Ancient Logic and its Modern Interpretations: Proceedings of the Buffalo Symposium on Modernist Interpretations of Ancient Logic, 21 and 22 April, 1972

Articles by Ian Mueller, Ronald Zirin, Norman Kretzmann, John Corcoran, John Mulhern, Mary Mulhern,Josiah Gould, and others. Topics: Aristotle's Syllogistic, Stoic Logic, Modern Research in Ancient Logic

A Logic of Knowing How

In this paper, we propose a single-agent modal logic framework for reasoning about goal-direct "knowing how" based on ideas from linguistics, philosophy, modal logic and automated planning. We first define a modal language to express "I know how to guarantee phi given psi" with a semantics not based on standard epistemic models but labelled transition systems that represent the agent's knowledge of his own abilities. A sound and complete proof system is given to capture the valid reasoning patterns about "knowing how" where the most important axiom suggests its compositional nature.Comment: 14 pages, a 12-page version accepted by LORI

Confirmation and Evidence

The question how experience acts on our beliefs and how beliefs are changed in the light of experience is one of the oldest and most controversial questions in philosophy in general and epistemology in particular. Philosophy of science has replaced this question by the more specific enquiry how results of experiments act on scientific hypotheses and theories. Why do we maintain some theories while discarding others? Two general questions emerge: First, what is our reason to accept the justifying power of experience and more specifically, scientific experiments? Second, how can the relationship between theory and evidence be described and under which circumstances is a scientific theory confirmed by a piece of evidence? The book focuses on the second question, on explicating the relationship between theory and evidence and capturing the structure of a valid inductive argument. Special attention is paid to statistical applications that are prevalent in modern empirical science. After an introductory chapter about the link between confirmation and induction, the project starts with discussing qualitative accounts of confirmation in first-order predicate logic. Two major approaches, the Hempelian satisfaction criterion and the hypothetico-deductivist tradition, are contrasted to each other. This is subsequently extended to an account of the confirmation of entire theories as opposed to the confirmation of single hypothesis. Then the quantative Bayesian account of confirmation is explained and discussed on the basis of a theory of rational degrees of belief. After that, I present the various schools of statistical inference and explain the foundations of these competing schemes. Finally, I argue for a specific concept of statistical evidence, summarize the results, and sketch some open questions. </p

Desire, belief, and conditional belief

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2008.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 127-132).This dissertation studies the logics of value and conditionals, and the question of whether they should be given cognitivist analyses. Emotivist theories treat value judgments as expressions of desire, rather than beliefs about goodness. Inference ticket theories of conditionals treat them as expressions of conditional beliefs, rather than propositions. The two issues intersect in decision theory, where judgments of expected goodness are expressible by means of decision-making conditionals. In the first chapter, I argue that decision theory cannot be given a Humean foundation by means of money pump arguments, which purport to show that the transitivity of preference and indifference is a requirement of instrumental reason. Instead, I argue that Humeans should treat the constraints of decision theory as constitutive of the nature of preferences. Additionally, I argue that transitivity of preference is a stricter requirement than transitivity of indifference. In the second chapter, I investigate whether David Lewis has shown that decision theory is incompatible with anti-Humean theories of desire. His triviality proof against "desire as belief' seems to show that desires can be at best conditional beliefs about goodness. I argue that within causal decision theory we can articulate the cognitivist position where desires align with beliefs about goodness, articulated by the decision making conditional. In the third chapter, I turn to conditionals in their own right, and especially iterated conditionals.(cont.) I defend the position that indicative conditionals obey the import-export equivalence rather than modus ponens (except for simple conditionals), while counterfactual subjunctive conditionals do obey modus ponens. The logic of indicative conditionals is often thought to be determined by conditional beliefs via the Ramsey Test. I argue that iterated conditionals show that the conditional beliefs involved in indicative supposition diverge from the conditional beliefs involved in learning, and that half of the Ramsey Test is untenable for iterated conditionals.by David Jeffrey Etlin.Ph.D