Algorithmic iteration for computational intelligence

Machine awareness is a disputed research topic, in some circles considered a crucial step in realising Artificial General Intelligence. Understanding what that is, under which conditions such feature could arise and how it can be controlled is still a matter of speculation. A more concrete object of theoretical analysis is algorithmic iteration for computational intelligence, intended as the theoretical and practical ability of algorithms to design other algorithms for actions aimed at solving well-specified tasks. We know this ability is already shown by current AIs, and understanding its limits is an essential step in qualifying claims about machine awareness and Super-AI. We propose a formal translation of algorithmic iteration in a fragment of modal logic, formulate principles of transparency and faithfulness across human and machine intelligence, and consider the relevance to theoretical research on (Super)-AI as well as the practical import of our results

Algorithmic iteration for computational intelligence

Machine awareness is a disputed research topic, in some circles considered a crucial step in realising Artificial General Intelligence. Understanding what that is, under which conditions such feature could arise and how it can be controlled is still a matter of speculation. A more concrete object of theoretical analysis is algorithmic iteration for computational intelligence, intended as the theoretical and practical ability of algorithms to design other algorithms for actions aimed at solving well-specified tasks. We know this ability is already shown by current AIs, and understanding its limits is an essential step in qualifying claims about machine awareness and Super-AI. We propose a formal translation of algorithmic iteration in a fragment of modal logic, formulate principles of transparency and faithfulness across human and machine intelligence, and consider the relevance to theoretical research on (Super)-AI as well as the practical import of our results

Embedding Non-Ground Logic Programs into Autoepistemic Logic for Knowledge Base Combination

In the context of the Semantic Web, several approaches to the combination of ontologies, given in terms of theories of classical first-order logic and rule bases, have been proposed. They either cast rules into classical logic or limit the interaction between rules and ontologies. Autoepistemic logic (AEL) is an attractive formalism which allows to overcome these limitations, by serving as a uniform host language to embed ontologies and nonmonotonic logic programs into it. For the latter, so far only the propositional setting has been considered. In this paper, we present three embeddings of normal and three embeddings of disjunctive non-ground logic programs under the stable model semantics into first-order AEL. While the embeddings all correspond with respect to objective ground atoms, differences arise when considering non-atomic formulas and combinations with first-order theories. We compare the embeddings with respect to stable expansions and autoepistemic consequences, considering the embeddings by themselves, as well as combinations with classical theories. Our results reveal differences and correspondences of the embeddings and provide useful guidance in the choice of a particular embedding for knowledge combination.Comment: 52 pages, submitte

Information sharing among ideal agents

Multi-agent systems operating in complex domains crucially require agents to interact with each other. An important result of this interaction is that some of the private knowledge of the agents is being shared in the group of agents. This thesis investigates the theme of knowledge sharing from a theoretical point of view by means of the formal tools provided by modal logic. More specifically this thesis addresses the following three points. First, the case of hypercube systems, a special class of interpreted systems as defined by Halpern and colleagues, is analysed in full detail. It is here proven that the logic S5WDn constitutes a sound and complete axiomatisation for hypercube systems. This logic, an extension of the modal system S5n commonly used to represent knowledge of a multi-agent system, regulates how knowledge is being shared among agents modelled by hypercube systems. The logic S5WDn is proven to be decidable. Hypercube systems are proven to be synchronous agents with perfect recall that communicate only by broadcasting, in separate work jointly with Ron van der Meyden not fully reported in this thesis. Second, it is argued that a full spectrum of degrees of knowledge sharing can be present in any multi-agent system, with no sharing and full sharing at the extremes. This theme is investigated axiomatically and a range of logics representing a particular class of knowledge sharing between two agents is presented. All the logics but two in this spectrum are proven complete by standard canonicity proofs. We conjecture that these two remaining logics are not canonical and it is an open problem whether or not they are complete. Third, following a influential position paper by Halpern and Moses, the idea of refining and checking of knowledge structures in multi-agent systems is investigated. It is shown that, Kripke models, the standard semantic tools for this analysis are not adequate and an alternative notion, Kripke trees, is put forward. An algorithm for refining and checking Kripke trees is presented and its major properties investigated. The algorithm succeeds in solving the famous muddy-children puzzle, in which agents communicate and reason about each other's knowledge. The thesis concludes by discussing the extent to which combining logics, a promising new area in pure logic, can provide a significant boost in research for epistemic and other theories for multi-agent systems

Empiricism and Philosophy

Though Quine's argument against the analytic-synthetic distinction is widely disputed, one of the major effects of his argument has been to popularise the belief that there is no sharp distinction between science and philosophy. This thesis begins by distinguishing reductive from holistic empiricism, showing why reductive empiricism is false, refuting the major objections to holistic empiricism and stating the limits on human knowledge it implies. Quine's arguments (and some arguments that have been mistakenly attributed to him) from holism against the analytic-synthetic are considered, and while many of them are found wanting one good argument is presented. Holism does not, however, imply that there is no sharp distinction between science and philosophy, and indeed implies that the distinction between scientific and philosophical disputes is perfectly sharp. The grounds upon which philosophical disputes may be resolved are then sought for and deliniated

Empiricism and Philosophy

Though Quine's argument against the analytic-synthetic distinction is widely disputed, one of the major effects of his argument has been to popularise the belief that there is no sharp distinction between science and philosophy. This thesis begins by distinguishing reductive from holistic empiricism, showing why reductive empiricism is false, refuting the major objections to holistic empiricism and stating the limits on human knowledge it implies. Quine's arguments (and some arguments that have been mistakenly attributed to him) from holism against the analytic-synthetic are considered, and while many of them are found wanting one good argument is presented. Holism does not, however, imply that there is no sharp distinction between science and philosophy, and indeed implies that the distinction between scientific and philosophical disputes is perfectly sharp. The grounds upon which philosophical disputes may be resolved are then sought for and deliniated