The Effect of Taxes on Multinational Debt Location

We provide new evidence that differences in international tax rates and tax regimes affect multinational firms\u27 debt location decisions. Our sample contains 8287 debt issues from 2437 firms headquartered in 23 different countries with debt-issuing subsidiaries in 59 countries. We analyze firms\u27 marginal decisions of where to issue debt to investigate the influence of a comprehensive set of tax-related effects, including differences in personal and corporate tax rates, tax credit and exemption systems, and bi-lateral cross-country withholding taxes on interest and dividend payments. Our results show that differences in personal and corporate tax rates, the presence of dividend imputation or relief tax systems, the tax treatment of repatriated profits, and inter-country withholding taxes on dividends and interest significantly influence the decision of where to locate debt and the proportion of debt located abroad. Our results are robust to firm and issue specific factors and to the effect of legal regimes, debt market development, and exchange rate risk

Not quite as advertised: Canada’s managed float in the 1950s and Bank of Canada intervention

Canada has perhaps the longest track record of adhering to a floating exchange rate regime, but it may well also have been the first country to adopt a managed float during the 1950s. In spite of criticisms levelled at the Canadian government’s decision to float the dollar, the remarkable feature of the behaviour of the exchange rate during the so-called float is the relative stability of the nominal exchange rate, and the small volatility in its movements. This article stresses the impact of foreign exchange intervention in limiting exchange rate appreciations and in moderating exchange rate volatility, using newly found, and heretofore unused, intervention data. Until now, all studies of Canada’s experience with the float have relied on official foreign exchange reserves data. A counterfactual experiment also suggests that nominal exchange rate levels, and variability, would have been different had there been no foreign exchange market intervention

"Explaining the September 1992 ERM Crisis: The Maastricht Bargain and Domestic Politics in Germany, France and Great Britain"

At the time of the September 1992 crisis, the conventional wisdom held in the ERM was due to an unfortunate contuence of exceptional circumstances -- the shock of German reunification, a debt-driven recession in Britain, and the uncertainties caused by the Danish and French referenda on Maastricht. This paper points to systemic factors at both the EC and domestic levels in explaining the September crisis. At the Community level, it is argued that the ERM was the victim of an underlying structural flaw in the Maastricht 3-stage plan for EMU. Intergovemmental bargaining, reflecting the differing national preferences of Germany and France in particular, produced an untenable compromise with potentially chaotic consequences: the matching of demanding economic convergence criteria with a strict timetable for their fulfillment, upon commencement of Stage II of the EMU process set for January 1994. Far from being epiphenomenal, this bargain was only the latest manifestation of an ongoing debate between "economist" and monetarist" approaches to monetary integration, tracing back to the early 1970s. and I argue that the "framing effects" of the Stage II criteria fundamentally altered the nature of economic discourse at Stage I, beginning in 1990. Specific reference numbers for debt ratios and relative and interest rate targets emphasized economic divergence in countries with clearly overvalued currencies, and invited markets to test the strength of govemments' political commitments to their exchange rate pegs. The second component of my explanation of the September crisis lies at the domestic level. Even though strict convergence criteria and timetables provided a severe test of the credibility of members' European commitments, it was not a foregone conclusion that the Maastricht bargain would result in turbulence on the currency markets. A margin of maneuver was left to the member governments, through the demonstration of a willingness to take painful measures, such as fiscal and wage restraint or timely interest rate hikes, to defend the ERM commitment

Improving Global Financial Stability

This report concludes that the failure of developing country governments and international financial institutions to adapt to changing markets helped trigger some of the world's financial crises. Arguing that global finance is "more susceptible to crisis than it need be," the report targets both developing and developed countries and the IMF as being in serious need of reform to prevent future breakdowns. The report endorses international standards to be adopted by developing countries, and hails private-sector participation and resources as vital to building an accepted set of best practices

The Global Spread of Stock Exchange, 1980-1998

Nations opened local stock exchanges at a rapid pace during the late 1980s and 1990s, creating a channel for investment capital from wealthy industrial nations to "emerging markets" as well as a mechanism for institutional change in local economies. This study examines the local and global processes by which exchanges spread, examining all nations "at risk" during the 1980s and 1990s. We find that local factors influencing the creation of stock exchanges included the size of the economy (overall and relative to population size); the legacy of colonialism; and a recent transition to multi-party democracy. Global factors associated with creating exchanges included levels of prior investment by multinationals; IMF "structural adjustment" aid; centrality in trade flows; and regional "contagion." In contrast to prior work in financial economics, we find no evidence for the influence of legal tradition, and contrary to the implications of dependency theory, we find no sign that foreign capital penetration affects the creation of exchanges. We also find no consistent evidence for the influence of stock exchanges on inequality or human development at the national level, above and beyond their effect on economic and population growth. The results indicate that globalization is usefully construed as a process analogous to institutional diffusion at the organization level.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39725/3/wp341.pd

Sand in the wheels, or oiling the wheels, of international finance? : New Labour's appeal to a 'new Bretton Woods'

Tony Blair’s political instinct typically is to associate himself only with the future. As such, his explicit appeal to ‘the past’ in his references to New Labour’s desire to establish a “new Bretton Woods” is sufficient in itself to arouse some degree of analytical curiosity (see Blair 1998a). The fact that this appeal was made specifically in relation to Bretton Woods is even more interesting. The resonant image of the international economic context established by the original Bretton Woods agreements invokes a style and content of policy-making which Tony Blair typically dismisses as neither economically nor politically consistent with his preferred vision of the future (see Blair 2000c, 2001b)