5,323 research outputs found
A Plausibility Semantics for Abstract Argumentation Frameworks
We propose and investigate a simple ranking-measure-based extension semantics
for abstract argumentation frameworks based on their generic instantiation by
default knowledge bases and the ranking construction semantics for default
reasoning. In this context, we consider the path from structured to logical to
shallow semantic instantiations. The resulting well-justified JZ-extension
semantics diverges from more traditional approaches.Comment: Proceedings of the 15th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic
Reasoning (NMR 2014). This is an improved and extended version of the
author's ECSQARU 2013 pape
Logic-based Technologies for Intelligent Systems: State of the Art and Perspectives
Together with the disruptive development of modern sub-symbolic approaches to artificial intelligence (AI), symbolic approaches to classical AI are re-gaining momentum, as more and more researchers exploit their potential to make AI more comprehensible, explainable, and therefore trustworthy. Since logic-based approaches lay at the core of symbolic AI, summarizing their state of the art is of paramount importance now more than ever, in order to identify trends, benefits, key features, gaps, and limitations of the techniques proposed so far, as well as to identify promising research perspectives. Along this line, this paper provides an overview of logic-based approaches and technologies by sketching their evolution and pointing out their main application areas. Future perspectives for exploitation of logic-based technologies are discussed as well, in order to identify those research fields that deserve more attention, considering the areas that already exploit logic-based approaches as well as those that are more likely to adopt logic-based approaches in the future
Logic-based Technologies for Multi-agent Systems: A Systematic Literature Review
Precisely when the success of artificial intelligence (AI) sub-symbolic techniques makes them be identified with the whole AI by many non-computerscientists and non-technical media, symbolic approaches are getting more and more attention as those that could make AI amenable to human understanding. Given the recurring cycles in the AI history, we expect that a revamp of technologies often tagged as “classical AI” – in particular, logic-based ones will take place in the next few years.
On the other hand, agents and multi-agent systems (MAS) have been at the core of the design of intelligent systems since their very beginning, and their long-term connection with logic-based technologies, which characterised their early days, might open new ways to engineer explainable intelligent systems. This is why understanding the current status of logic-based technologies for MAS is nowadays of paramount importance.
Accordingly, this paper aims at providing a comprehensive view of those technologies by making them the subject of a systematic literature review (SLR). The resulting technologies are discussed and evaluated from two different perspectives: the MAS and the logic-based ones
Creationism and evolution
In Tower of Babel, Robert Pennock wrote that
“defenders of evolution would help their case
immeasurably if they would reassure their
audience that morality, purpose, and meaning are
not lost by accepting the truth of evolution.” We
first consider the thesis that the creationists’
movement exploits moral concerns to spread its
ideas against the theory of evolution. We analyze
their arguments and possible reasons why they are
easily accepted. Creationists usually employ two
contradictive strategies to expose the purported
moral degradation that comes with accepting the
theory of evolution. On the one hand they claim
that evolutionary theory is immoral. On the other
hand creationists think of evolutionary theory as
amoral. Both objections come naturally in a
monotheistic view. But we can find similar
conclusions about the supposed moral aspects of
evolution in non-religiously inspired discussions.
Meanwhile, the creationism-evolution debate
mainly focuses — understandably — on what
constitutes good science. We consider the need for
moral reassurance and analyze reassuring
arguments from philosophers. Philosophers may
stress that science does not prescribe and is
therefore not immoral, but this reaction opens the
door for the objection of amorality that evolution
— as a naturalistic world view at least —
supposedly endorses. We consider that the topic of
morality and its relation to the acceptance of
evolution may need more empirical research
On Cognitive Preferences and the Plausibility of Rule-based Models
It is conventional wisdom in machine learning and data mining that logical
models such as rule sets are more interpretable than other models, and that
among such rule-based models, simpler models are more interpretable than more
complex ones. In this position paper, we question this latter assumption by
focusing on one particular aspect of interpretability, namely the plausibility
of models. Roughly speaking, we equate the plausibility of a model with the
likeliness that a user accepts it as an explanation for a prediction. In
particular, we argue that, all other things being equal, longer explanations
may be more convincing than shorter ones, and that the predominant bias for
shorter models, which is typically necessary for learning powerful
discriminative models, may not be suitable when it comes to user acceptance of
the learned models. To that end, we first recapitulate evidence for and against
this postulate, and then report the results of an evaluation in a
crowd-sourcing study based on about 3.000 judgments. The results do not reveal
a strong preference for simple rules, whereas we can observe a weak preference
for longer rules in some domains. We then relate these results to well-known
cognitive biases such as the conjunction fallacy, the representative heuristic,
or the recogition heuristic, and investigate their relation to rule length and
plausibility.Comment: V4: Another rewrite of section on interpretability to clarify focus
on plausibility and relation to interpretability, comprehensibility, and
justifiabilit
Current and Future Challenges in Knowledge Representation and Reasoning
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning is a central, longstanding, and active
area of Artificial Intelligence. Over the years it has evolved significantly;
more recently it has been challenged and complemented by research in areas such
as machine learning and reasoning under uncertainty. In July 2022 a Dagstuhl
Perspectives workshop was held on Knowledge Representation and Reasoning. The
goal of the workshop was to describe the state of the art in the field,
including its relation with other areas, its shortcomings and strengths,
together with recommendations for future progress. We developed this manifesto
based on the presentations, panels, working groups, and discussions that took
place at the Dagstuhl Workshop. It is a declaration of our views on Knowledge
Representation: its origins, goals, milestones, and current foci; its relation
to other disciplines, especially to Artificial Intelligence; and on its
challenges, along with key priorities for the next decade
A Description Logic Framework for Commonsense Conceptual Combination Integrating Typicality, Probabilities and Cognitive Heuristics
We propose a nonmonotonic Description Logic of typicality able to account for
the phenomenon of concept combination of prototypical concepts. The proposed
logic relies on the logic of typicality ALC TR, whose semantics is based on the
notion of rational closure, as well as on the distributed semantics of
probabilistic Description Logics, and is equipped with a cognitive heuristic
used by humans for concept composition. We first extend the logic of typicality
ALC TR by typicality inclusions whose intuitive meaning is that "there is
probability p about the fact that typical Cs are Ds". As in the distributed
semantics, we define different scenarios containing only some typicality
inclusions, each one having a suitable probability. We then focus on those
scenarios whose probabilities belong to a given and fixed range, and we exploit
such scenarios in order to ascribe typical properties to a concept C obtained
as the combination of two prototypical concepts. We also show that reasoning in
the proposed Description Logic is EXPTIME-complete as for the underlying ALC.Comment: 39 pages, 3 figure
Quantify resilience enhancement of UTS through exploiting connect community and internet of everything emerging technologies
This work aims at investigating and quantifying the Urban Transport System
(UTS) resilience enhancement enabled by the adoption of emerging technology
such as Internet of Everything (IoE) and the new trend of the Connected
Community (CC). A conceptual extension of Functional Resonance Analysis Method
(FRAM) and its formalization have been proposed and used to model UTS
complexity. The scope is to identify the system functions and their
interdependencies with a particular focus on those that have a relation and
impact on people and communities. Network analysis techniques have been applied
to the FRAM model to identify and estimate the most critical community-related
functions. The notion of Variability Rate (VR) has been defined as the amount
of output variability generated by an upstream function that can be
tolerated/absorbed by a downstream function, without significantly increasing
of its subsequent output variability. A fuzzy based quantification of the VR on
expert judgment has been developed when quantitative data are not available.
Our approach has been applied to a critical scenario (water bomb/flash
flooding) considering two cases: when UTS has CC and IoE implemented or not.
The results show a remarkable VR enhancement if CC and IoE are deploye
Argumentation and data-oriented belief revision: On the two-sided nature of epistemic change
This paper aims to bring together two separate threads in the formal study of epistemic change: belief revision and argumentation theories. Belief revision describes the way in which an agent is supposed to change his own mind, while argumentation deals with persuasive strategies employed to change the mind of other agents. Belief change and argumentation are two sides (cognitive and social) of the same epistemic coin. Argumentation theories are therefore incomplete, if they cannot be grounded in belief revision models - and vice versa. Nonetheless, so far the formal treatment of belief revision widely neglected any systematic comparison with argumentation theories. Such lack of integration poses severe limitations to our understanding of epistemic change, and more comprehensive models should instead be devised. After a short critical review of the literature (cf. 1), we outline an alternative model of belief revision whose main claim is the distinction between data and beliefs (cf. 2), and we discuss in detail its expressivity with respect to argumentation (cf. 3): finally, we summarize our conclusions and future works on the interface between belief revision and argumentation (cf. 4)
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