Systematizing Decentralization and Privacy: Lessons from 15 Years of Research and Deployments

Decentralized systems are a subset of distributed systems where multiple authorities control different components and no authority is fully trusted by all. This implies that any component in a decentralized system is potentially adversarial. We revise fifteen years of research on decentralization and privacy, and provide an overview of key systems, as well as key insights for designers of future systems. We show that decentralized designs can enhance privacy, integrity, and availability but also require careful trade-offs in terms of system complexity, properties provided, and degree of decentralization. These trade-offs need to be understood and navigated by designers. We argue that a combination of insights from cryptography, distributed systems, and mechanism design, aligned with the development of adequate incentives, are necessary to build scalable and successful privacy-preserving decentralized systems

Community Based Targeting for Social Safety Nets

This paper interprets case studies and theory on community involvement in beneficiary selection and benefit delivery for social safety nets. Several considerations should be carefully balanced in assessing the advantages of using community groups as targeting agents. First, benefits from utilizing local information and social capital may be eroded by costly rent-seeking. Second, the potential improvement in targeting criteria from incorporating local notions of deprivation must be tempered by the possibility of program capture by local elites, and by the possibility that local preferences are not pro-poor. Third, performance may be undermined by unforeseen strategic targeting by local communities in response to national funding and evaluation criteria, or by declines in political support.

Disaster Risk Management by Communities and Local Governments

This study refers to disaster risk management at the local level. The topic was selected by the members of the Natural Disasters Network of the Regional Policy Dialogue, and was presented during its 3rd Meeting, on March 6 and 7, 2003. The goal of this document is to achieve a better knowledge of the best practices and benefits that disaster risk management represents for Latin America and the Caribbean. Included are comparative case studies of the Philippines, Colombia, Guatemala and Switzerland. Also discussed are strengths and weaknesses of local organizations in decentralized systems and financial services for disaster risk management.Disasters, Financial Risk, Decentralization, Civil Society, Environment, disaster risk management

Centralized vs. decentralized computing : organizational considerations and management options

The long-standing debate over whether to centralize or decentralize computing is examined in terms of the fundamental organizational and economic factors at stake. The traditional debate is examined and found to focus predominantly on issues of efficiency vs. effectiveness, with solutions based on a rationalistic strategy of optimizing in this tradeoff. A more behavioralistic assessment suggests that the driving issues in the debate are the politics of organization and resources, centering on the issue of control. The economics of computing deployment decisions is presented as an important issue, but one that often serves as a field of argument that is based on more political concerns. The current situation facing managers of computing, given the advent of small and comparatively inexpensive computers, is examined in detail, and a set of management options for dealing with this persistent issue is presented

A semi-decentralized control strategy for urban traffic

We present in this article a semi-decentralized approach for urban traffic control, based on the TUC (Traffic responsive Urban Control) strategy. We assume that the control is centralized as in the TUC strategy, but we introduce a contention time window inside the cycle time, where antagonistic stages alternate a priority rule. The priority rule is set by applying green colours for given stages and yellow colours for antagonistic ones, in such a way that the stages with green colour have priority over the ones with yellow colour. The idea of introducing this time window is to reduce the red time inside the cycle, and by that, increase the capacity of the network junctions. In practice, the priority rule could be applied using vehicle-to-vehicle (v2v) or vehicle-to-infrastructure (v2i) communications. The vehicles having the priority pass almost normally through the junction, while the others reduce their speed and yield the way. We propose a model for the dynamics and the control of such a system. The model is still formulated as a linear quadratic problem, for which the feedback control law is calculated off-line, and applied in real time. The model is implemented using the Simulation of Urban MObility (SUMO) tool in a small regular (American-like) network configuration. The results are presented and compared to the classical TUC strategy.Comment: 16 page

When Does decentralization deliver? The Dilemma of Design

Decentralization since early 1990s has become one of the buzzwords of the development paradigms. Among all ingredients of decentralization, the fiscal component of it has a special significance. Not surprisingly the literature unanimously recognizes that it is the regulation of intergovernmental relationships in the fiscal arena that can strike the right balance among different objectives of each level and resolve tensions between them. Thus, the fiscal decentralization is in vogue. The trend that began in 90s has only gained momentum at the turn of the century. Yet the outcome of adopting similar policies has not been uniform across the globe. Some have succeeded, some are stumbling and some others have failed. In fact, the success of decentralization depends on its design. The paper looks into various questions associated with the dilemma of designing decentralization instruments for the success of fiscal decentralization These include the question of designing the right mix of policies, the questions of sequencing and synchronization, the question of pace and that of balancing the contrasting forces of centralization and decentralization. The paper offers the insight to the policymakersthat while designing fiscal decentralization they should not try to replicate any ‘idealtype’ solution. Though the ideal types can be powerful analytical tools, yet they do not lead to solutions for specific situations Real world fiscal arrangements rarely follow the idealized model; they are loaded with historical developments and political ad hocsolutions. It is simply not realistic to start from tabula rasa. The paper emphasizes that there is no “one size fits all” type answer to decentralization question. All systems will have to work out their own style of going about decentralization and restructuring of intergovernmental relations depending on the context and conditions peculiar to their own situation. The paper also argues that any attempt towards fiscal decentralization must be firmly grounded in the basic principles of fiscal federalism, irrespective of the fact whether the country in question is an officially declared federal state or not. Thus while implementing decentralization policies, the need isto ‘bring the federal back in’.Decentralization; Centralization; Design; Sequence; Instuments; Federalism

Governance in Southeast Asia: Issues and Options

This paper attempts to analyze governance systems in Southeast Asia and proposes some policy suggestions that can improve governance practices in the region. It also discusses the links between governance and official development assistance (ODA) and the role of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation. To put the discussion on governance systems in a proper context, the paper discusses the governance and growth nexus in Southeast Asia; describes the operating governance systems in Southeast Asia; analyzes economic governance, more specifically in the areas of economic management and growth, revenue generation, social spending, access to services, cost of doing business, and corporate governance; and examines political governance, focusing on the rule of law and judicial independence, conflict management, and voice participation.governance, development program, corruption

Social funds and decentralisation: optimal institutional design.

Most of the 60+ developing countries that have established social funds (SFs) are decentralising their governments as well. But the question of how to tailor SFs - originally a highly centralised model - for a decentralising context has received relatively little attention in the literature. We first examine evidence on the ability of SFs to adapt to a decentralised context. We then lay out the implications of decentralisation for SF institutional design step-by-step through the project cycle. The topic is doubly important because social funds can increase their effectiveness, and the sustainability of their investments, by reorganising internal processes to take advantage of the political and civic institutions that decentralisation creates. Local government has an informational advantage in local needs and characteristics (time and place), whereas SFs have access to better technology and knowledge of sectoral best practice. The key is to create institutional incentives that best combine these relative advantages.