42,781 research outputs found

    La crisis de la deuda soberana o pública: el caso de España

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    The sovereign debt crisis is often evoked as one of the main causes of the economic difficulties faced by net importing countries and as the rationale behind the austerity measures imposed on their residents. Nothing seems more evident than a country whose global, commercial and financial, imports exceed its global exports has to finance its deficit through a foreign loan. This inevitably leads to the formation of an external debt. Yet, things are less straightforward than they might appear, and a rigorous analysis is called for to verify whether any country’ sovereign debt is ever justifiable. The paper shows that it is because net global imports are paid twice that net importing countries run up a sovereign debt. The case of Spain is symptomatic and provides statistical confirmation of the pathological increase in the country’s external debtLa crisis de la deuda soberana suele considerarse como una de las principales causas de las dificultades económicas a las que se enfrentan los países importadores netos. Constituye asimismo la razón que justifica las medidas de austeridad impuestas a sus residentes. Nada parece más evidente que un país, cuyas importaciones globales, comerciales y financieras, exceden sus exportaciones globales, tenga que financiar su déficit mediante un préstamo extranjero. Lo que conduce inevitablemente a la formación de la deuda exterior. Sin embargo, la realidad es más compleja de lo que parece. De ahí que sea necesario un análisis riguroso que aclare si la deuda soberana de cada país está justificada. Este artículo muestra que no lo está, desde el momento en que los países importadores netos se encuentran con una deuda soberana debido al doble coste de las importaciones globales netas. El caso espa˜nol es sintomático y aporta confirmación estadística del aumento patológico de la deuda exterior del paí

    Renegotiating the Odious Debt Doctrine

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    Following the United States\u27 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq,\u27 the US government argued that the successor government in Iraq was not responsible for Iraq\u27s Saddam-era debt under the purported doctrine of odious-regime debt. This purported doctrine apparently excused--by operation of law--all successor regimes from repaying debts that were incurred by oppressive predecessor regimes. Here, Cheng presents three-part response regarding the purported rule that oppressive debts of a predecessor government do not bind its successor

    Auxiliary Companies of the Horticultural Sector as a Competitiveness Element: The Case of Almeria (Spain)

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    The horticultural model of Almeria (Spain) based on the operation of greenhouses is an international reference and has been considered as an economic miracle. Alongside this agricultural development has been the deployment of the diverse productive activity of auxiliary companies. The objective of this article is to understand how these companies operate and analyze their factors of competitiveness, competing needs, and future competitive improvements, taking as reference four of the most important subsectors (machinery, greenhouse infrastructure, plastics, and seeds). The Delphi method was used and through a panel of experts the conditioning factors of each of the variables to be analyzed (factors, needs, and competitiveness improvements) was chosen. Of the 120 companies that were sent questionnaires, 72 participated. The sectors that make up the auxiliary companies are heterogeneous and therefore the results obtained have differed among them. The synergies between the greenhouse crops and the auxiliary companies are an example of diversification of productive activity that can be extrapolated to other production areas worldwide. The future of the auxiliary companies is linked to that of the intensive agriculture and the key variables must be underscored by competitiveness and sustainability

    A Decade of Debt

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    This book presents evidence that public debts in the advanced economies have surged in recent years to levels not recorded since the end of World War II, surpassing the heights reached during the First World War and the Great Depression. At the same time, private debt levels, particularly those of financial institutions and households, are in uncharted territory and are (in varying degrees) a contingent liability of the public sector in many countries. Historically, high leverage episodes have been associated with slower economic growth and a higher incidence of default or, more generally, restructuring of public and private debts. A more subtle form of debt restructuring in the guise of “financial repression” (which had its heyday during the tightly regulated Bretton Woods system) also importantly facilitated sharper and more rapid debt reduction than would have otherwise been the case from the late 1940s to the 1970s. It is conjectured here that the pressing needs of governments to reduce debt rollover risks and curb rising interest expenditures in light of the substantial debt overhang (combined with the widespread “official aversion” to explicit restructuring) are leading to a revival of financial repression—including more directed lending to government by captive domestic audiences (such as pension funds), explicit or implicit caps on interest rates, and tighter regulation on cross-border capital movements.

    An agenda for the European Council: feasible steps to bring the eurozone back from the precipice. CEPS Policy Brief No. 274, 20 June 2012

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    In the run-up to the emergency European Council meeting at the end of June, Stefano Micossi outlines in this Policy Brief the main elements of a realistic and yet incisive policy package, capable of reassuring financial markets and a bewildered public opinion. It is more than Germany has been willing to accept so far but much less than many of the demands it will confront at the Council meeting. More importantly, it only requires a minimum of additional disbursements by the member states, while strengthening risk-sharing for sovereign and banking risks

    Cotton manufacturers as bankers: the textile trade and credit in spain, 1840-1913

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    [cat] La historiografia ha assenyalat que en el segle XIX el crèdit que els fabricants cotoners catalans oferien als seus clients era de caràcter informal i, per tant, impossible de ser transferit al sistema bancari. Això hauria tingut un efecte negatiu en la rendibilitat de les empreses cotoneres. A partir de l’anàlisi de diversos arxius empresarials, així com de fonts judicials i notarials, aquest treball confirma aquesta descripció dels fets però proposa una interpretació més optimista. Els fabricants feien de banquers dels seus clients perquè eren els millor situats per a exercir aquesta funció. Havien construït una bona estructura d’informació, gestionaven eficientment el risc creditici i obtenien beneficis d’aquesta activitat.[eng] Historians claim that in the nineteenth century Catalan cotton manufacturers were giving informal credit to their clients, and were therefore unable to transfer this credit to the banking system. Such circumstances would have had a detrimental effect on the profitability of the cotton firms. Based on an analysis of the archives of several firms, as well as judicial and notary sources, we can confirm this state of affairs, but present a more optimistic interpretation of the system. Manufacturers were, in fact, acting as their customers’ bankers because they were in the best position to perform this function. They built up a good information structure, managed the credit risk efficiently and earned money from this activity
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