Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors

In April 2002 the International Monetary Fund introduced a sovereign bankruptcy proposal only to be rebuffed by the United States Treasury. Where the IMF wanted a mandatory bankruptcy regime, the Treasury wanted to solve distress problems with contractual devices. Sovereign bondholders and sovereign issuers themselves flatly rejected both proposals, even though they were nominally the beneficiaries of both proponents. This Article addresses and explains this bondholder reaction. In so doing, it takes a highly skeptical view of the IMF\u27s proposal even as it shows that the incentive structure surrounding sovereign lending renders untenable the Treasury\u27s contractarian proposal. The Article\u27s analysis follows from a review and restatement of the economic learning on sovereign debt relationships. The IMF and the Treasury share the objective facilitating restructuring by substituting a regime of collective action for the prevailing practice of requiring unanimous bondholder consent to significant amendments of bond contracts. In so doing they follow a conventional wisdom respecting bond contracts under which standard unanimity provisions are inefficient and irrational. The Article shows that this dismissal of the unanimity requirement comes too quickly. Under our analysis of the problem the debtor distress, bondholders rationally may prefer to make compositions harder to conclude. There is no first best equilibrium bond contract; instead bondholders select from a menu of second best forms, making trade offs between unanimous action and collective action provisions in an imperfect world. One factor leading lenders to favor unanimous action is the need to self protect. In a world without a good faith backstop, creditors motivated by side deals can take advantage of majority rule to impose suboptimal compositions. Holding out is the only weapon available to the minority creditor. The Article argues that, given such side deals, a stable majoritarian regime cannot be achieved as a matter of free contract. Mandate will be necessary. It follows that the Treasury\u27s contractarian approach is implausible absent a backstop regime of intercreditor good faith duties. The Article draws on the history of corporate reorganization prior to the enactment of the section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act of 1934 to show that courts have grappled with these questions before, intervening aggressively on equitable principles

Domestic versus External Borrowing and Fiscal Policy in Emerging Markets

Domestic public debt issued by emerging markets has risen significantly relative to international debt in recent years. Some recent empirical evidence also suggests that sovereigns have defaulted differentially on debt held by domestic and external creditors. Standard models of sovereign debt, however, mainly focus on how the actions of foreign creditors influence default decisions of sovereigns. Contrasting this one-sided focus, this paper adds to a new theoretical literature that points at the possibility of default on domestic debt and the consequences of doing so. It presents a model of an emerging market economy in which the government can selectively default on its domestic or external debt obligations. The model shows that the differential ability of domestic and foreign creditors to punish the government creates a gap in the expected default costs to the sovereign, and hence a differential in its propensity to default on its domestic versus foreign debt. The extent to which the possibility of differential treatment of creditors affects the composition of debt is explored. It shows that a country characterized by volatile output, sovereign risk, and costly tax collection will want to borrow in domestic markets as well as in international capital markets. The optimal allocation of debt between domestic and foreign creditors can thus be viewed as the government's purchase of insurance against macroeconomic shocks that affect its budget.Debt management; International topics

Indian Microfinance Sector: A Case Study

In developing areas of the world with very little economic structure, many activities are not monetized. In other words, money is not used to carry out these tasks because the people in these areas do not have the expendable funds required. In order to combat this problem, micro financing has become increasingly more apparent in these areas of distress. Microfinance is an economic development strategy that allows for those in need to borrow actual money in order to start a business, go to school, or even gain access to everyday living requirements. Microfinance has made tremendous strides over the years, but still faces several obstacles including regulation, loan strategies, and loan consumption. This study will attempt to analyze the microfinance industry in India by challenging certain aspects of its use, as well as offer suggestions that could have beneficial effects upon the industry

Microfinance, Poverty Relief, and Political Justice

Microfinance - the practice of providing small loans to promote entrepreneurial activity among those with few financial assets - is increasingly seen as a sustainable means of aiding the global poor. Perhaps its most influential advocate, Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus, has claimed that there is a human right to microfinance, given its potential for poverty alleviation. This book directs critical philosophical attention at this very widely used and praised poverty-reducing measure. In chapters that discuss microfinance schemes and models around the world, internationally renowned contributors address important questions about both the positive impact of microfinance and cases of exploitation and repayment pressure. Exploring how far microfinance can or should be situated within broader concerns about justice, this volume sheds light on ethical issues that have so far received little systematic attention, and it advances discussion on new human rights, exploitation, and global justice

Predatory Equity: Evolution of a Crisis

This paper suggests that tenants and communities around New York City face a serious crisis stemming from the scale of the predatory equity model and the pending default crisis. New protections and strategies must be put in place to safeguard the tenants, affordable housing, communities and investors who may be damaged