2,597,832 research outputs found
Decision Theory
A book chapter (about 4,000 words, plus references) on decision theory in moral philosophy, with particular attention to uses of decision theory in specifying the contents of moral principles (e.g., expected-value forms of act and rule utilitarianism), uses of decision theory in arguing in support of moral principles (e.g., the hypothetical-choice arguments of Harsanyi and Rawls), and attempts to derive morality from rationality (e.g., the views of Gauthier and McClennen)
Causal Decision Theory and Decision Instability
The problem of the man who met death in Damascus appeared in the infancy of the theory of rational choice known as causal decision theory. A straightforward, unadorned version of causal decision theory is presented here and applied, along with Brian Skyrms’ deliberation dynamics, to Death in Damascus and similar problems. Decision instability is a fascinating topic, but not a source of difficulty for causal decision theory. Andy Egan’s purported counterexample to causal decision theory, Murder Lesion, is considered; a simple response shows how Murder Lesion and similar examples fail to be counterexamples, and clarifies the use of the unadorned theory in problems of decision instability. I compare unadorned causal decision theory to previous treatments by Frank Arntzenius and by Jim Joyce, and recommend a well-founded heuristic that all three accounts can endorse. Whatever course deliberation takes, causal decision theory is consistently a good guide to rational action
Constructive Decision Theory
Contemporary approaches to decision making describe a decision problem by sets of states and outcomes, and a rich set of acts: functions from states to outcomes over which the decision maker (DM) has preferences. Real problems do not come so equipped. It is often unclear what the state and outcome spaces would be. We present an alternative foundation for decision making, in which the primitive objects of choice are syntactic programs. We show that if the DM's preference relation on objects of choice satisfies appropriate axioms, then we can find states, outcomes, and an embedding of the programs into Savage acts such that preferences can be represented by EU in the Savage framework. A modeler can test for SEU behavior without having access to the subjective states and outcomes. We illustrate the power of our approach by showing that it can represent DMs who are subject to framing effects.Decision theory, subjective expected utility, behavioral anomalies
Quantum Probability from Decision Theory?
In a recent paper (quant-ph/9906015), Deutsch claims to derive the
"probabilistic predictions of quantum theory" from the "non-probabilistic
axioms of quantum theory" and the "non-probabilistic part of classical decision
theory." We show that his derivation fails because it includes hidden
probabilistic assumptions.Comment: LaTeX, 8 pages, no figure
Sequential Extensions of Causal and Evidential Decision Theory
Moving beyond the dualistic view in AI where agent and environment are
separated incurs new challenges for decision making, as calculation of expected
utility is no longer straightforward. The non-dualistic decision theory
literature is split between causal decision theory and evidential decision
theory. We extend these decision algorithms to the sequential setting where the
agent alternates between taking actions and observing their consequences. We
find that evidential decision theory has two natural extensions while causal
decision theory only has one.Comment: ADT 201
Decision theory under uncertainty
We review recent advances in the field of decision making under uncertainty or ambiguity.Ambiguity ; ambiguity aversion ; uncertainty ; decision
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