An Attempt to Update Edward Dembowski’s Philosophy of Creation

The article mainly discusses Edward Dembowski's philosophy of creation in connection with his Hegelian influences, leftist associations and the ongoing discussion in nineteenth century romantic polish philosophy. The nineteenth century, with its German Idealism and French tendency to act in the name of social rights, had introduced new ideas to work with during harsh historical times. Dembowski, amongst other Poles, was the closest to constructing a coherent metaphysical system for the philosophy of creation (filozofia twórczości). In the paper, I try to show a part of his intellectual evolution, stretching from defining philosophy as knowledge itself in the form of a Hegelian system, through his critique of Hegel's and Cieszkowski's systems, up to his own established system – the philosophy of creation and its social connections. I also speculate about which of his philosophical ideas can remain relevant today

Inferring Mechanisms for Global Constitutional Progress

Constitutions help define domestic political orders, but are known to be influenced by two international mechanisms: one that reflects global temporal trends in legal development, and another that reflects international network dynamics such as shared colonial history. We introduce the provision space; the growing set of all legal provisions existing in the world's constitutions over time. Through this we uncover a third mechanism influencing constitutional change: hierarchical dependencies between legal provisions, under which the adoption of essential, fundamental provisions precedes more advanced provisions. This third mechanism appears to play an especially important role in the emergence of new political rights, and may therefore provide a useful roadmap for advocates of those rights. We further characterise each legal provision in terms of the strength of these mechanisms

Teacher Voices: Teaching Young Men of Color

Twelve teachers from diverse geographic and ethnic backgrounds and academic disciplines came together to talk about the role that gender plays in their classrooms. They identified barriers to learning, suggested ways to overcome them, and submitted successful teaching ideas. The report presents the teachers' messages in their own words, as well as classroom assignments they have found effective in teaching young men of color

When EU Law meets Arab Law: Assessment of Anti-Corruption Law in Morocco and Some Proposed Amendments

This article reviews the present state of the adoption of anti-corruption legal provisions usually adopted in EU (or candidate) countries in Morocco. Morocco lags behind many countries in its adoption of anti-corruption legislation and the recently established Central Agency of the Prevention of Corruption is unlikely to succeed in speeding up the adoption of these measures. English language translations of a number of Moroccan anti-corruption legal instruments are presented and amendments to these legal instruments are recommended (based on international best practice) in order to increase the likely effectiveness of Moroccan law enforcement institutions in fighting corruption.

Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo

A recent article in the California Law Review by Professors Eric Posner and John Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, argues that the only effective international tribunals are dependent tribunals, by which the authors mean ad hoc tribunals staffed by judges closely controlled by governments through the power of reappointment or threats of retaliation. Independent tribunals, by contrast, meaning tribunals staffed by judges appointed on similar terms as those in domestic courts, pose a danger to international cooperation. According to Posner and Yoo, independent tribunals are suspect because they are more likely to allow moral ideals, ideological imperatives or the interests of other states to influence their judgments. In this response, we identify the many shortcomings in the theory, methodology, and empirics in Judicial Independence in International Tribunals. We do so to challenge the authors\u27 core conjecture: that formally dependent international tribunals are correlated with effective judicial outcomes. We then offer our own counter-theory; a theory of constrained independence in which states establish independent international tribunals to enhance the credibility of their commitments and then use more fine grained structural, political, and discursive mechanisms to limit the potential for judicial excesses

The new terrorists: the normalisation and spread of anti-terror laws in Australia

This article explores the dynamic by which once exceptional measures become normalised and then extended to new extremes. Abstract Since September 11, Australia’s federal Parliament has enacted a range of exceptional measures aimed at preventing terrorism. These measures include control orders, which were not designed or intended for use outside of the terrorism context. What has followed, however, has been the migration of this measure to new contexts in the states and territories, especially in regard to what some have termed the ‘war on bikies’. This has occurred to the point that this measure, once considered extreme, has become accepted as a normal aspect of the criminal justice system, and has in turn given rise to even more stringent legal measures. This article explores the dynamic by which once exceptional measures become normalised and then extended to new extremes. It explores these issues in the context of the role that constitutional values have played in this process

Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo

A recent article in the California Law Review by Professors Eric Posner and John Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, argues that the only effective international tribunals are dependent tribunals, by which the authors mean ad hoc tribunals staffed by judges closely controlled by governments through the power of reappointment or threats of retaliation. Independent tribunals, by contrast, meaning tribunals staffed by judges appointed on similar terms as those in domestic courts, pose a danger to international cooperation. According to Posner and Yoo, independent tribunals are suspect because they are more likely to allow moral ideals, ideological imperatives or the interests of other states to influence their judgments. In this response, we identify the many shortcomings in the theory, methodology, and empirics in Judicial Independence in International Tribunals. We do so to challenge the authors\u27 core conjecture: that formally dependent international tribunals are correlated with effective judicial outcomes. We then offer our own counter-theory; a theory of constrained independence in which states establish independent international tribunals to enhance the credibility of their commitments and then use more fine grained structural, political, and discursive mechanisms to limit the potential for judicial excesses