Coalition Formation Games for Collaborative Spectrum Sensing

Collaborative Spectrum Sensing (CSS) between secondary users (SUs) in cognitive networks exhibits an inherent tradeoff between minimizing the probability of missing the detection of the primary user (PU) and maintaining a reasonable false alarm probability (e.g., for maintaining a good spectrum utilization). In this paper, we study the impact of this tradeoff on the network structure and the cooperative incentives of the SUs that seek to cooperate for improving their detection performance. We model the CSS problem as a non-transferable coalitional game, and we propose distributed algorithms for coalition formation. First, we construct a distributed coalition formation (CF) algorithm that allows the SUs to self-organize into disjoint coalitions while accounting for the CSS tradeoff. Then, the CF algorithm is complemented with a coalitional voting game for enabling distributed coalition formation with detection probability guarantees (CF-PD) when required by the PU. The CF-PD algorithm allows the SUs to form minimal winning coalitions (MWCs), i.e., coalitions that achieve the target detection probability with minimal costs. For both algorithms, we study and prove various properties pertaining to network structure, adaptation to mobility and stability. Simulation results show that CF reduces the average probability of miss per SU up to 88.45% relative to the non-cooperative case, while maintaining a desired false alarm. For CF-PD, the results show that up to 87.25% of the SUs achieve the required detection probability through MWCComment: IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, to appea

A Game-Theoretic Framework for Optimum Decision Fusion in the Presence of Byzantines

Optimum decision fusion in the presence of malicious nodes - often referred to as Byzantines - is hindered by the necessity of exactly knowing the statistical behavior of Byzantines. By focusing on a simple, yet widely studied, set-up in which a Fusion Center (FC) is asked to make a binary decision about a sequence of system states by relying on the possibly corrupted decisions provided by local nodes, we propose a game-theoretic framework which permits to exploit the superior performance provided by optimum decision fusion, while limiting the amount of a-priori knowledge required. We first derive the optimum decision strategy by assuming that the statistical behavior of the Byzantines is known. Then we relax such an assumption by casting the problem into a game-theoretic framework in which the FC tries to guess the behavior of the Byzantines, which, in turn, must fix their corruption strategy without knowing the guess made by the FC. We use numerical simulations to derive the equilibrium of the game, thus identifying the optimum behavior for both the FC and the Byzantines, and to evaluate the achievable performance at the equilibrium. We analyze several different setups, showing that in all cases the proposed solution permits to improve the accuracy of data fusion. We also show that, in some instances, it is preferable for the Byzantines to minimize the mutual information between the status of the observed system and the reports submitted to the FC, rather than always flipping the decision made by the local nodes as it is customarily assumed in previous works

A market based approach for resolving resource constrained task allocation problems in a software development process

We consider software development as an economic activity, where goods and services can be modeled as a resource constrained task allocation problem. This paper introduces a market based mechanism to overcome task allocation issues in a software development process. It proposes a mechanism with a prescribed set of rules, where valuation is based on the behaviors of stakeholders such as biding for a task. A bid process ensures that a stakeholder, who values the resource most, will have it allocated for a limited number of times. To observe the bidders behaviors, we initiate an approach incorporated with a process simulation model. Our preliminary results support the idea that our model is useful for optimizing the value based task allocations, creating a market value for the project assets, and for achieving proper allocation of project resources specifically on large scale software projects

Ms Pac-Man versus Ghost Team CEC 2011 competition

Games provide an ideal test bed for computational intelligence and significant progress has been made in recent years, most notably in games such as Go, where the level of play is now competitive with expert human play on smaller boards. Recently, a significantly more complex class of games has received increasing attention: real-time video games. These games pose many new challenges, including strict time constraints, simultaneous moves and open-endedness. Unlike in traditional board games, computational play is generally unable to compete with human players. One driving force in improving the overall performance of artificial intelligence players are game competitions where practitioners may evaluate and compare their methods against those submitted by others and possibly human players as well. In this paper we introduce a new competition based on the popular arcade video game Ms Pac-Man: Ms Pac-Man versus Ghost Team. The competition, to be held at the Congress on Evolutionary Computation 2011 for the first time, allows participants to develop controllers for either the Ms Pac-Man agent or for the Ghost Team and unlike previous Ms Pac-Man competitions that relied on screen capture, the players now interface directly with the game engine. In this paper we introduce the competition, including a review of previous work as well as a discussion of several aspects regarding the setting up of the game competition itself. © 2011 IEEE