesis explore these concepts. Furthermore,
the proposed novel mechanisms were evaluated in real-world use cases, such
as 5G networks or other Network Slicing enabled infrastructures.A relação entre atacantes e defensores tem sido tradicionalmente assimétrica,
com os atacantes a terem o tempo como vantagem para conceberem
uma exploração que comprometa o defensor. O impulso para a Cloudificação
do mundo torna a situação mais desafiante, pois reduz o custo de um
ataque, com uma padronização de facto sobre um conjunto de protocolos.
A descoberta de uma vulnerabilidade tem agora um impacto mais amplo em
várias verticais (casos de uso empresarial), enquanto anteriormente, alguns
estavam numa pilha de protocolos segregados que exigiam uma investigação
independente das suas vulnerabilidades. Além disso, a definição de um
perímetro dentro de um sistema Cloud não é trivial, enquanto antes, o equipamento
dedicado já criava um perímetro. Esta proposta toma as mais recentes
tecnologias de softwarização e virtualização da rede, ambas facilitadoras da
Cloud, para criar novos mecanismos dinâmicos de segurança que incidem sobre
esta relação assimétrica utilizando novas abordagens de Moving Target
Defense (MTD). A utilização eficaz do espaço de exploração, combinada com
as capacidades de reconfiguração de frameworks como Network Function
Virtualization (NFV) e Management and Orchestration (MANO), deverá permitir
ajustar dinamicamente os níveis de defesa para alcançar a segurança
necessária, tal como definida pelo risco actualmente aceitável. As tarefas de
optimização e de integração desta tese exploram estes conceitos. Além disso,
os novos mecanismos propostos foram avaliados em casos de utilização no
mundo real, tais como redes 5G ou outras infraestruturas de Network Slicing.Programa Doutoral em Engenharia Informátic
Automating Cyberdeception Evaluation with Deep Learning
A machine learning-based methodology is proposed and implemented for conducting evaluations of cyberdeceptive defenses with minimal human involvement. This avoids impediments associated with deceptive research on humans, maximizing the efficacy of automated evaluation before human subjects research must be undertaken. Leveraging recent advances in deep learning, the approach synthesizes realistic, interactive, and adaptive traffic for consumption by target web services. A case study applies the approach to evaluate an intrusion detection system equipped with application-layer embedded deceptive responses to attacks. Results demonstrate that synthesizing adaptive web traffic laced with evasive attacks powered by ensemble learning, online adaptive metric learning, and novel class detection to simulate skillful adversaries constitutes a challenging and aggressive test of cyberdeceptive defenses
Multiple UAV systems: a survey
Nowadays, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are used in many different applications. Using systems of multiple UAVs is the next obvious step in the process of applying this technology for variety of tasks. There are few research works that cover the applications of these systems and they are all highly specialized. The goal of this survey is to fill this gap by providing a generic review on different applications of multiple UAV systems that have been developed in recent years. We also present a nomenclature and architecture taxonomy for these systems. In the end, a discussion on current trends and challenges is provided.This work was funded by the Ministry of Economy, Industryand Competitiveness of Spain under Grant Nos. TRA2016-77012-R and BES-2017-079798Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version
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