The shape of incomplete preferences

Incomplete preferences provide the epistemic foundation for models of imprecise subjective probabilities and utilities that are used in robust Bayesian analysis and in theories of bounded rationality. This paper presents a simple axiomatization of incomplete preferences and characterizes the shape of their representing sets of probabilities and utilities. Deletion of the completeness assumption from the axiom system of Anscombe and Aumann yields preferences represented by a convex set of state-dependent expected utilities, of which at least one must be a probability/utility pair. A strengthening of the state-independence axiom is needed to obtain a representation purely in terms of a set of probability/utility pairs.Comment: Published at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/009053606000000740 in the Annals of Statistics (http://www.imstat.org/aos/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

Reasons and Means to Model Preferences as Incomplete

Literature involving preferences of artificial agents or human beings often assume their preferences can be represented using a complete transitive binary relation. Much has been written however on different models of preferences. We review some of the reasons that have been put forward to justify more complex modeling, and review some of the techniques that have been proposed to obtain models of such preferences

Dynamic Non-Bayesian Decision Making

The model of a non-Bayesian agent who faces a repeated game with incomplete information against Nature is an appropriate tool for modeling general agent-environment interactions. In such a model the environment state (controlled by Nature) may change arbitrarily, and the feedback/reward function is initially unknown. The agent is not Bayesian, that is he does not form a prior probability neither on the state selection strategy of Nature, nor on his reward function. A policy for the agent is a function which assigns an action to every history of observations and actions. Two basic feedback structures are considered. In one of them -- the perfect monitoring case -- the agent is able to observe the previous environment state as part of his feedback, while in the other -- the imperfect monitoring case -- all that is available to the agent is the reward obtained. Both of these settings refer to partially observable processes, where the current environment state is unknown. Our main result refers to the competitive ratio criterion in the perfect monitoring case. We prove the existence of an efficient stochastic policy that ensures that the competitive ratio is obtained at almost all stages with an arbitrarily high probability, where efficiency is measured in terms of rate of convergence. It is further shown that such an optimal policy does not exist in the imperfect monitoring case. Moreover, it is proved that in the perfect monitoring case there does not exist a deterministic policy that satisfies our long run optimality criterion. In addition, we discuss the maxmin criterion and prove that a deterministic efficient optimal strategy does exist in the imperfect monitoring case under this criterion. Finally we show that our approach to long-run optimality can be viewed as qualitative, which distinguishes it from previous work in this area.Comment: See http://www.jair.org/ for any accompanying file

Dominance Measuring Method Performance under Incomplete Information about Weights.

In multi-attribute utility theory, it is often not easy to elicit precise values for the scaling weights representing the relative importance of criteria. A very widespread approach is to gather incomplete information. A recent approach for dealing with such situations is to use information about each alternative?s intensity of dominance, known as dominance measuring methods. Different dominancemeasuring methods have been proposed, and simulation studies have been carried out to compare these methods with each other and with other approaches but only when ordinal information about weights is available. In this paper, we useMonte Carlo simulation techniques to analyse the performance of and adapt such methods to deal with weight intervals, weights fitting independent normal probability distributions orweights represented by fuzzy numbers.Moreover, dominance measuringmethod performance is also compared with a widely used methodology dealing with incomplete information on weights, the stochastic multicriteria acceptability analysis (SMAA). SMAA is based on exploring the weight space to describe the evaluations that would make each alternative the preferred one